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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is an appeal from the District Court involving a Domestic Relations Case 
and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-2a-3(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellee disagrees with Appellant's characterization of the nature of the issues 
presented for review. More particularly, Appellant erroneously designates factual 
issues as legal issues and thereby purports to apply an incorrect standard of review. 
Appellee will hereinafter recite the issues which Appellant presents for review noting 
Appellee's position as to the nature of the issue and the appropriate standard of 
review. 
1. Did Judge Dever err in assessing Defendant/Appellee's income, and 
consequently err in the amount of child support and alimony that he 
awarded? 
This issue involves mixed questions of fact and law. Conclusions of Law are 
reviewed for correctness. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991); 
Pendeleton v. Pendeleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah App. 1996); Smith v. Smith, 
793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990) (hereinafter "Legal Review Standard"). 
Findings of Fact are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous standard of review such 
that due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses." Howell v. Howell supra. The Appellate Court defers to 
the trial court's factual findings unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous. 
Pendeleton v. Pendeleton, supra. The Appellant must demonstrate that the trial 
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court's Findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence thus making them clearly erroneous. Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P. 2d 429, 
432 (Utah App. 1994). Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining 
alimony and property distribution in divorce cases and will be upheld on appeal unless 
a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Howell v. Howell, supra; 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988) (hereinafter "Factual 
Review Standard"). 
2. Did Judge Dever err factually and legally is setting the alimony 
award? 
Appellant agrees that this issue involves mixed questions of fact and law and 
subject to the standard of review stated with respect to the first issue, supra. 
3. Did Judge Dever err in failing to divide the C&G Retirement 
Account? 
Awarding Appellee the C&G Retirement Account and offsetting Appellant's 
share of said Retirement Account with other assets is the preferred method of dividing 
retirement accounts inasmuch as it allows the parties to make as much of a clean break 
from each other as is reasonably possible. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 845 
(Utah App. 1992); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988), cert. 
denied. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
4. Did Judge Dever err in failing to order David Griffith to pay Janna 
Griffith's attorneys' fees? 
Appellees submit that this is an issue of fact and subject to the discretion of the 
trial court. Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992); Rasband v. Rasband, 752 
2 
P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988); Finlandson v. Finlandson, 874 P.2d 843, 850 (Utah 
App. 1994). As an issue of fact, it is subject to the Factual Review Standard 
described under the first issue, supra. An award of attorneys' fees will be upheld if 
supported by adequate Findings. Finlandson v. Finlandson, supra. 
5. Should Judge Dever have vacated the Order signed by Judge Rokich 
after Judge Rokich recused himself from the case? 
Appellee disputes that this issue involves only questions of law and asserts that 
it involves mixed questions of law and fact and subject to the standard of review stated 
with respect to the first issue, supra. 
6. Did Judge Dever err in awarding attorneys' fees as a result of 
Ms, Griffith's Motion to Disqualify Defense Counsel, Robert 
McDonald? 
Appellee disputes that this issue involves only questions of law and asserts that 
it involves mixed questions of law and fact and subject to the standard of review stated 
with respect to the first issue, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations 
whose interpretation would be determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
In addressing the issues raised by this Appeal, Plaintiff/Appellant, Janna 
Griffith, will be referred to as "Janna" and Defendant/Appellee, David Gary Griffith, 
will be referred to as "David". 
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The Court will note that the trial court clerk prepared the record by numbering 
files and transcripts starting with the last page with the numbers increasing to the first 
page. This numbering makes references to the Record difficult. In order to avoid the 
difficulty, when citing multiple pages of the record, Appellee will cite the first page to 
be reviewed (the higher number) followed by a citation to the last page to be reviewed 
(the lower number). 
A. Nature of Case 
This is a divorce action commenced by Janna on September 14, 1994 (R. 1-11). 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Trial of this matter commenced before the Honorable John A. Rokich, District 
Judge, on March 14, 1996. However, prior to the time either party called a witness, 
or otherwise submitted evidence, Judge Rokich stated that after reading David's Trial 
Memorandum he discovered that Paul Griffith, David's brother, was to be called as a 
witness at trial. Judge Rokich stated that he and Paul Griffith suffered from a similar 
ailment and were being treated by the same physician. Judge Rokich stated that the 
physician had suggested Paul Griffith telephone Judge Rokich concerning the affects of 
medication which Judge Rokich was considering. The telephone conversation took 
place approximately a week before the trial and lasted approximately ten (10) minutes 
(R. 1953-1951). At the time of the conversation, Judge Rokich was unaware that Paul 
Griffith was David's brother. Judge Rokich explained the nature and circumstances of 
the telephone conversation, and responded to several questions by Janna's attorney 
concerning the substance conversation. Ibid. 
4 
After questioning Judge Rokich concerning the telephone conversation, neither 
Janna nor her attorney voiced any objection to Judge Rokich presiding over the trial. 
Shortly thereafter, Janna called witnesses, offered exhibits and the trial proceeded for 
the entire day (R. 1936, 1953-1763) 
At the commencement of the second day of trial on March 15, 1997, Janna's 
attorney, for the first time, voiced objection to Judge Rokich presiding over the trial 
claiming, for the first time, "there has been an attempt to unduly influence this court" 
(R. 1762). Judge Rokich determined that Janna's attorney's objection was a "serious 
allegation, although totally unfounded in this case, nevertheless casts a shadow of 
impropriety over the proceedings. When Mr. Allred suggested that the court could be 
influenced, it left the court with no alternative but for the court to recuse itself. If the 
court was to do otherwise, the parties would question whether they would receive a 
fair trial and that justice could be done" (R. 1014). 
The trial court further concluded that Janna's attorney acted in bad faith in an 
attempt to "manipulate the court which tainted the proceedings and caused the court to 
recuse itself" (R. 1009). Judge Rokich thereafter entered judgment in favor of David 
and against Janna and Mr. Allred, in the sum of Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty 
Two Dollars ($4,542) (R. 1175) to compensate David for costs and attorneys' fees 
incurred during the first day of trial and duplicative time necessary to prepare for a 
second trial in the future (R. 1181-1177). 
The recusal was not based on any bias or prejudice for or against either party 
(R. 1188-1187). At no time prior to the recusal, did Janna or her attorney file an 
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affidavit pursuant to Rule 63, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or otherwise claim any 
bias or prejudice for or against either party. Judge Rokich expressly confirmed the 
absence of any bias or prejudice for or against either party (R. 1188). 
On January 5, 1996, Janna's attorney, J. Franklin Allred, filed a Motion to 
Disqualify David's attorney, Robert McDonald, on the grounds that Mr. McDonald 
had represented Mr. Allred in his divorce fifteen (15) years earlier (R. 634). David 
filed a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions against Janna and Mr. Allred by reason of the 
frivolous nature of Janna's Motion to Disqualify (R. 743). An Order denying Janna's 
Motion to Disqualify Mr. McDonald was executed by the Court on March 12, 1996 
(R. 887-885). The Court reserved ruling on David's Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to 
Rule 11. Ibid. At the time of the entry of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce, Judge 
Dever1 granted David's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions and entered Judgment against 
Janna and Mr. Allred in the sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred Eighty Eight 
Dollars and Fifty Cents ($2,588.50) (R. 1738). 
On May 24, 1996, David filed a Motion to Bifurcate seeking to terminate the 
marriage reserving for later trial all of the other issues raised by the pleadings in the 
action. On May 28, 1996, The Honorable Lee A. Dever granted David's Motion to 
Bifurcate. On that date, Janna took the stand and testified as to jurisdiction and 
grounds. A Decree of Divorce dissolving the marriage and reserving all other issues 
raised by the pleadings was entered by Judge Dever on June 3, 1996 (R. 1231). Trial 
1
 The pre-trial motion to disqualify was heard and 
determined by Judge Dever (R. 887). 
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of the remaining issues raised by the pleadings in the Action was set for August 7, 
1996 (R. 1174). 
Trial of the unresolved issues was held before the Honorable Lee A. Dever on 
August 7, 8 and 13, 1996. On February 10, 1997, Judge Dever entered a 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce resolving all remaining issues raised by the pleadings 
in the Action (R. 1747). On the same date Judge Dever entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 1731). The Decree ordered David to pay Janna child support 
in the sum of One Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Six Dollars ($1,376) (R. 1741) 
and alimony in the sum of Four Hundred Dollars ($400) (R. 1740). 
On March 3, 1997, Janna and her attorney, J. Franklin All red, filed a Notice of 
Appeal (R. 1751). 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. Janna and David, were married on November 12, 1976. There were 
four (4) children born as issue of the marriage: Jennifer, born October 25, 1978; 
Brianne, born April 14, 1981; Chad, born September 5, 1983; and, Brett, born June 
5, 1986 (R. 1730, 2177, 2170). 
2. During the course of the marriage, irreconcilable differences arose 
between the parties. By reason of these differences, Janna and David began living 
separate and apart in approximately April or May, 1994 (R. 2081-2080). 
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3. At some point prior to 1983, David's parents, Gary and Naomi Griffith, 
gifted the parties a parcel of land for the purpose of constructing a residence.2 The 
gift was formalized by the execution and delivery of a Warranty Deed from David's 
parents (Gary and Naomi Griffith) to David and Janna dated May 16, 1985 
(Exhibit 15). An additional tract of land contiguous to the original lot was conveyed 
by Warranty Deed on March 3, 1992 (Exhibit 16). 
4. Construction of the home proceeded for a period of two (2) years 
(R. 2070). David performed all of the construction activity except for brick work, 
plumbing, electrical and some speciality items (R. 2071-2070). Construction was 
sufficiently completed to allow the family to move into the home on September 4, 
1983 (R. 2172). 
5. On the date of trial, the market value of the home was $ 162,225.3 As of 
the time of trial, the unpaid balance of the mortgage4 was $62,715 (Exhibit 113, 
R. 2150) leaving an equity of $99,510 ($162,225 - $62,715 = $99,510). 
2
 There i s no evidence as t o the da te of the g i f t , but i t was 
more than two (2) yea r s p r i o r t o September 4, 1983, the da te the 
p a r t i e s moved i n t o the home (R. 2070, 2172) . 
3
 The Appra i sa l Report (Exhibi t 14) , f a i l e d t o cons ide r an 
a d d i t i o n a l s t r i p of land t h a t was deeded t o Janna and David a t a 
l a t e r p o i n t in time (Exhibi t 16) (R. 2495) . Furthermore, the 
a p p r a i s e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t the home had i nc r ea sed in va lue from the 
da te of the a p p r a i s a l (September 28, 1995) t o the da te of t r i a l 
(August 1996) in the amount of $7,725 (R. 2494), r e s u l t i n g in a 
market va lue of $162,225 (R. 2494) . 
4
 Desp i te J a n n a ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of the Al ien G r i f f i t h debt 
as a "Second Mortgage" (Exhibi t 143) , t h e r e i s only one (1) 
mortgage on the home (R. 2150) . 
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6. David began employment with Christensen & Griffith Construction 
Company (hereinafter "C&G"") on a full time basis in 1977 (R. 2078). C&G is 
owned by David's father, Gary Griffith, and David's uncle, Ron Christensen 
(R. 2485-2484). The company is organized as a Utah corporation and commenced 
business in 1958 (R. 2447). 
7. The officers of C&G are Gary Griffith (CEO and President) and Ron 
Christensen (Chief Financial Officer and Secretary/Treasurer) (R. 2371). The Board 
of Directors consists of Gary Griffith, Naomi Griffith (David's mother), Ron 
Christensen and Barbara Christensen (R. 2488-2487). Gary Griffith supervises and is 
responsible for the construction aspect of the business (R. 2452). Ron Christensen is 
responsible and supervises the financial aspect of the business (R. 2487). There is 
very little overlap in the duties of Gary Griffith and Ron Christensen (R. 2452). 
8. As David's experience and knowledge of the construction industry 
increased, he was periodically promoted. At the time of trial, David was one of two 
construction managers (R. 2077). The other construction manager was David's 
brother, Paul Griffith (R. 2077). The duties of the construction managers involved 
preparation of bids, arranging for labor and procurement of materials to perform jobs, 
coordination of equipment between jobs, public relations, implementation of change 
orders, billing, compliance with safety specifications, and overseeing job progress 
(R. 2078-2077; Exhibit 186, p. 12). 
9. At no time during his association with C&G, has David ever held voting 
stock in the company and has never served as an officer or director of the company 
9 
(R. 2371, 2487-2486, 2485). At no time has David had any control or right to control 
his compensation (R. 2445-2444, 2442, 2449-2448, 2376-2375). All decisions 
relating to salaries, wages, bonuses and other benefits are determined solely by Gary 
Griffith and Ron Christensen and then ratified by the Board of Directors (R. 2445). 
10. Janna's claim that C&G manipulated David's compensation "to minimize 
Janna's recovery from the divorce"5 is an unfounded, bad faith conclusion and 
contrary to the evidence. Ron Christensen, the Chief Financial Officer of the 
company, unequivocally denied that the pending divorce action was considered in 
decisions relating to David's income (R. 2439-2436). His testimony is corroborated 
by C&G's actions after the Divorce was filed. In December 1994, more than three 
(3) months after the divorce action was filed, C&G awarded David a bonus in the sum 
of $15,000 (R. 2788-2787). In contrast, David's bonus for 1993 (the last bonus prior 
to the commencement of the divorce action) was only $5,000 (R. 2791-2790). In 
December 1995, more than fifteen (15) months after the divorce action had been filed, 
C&G awarded David a bonus of $12,000 (Exhibit 154, R. 2791-2790). David 
received two (2) salary increases after the divorce was filed, one in June 1995 and 
another in June 1996 (Exhibit 152). David's salary increases were based upon the 
same percentage rate as salary increases for all C&G employees (R. 2378). 
11. The only influence of the pending divorce action was on Gary Griffith's 
decision to gift non-voting stock to his children and grandchildren. In this regard, in 
1994, as part of an estate plan to avoid inheritance taxes, Gary Griffith decided to 
5
 See Janna 's Brief, p . 5. 
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make inter vivos gifts of C&G stock to his children and grandchildren (R. 2370-2369, 
2599-2598). Prior to implementing the decision, Janna commenced this divorce action 
against David. Inasmuch as Janna had filed for divorce against David, Gary Griffith 
wanted to be certain that his property would not end up in the hands of an antagonistic 
former daughter-in-law. Thus, the non-voting shares intended to be gifted to David 
were gifted to David's grandmother for distribution to David after the divorce was 
completed (R. 2369-2367). No one can seriously assert that Gary Griffith did not 
have the absolute right to dispose of his property in any manner he chose including 
any arrangement he deemed appropriate to assure his gift would not be diverted to an 
unintended donee. Gary Griffith is not a party to this action and has no financial 
obligation to Janna. 
12. Janna's claim that she was promised stock in C&G is not supported by 
the evidence. Gary Griffith denies ever promising Janna C&G Stock (R. 2598-2597). 
Furthermore, Janna's testimony concerning "promises" made no mention whatsoever 
of C&G stock (R. 2162-2161). 
13. As compensation for his services as construction manager, David 
receives a weekly salary of $1,020 (Exhibit 152). Depending on the profitability of 
the business operations during each fiscal year, David may receive a bonus 
(R. 2449-2448, 2063-2062). At the time of the commencement of the divorce action 
in 1994, David earned a gross weekly income of $930 (Exhibit 152). In June 1995, 
David's gross weekly salary was increased to $970 (Exhibit 152). In June 1996, 
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David's gross weekly income was increased to $1,020, the amount of his weekly 
compensation at the time of trial (R. 2066-2065, Exhibit 152). 
14. During the five (5) year period prior to trial, David received the 
following annual bonuses: 1990, $2,500; 1991, $-0-; 1992, $4,000; 1993, $5,000; 
1994, $15,000; and, 1995 $12,000 (R. 2791-2790). The decision as to whether David 
receives a bonus, and the amount thereof, is determined by Gary Griffith and Ron 
Christensen on the basis of the profitability of the company during the preceding fiscal 
year (R. 2449-2448, 2063-2062). Thus, David has no guarantee that he will receive 
an annual bonus or the amount thereof (R. 2063-2062). 
15. Commencing in 1983 and continuing until Spring 1996, David performed 
construction activities after hours and on weekend which were referred to as "side 
jobs" (R. 2073-2071). The side job activity consisted of hard labor incident to 
excavation and concrete work (R. 2073). There was no similarity to the type of work 
performed on a side job and the duties of his employment as construction manager for 
C&G (R. 2073-2072, See 1 8, supra). During the period he performed side jobs, the 
work was done at night after completing the duties of his full-time employment or on 
weekends (R. 2071). 
16. The side job activity arose from two (2) sources: (a) third parties who 
contacted David and asked him to do work for them; and, (b) work that C&G had 
contracted to do where a problem had arisen preventing timely completion (R. 2072).6 
6
 This side job activity for C&G would arise in situations 
where a job was not complete and equipment was needed at another 
site. In such situations, in order to earn extra money, David 
would go out at night and run a bulldozer, dump truck or other 
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17. The purpose of the side job activity was to generate funds to pay a 
burdensome house payment and to finish the basement of the family home (R. 2071).7 
18. As noted in the following paragraphs, in the Spring of 1995 
circumstances beyond David's control made it impossible for David to continue side 
job activity. David discontinued all side job activity in the Spring of 1995 (R. 2068). 
19. In April 1995, David's brother, Paul Griffith, was diagnosed with 
Leukemia (Exhibit 186, pp. 16-17, R. 2450). Immediately thereafter, Paul Griffith 
began undergoing Chemotherapy (Exhibit 186, p. 17, R. 2450). By reason of the 
effects of the disease, the treatment for the disease, and the psychological impact of 
the disease, Paul Griffith was unable to fully perform the duties of his employment as 
construction manager at C&G.8 By reason of Paul Griffith's disability, David has 
been required to perform approximately 80% of the duties previously performed by 
Paul Griffith (Exhibit 168, p. 31, R. 2077-2076). No one else in the C&G 
organization is capable of performing the duties previously performed by Paul Griffith 
(Exhibit 168, p. 31, R. 2450-2449). 
equipment to assure its availability on another job (R. 2423-
2421). In situations where the work did not involve C&G, David 
would receive funds directly from the third party who requested 
his service and from those funds would pay C&G for any material 
charged to its account or for use of its equipment (R. 2419, 
2271-2265, Exhibit 185, R. 2237-2236, 2231). 
7
 The improvements to the family home consisted of 
finishing approximately 2,100 sq. ft. of basement space which 
involved construction of two (2) bedrooms, a bathroom and a 
family room (R. 2069) . 
8
 The physical, mental, and, psychological problems related 
to the disease and the treatment were described by Paul Griffith 
in his deposition (Exhibit 168, pp. 21-31) (See also R. 2076-
2077) . 
13 
20. In January 1993, Gary Griffith, Chief Executive Officer and President of 
C&G, was sworn in as Tooele County Commissioner (R. 2451, 2672). Initially, the 
duties of public office demanded very little of his time. However, his involvement 
with county government significantly increased thereby reducing his ability to perform 
his functions at C&G (R. 2451, 2672, 2074-2075). The decreasing involvement of 
Gary Griffith with C&G commenced in the Summer of 1994 (R. 2075-2074). In the 
absence of Gary Griffith, many of the duties of his employment were shifted to David 
inasmuch as no one else was capable of performing the duties of Gary Griffith 
(R. 2450-2451). 
21. The impact of Paul Griffith's disease, and the involvement of Gary 
Griffith with the Tooele County Commission, has had a profound impact on the hours, 
duties, and responsibilities of David. At the time of trial, David was working 50 - 60 
hours per week in addition to being "on call" 24 hours a day (R. 2067). By reason of 
the increased duties, responsibilities and workload, David is physically and mentally 
exhausted at the end of the day (R. 2076-2075). By reason of the increased 
responsibilities, duties, hours and stress, David was unable to perform any side jobs 
after hours or on weekends after April 1995 (R. 2073, 2068, 2075). 
22. Janna has been employed by Key Bank since 1983 (R. 2756). She 
worked on a part time basis for a period of ten (10) years. She began full time 
employment with Key Bank in December 1993 (R. 2756-2755). During the period of 
her employment, she has worked as a vault teller, customer service representative, 
14 
balanced the ATM account, managed the switchboard and opened new accounts 
(R. 2755). However, at the time of trial, she worked as a teller (R. 2755). 
23. At the time of trial, Janna had a gross monthly income of $1,313.9 
Janna receives her paycheck by direct deposit into her checking account at Key 
Bank.10 Adding David's child support obligation of $1,376 per month, income from 
her convenience store job of $80 per month, Janna has a gross monthly income 
(without alimony) of $2,769. Janna's employment is secure inasmuch as she has an 
employment contract which prevents discharge without good cause (R. 2754). 
24. During the course of the trial, Janna claimed her monthly living expenses 
totaled $4,115.44 (R. 2747, Exhibit 132). During cross examination concerning her 
living expenses, there was persuasive evidence that Janna's claimed living expenses 
9
 E x h i b i t 174 . 
10
 As noted on Janna's paycheck stub (Exhibits 174) her net 
bi-monthly income is deposited into her checking account. 
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ei e in if lated * • H-- , 1:1 lei eb> recti icil lg Jai 11 ia' s claii i led li i • ii lg expenses of 
$4,115 to $3,254.91. 
25 During the pre-trial discovery period, Ken Christensen, a OIK..,; . d 
.. -iecj c | i e c j ^ s ^ j3anjc statements and credit card 
charges in 1995. On the basis of such examination, he determined the total 
expenditures for living expense in N95 v. r • ner mon 
II i l inn i ! l l l l l i n ! Illllll iillllliill III I  l l l i lllliiii i .islll iilriiiini u n i r • nn i 11,• i' i n r rK Ut"puMi> M I U H u a i m 
is without merit inasmuch as Janna's compensation is made t-\ direct deposit (See 
1f 23, supra) thereby precluding Janna from deducting cash from her paycheck deposit 
I l Il Il I I I n I I i f VI i II I \f 
' ill il i 11 I III I mi i" I III l l lh v i ( i l l 11 l v 1 1 1 . 
1
 Janna voluntarily deducts $58 per month from her paycheck 
for health insurance for herself and the children despite the fact 
that David carries health insurance on the children (R. 2794, 
2749-2750). Thus, the duplicative premium attributable to the 
children is $46. U.C.A. § 78-45-7.15(4). Janna voluntarily 
deducts $3 7 per month from her paycheck for dental insurance for 
herself and the children despite the fact the children have dental 
insurance through David's employment (R. 2748). Thus, the 
duplicative premium attributable to the children is $30. U.C.A. 
§-78-45-7.15(4) . Janna included the sum of $214 per month as month 
installment payments to Alien Griffith (David's mother) which David 
agreed to assume (R. 2747-2746, Supp. Decree, 1 24, R. 1739) . Janna 
admitted that she made the children's school lunches thereby 
eliminating the school lunch expense of $146 per month 
(R. 2746-2745) . Janna admitted her tithing claim of $210 per month 
was voluntary and, under her beliefs, required financial sacrifice 
on her part (R. 2744) . With respect to her claim of $70 per month 
for automobile maintenance, Janna was unable to explain why there 
are no checks or credit card charges for automobile maintenance 
during 1995 (R. 2743). Janna admitted that her claim of automobile 
depreciation in the sum of $58.3 0 per month was not an 
out-of-pocket expense (R. 2742). Janna's claim for home 
maintenance ($191 per month) (Exhibit 132) was based on a 
percentage figure rather than an actual expenditure which averaged 
$71.50 (R. 2797) resulting in an inflated claim of $119.50. 
Inasmuch as Janna does not pay automobile insurance for Jennifer 
Griffith, the premium is $45 per month rather than $90 per month 
(Exhibit 132). Janna admitted that her house payment is $818.71 
rather than $930 (R. 2717). 
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Furthermore, Janna made no effort to quantify the amount of living expenses which 
she suggested may be attributable to cash. 
26. With respect to categories of expenses claimed by Janna, 
Mr. Christensen's review of Janna's bank statements, cancelled checks and credit card 
statements established a substantial variance between Janna's claims and Janna's actual 
expenditures.12 
27. During the course of her deposition, Janna submitted a document 
purporting to state the values of all furniture, fixtures and appliances (R. 2731). The 
personal property list which she submitted in her deposition was entered into evidence 
as Exhibit 156 (R. 2733-2726). With two (2) exceptions, David accepted the values 
12
 Maintenance of home and yard showed an expenditure of $50 
per month in 1994 and $93 per month in 1995, rather than $191.25 
claimed by Janna (R. 2797). Expenditures for food and household 
expenses showed $233 per month in 1994 and $437 in 1995 (R. 2796) , 
rather than the $700 claimed in Exhibit 132. Expenditures for 
automobile, fuel, oil, tires and licensing showed $17 per month in 
1994 and $29 per month in 1995 (R. 2796) , rather than the $150 per 
month claimed in Exhibit 132. Review of the cancelled checks, bank 
statements and credit card charges showed no expenses for 
automobile maintenance in 1994 or 1995 to support Janna's claim of 
$70 per month in Exhibit 132 (R. 2796) . Expenditures for the 
children's school lunch showed $29 per month in 1994 and no 
expenditures in 1995, rather than the $146 per month claimed in 
Exhibit 132 (R. 2795) . Expenditures for orthodontics were $30 per 
month in 1994 and 1995, rather than the $50 per month claimed in 
Exhibit 132 (R. 2794). Expenditures for prescriptions for Janna 
and the children were $54 in 1995 rather than the $95 claimed in 
Exhibit 132 (R. 2794). Ken Christensen confirmed that David has 
health and dental insurance which covers the children. Thus, 
Janna's claim for $53 per month for medical insurance, to the 
extent it is attributable to the children is duplicative 
(R. 2793-2794). Expenditures for laundry and dry cleaning were $5 
per month in 1994 and $13 per month in 1995 (R. 2792), rather than 
the $20 claimed in Exhibit 132. Expenditures for automobile 
insurance was $45 per month in 1994 and 1995 (R. 2792) , rather than 
the $90 claimed in Exhibit 132. Mr. Christensen found nothing 
which justified a miscellaneous expenditure of $50 per month as 
claimed in Exhibit 132. 
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Janna placed on the property in Exhibit 156 (R. 2059-2058) . David claimed the couch 
and love seat valued b> Jai ma at $200 should have been $2 ,000 (R. 2058) . The other 
concerning the automobile was resolved by David accepting Janna's value stated in 
Exhibit 1 w of $6 ,350 (R. 2057) The dispute over the couch and love seat was 
resol v e< i i: ^  ' awai dii ig tl le itei i is tc J ai u la at tl i : $2 ,000 figi n e (R 1707). 
28. During the course of the marriage, David obtained an IRA account 
having a value of $5,975 as of June 30, 1996 (Exhibit During the 
C v ^ ^ X 
June 30, 1996 (Exhibit 109, R. 2155). During the course of Lhc marr iage , Janna 
obtained a 401K savings plan with a value of $2,861 (Exhibit " 1 ° . T? ° 1 ^ During 
tl le LOUI 'SC u l tin" i i h j l l i i i p i , I I IMMIIHUI ill \n i h i m i < 1 
having a value of $85 ,264 (Exhibit 6, R. 2454-2453). 
29. During the course of the marriage, the parties maintained a joint savings 
account at key Bank (hxhihil I 4 J | DIIMIIJ..' ili-i" (RIHHJ i\il!<nvii!L! ilir \qui:if»nii ul ilir 
parties fi on i July 1994 to September 1994, $20,275 was withdrawn from the account 
(R. 2726, Exhibit 162). David claimed he made none of the withdrawals shown on 
E x h i b i t 111 J" < R J t l > _ " l .JIJiJ r e i c i v e d i f n i i i n l lllllli iiiim inn 'i u i l l h l i m i l h 1 11 11111 1 Hi i in 1 il I  1 i 
c . ~"n^2). j anna admitted she withdrew $16,600 from the account, and 
claimed that the remaining $3,675 was withdrav r • David (R. 2726-2725). The 
$16,600 which Janna took from, the joint accouK . i * posited in: itc • It i = i sepai ate 
aco : i II it ; i i Se ptei i lbei 2, 199 1 (R 2 721) SI ne admits that none of the $ 16,600 was 
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shared with David (R. 2719-2718). All of the money placed in her separate account 
has been expended (R. 2718). During the period that Janna was disposing of the 
$16,600, David's paycheck was being deposited into the joint account for the payment 
of household expenses (R. 2685). 
30. During the course of the trial, there was persuasive evidence that the 
minor children of the parties spend a great deal of time with their father and 
grandparents13 (R. 2684-2674). The frequency of the visits compel the conclusion that 
much of their food and entertainment expense is borne by David and his parents. 
Furthermore, there was disturbing evidence that child support payments during the 
post-divorce period were not used for the benefit of the children (R. 2030-2029, 
2831-2828; 2687, 2684-2674). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to impute "side job" 
income to David inasmuch as the undisputed evidence established that circumstances 
beyond David's control prevents him from performing said side jobs. There is no 
legal basis to impute income to a spouse who works 50 - 60 hours per week at a 
demanding occupation inasmuch as such spouse could not be considered as voluntarily 
underemployed. The claim that the court should impute income from David's full 
time job in excess of his salary by reason of extra time required to perform services 
for his father and terminally ill brother would require divorce courts to intrude into 
13
 During the post-divorce period, David and his parents lived 
in the same home. 
19 
tl rn in relationship thereby creating a dangerous precedent. This is 
especially true m circumstances where the undisputed evidence establishes the 
ernp; 
Refusal to impute incoi ne to David by reason of access to a compam j.r \ \ ^ ,? 
proper exercise of discretion inasmuch as evidence purporting to quantii ;:... 
s.nd access K\A\ |IM >|>n Is CM hud il h\ ill "i mm 1 U'M I , mi h evidence had not been 
properly excluded, such evidence would have no impact on David's ability to pay 
alimony or David's child support obligation. 
( i bonus 
fluctuated froni zero to $15,000, and the undisputed evidence that the payment of the 
bonus, and the amount thereof, was contingent upon factors beyond David's control, it 
was • - e 
preceding six (6) years. 
TT 
The trial court was i lot boi n id to accept lai n la s claii i i of li v ii lg expei lses of 
14 ) ss 44 There was credible and persuasive evidence that Janna's statement of 
living expenses was grossly inflated and, on the basis of the evidence presented at 
1 . . . : , , . ; i . . . " - I '> II i'!1"" i ' \ n e t i M > i t 
$2,806 per i nonth. 
The evidence, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law clearly demonstrate 
that the court considered .. -. mandau i 
cu in uiall Code Annotated § 30-3-5(7). The 
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Findings and Conclusions further establish that the trial court did not clearly abuse its 
discretion in determining alimony on the basis of the mandatory and discretionary 
criteria. 
III. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the value of David's 
retirement account on the basis of the only available information on the matter. The 
award to David of the entire corpus of his pension and profit sharing account was not 
an abuse of discretion. On the contrary, the trial court's award of the pension and 
profit sharing plan to David, offsetting Janna's share with other property, was a 
proper and sound exercise of discretion. 
IV. 
Inasmuch as the Court determined that Mr. Allred's attorneys' fees were 
unreasonable excessive, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order 
David to pay said attorneys' fees. The Finding that Mr. Allred's attorneys' fees were 
excessive; the award of child support and alimony which roughly equalized the 
respective income of the parties; and, the equal division of marital property, 
establishes the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to obligate David to 
pay Janna's attorneys' fees. 
V. 
The innocuous and coincidental telephone conversation between Judge Rokich 
and David's brother, Paul Griffith, was insufficient for Judge Rokich to enter a 
"disqualification" pursuant to Canon 3E of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Thus, Judge 
21 
Rokich diu not violate Canon 3F oi the Code of Judicial Conduct. Even if il he 
assumed, for the sake of discussion, that Judge Rokich violated Canon 3(; of the Cudc 
of : ui a Judgment in 
favor of Janna and her attorney for their bad faith attempts to manipulate the court 
which resulted in wasted and duplicative legal services, 
1 vii. Allicu, jjurporting to apply the 
provisions of Rule 63, U.R.C P > to the instant case is whin-, merit \ nere i~ nc 
factual basis for a clai^ ^ s or prejudice" and neithei 
ait i affida1 • it ii 1 a ::eoi da 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT THE TRIAL C O U R T S 
DETERMINATION AS TO THE AMOUNT OF DAVID'S INCOMI- \\ VS 
A PROPER AND REASONABLE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION. 
1. The Refusal Of the Trial Court to Impute Side Job Income To David Was 
An Appropriate Exercise of Discretion 
Janna argues that ,^ .. .. court er 
c: stablisl i 1: y a prepoi idi : evidei ice an\ facts or circumstances which would 
justify imputing income historically received from said side jobs to Defendant." 
(Findings, If 24, !•' ' 'J"4 l/2*i However, hi asv, . . , 
-ii iiiidine u' the trial court. Janna must establish that 
this Finding is so lacking in suppon as io he aiiaitNi tin J t \ r .*eighf o^the evidence 
thus making it clearly erroneous ana . ;.* bindings *.-, . ;jik 
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abuse of discretion. Shepherd v. Shepherd, supra; Howell v. Howell, supra; Rasband 
v. Rasband, supra. 
The undisputed evidence established that David was compelled to discontinue 
side job activity in the Spring of 199514 by reason of circumstances beyond his 
control.15 The circumstances thrust upon David made it impossible to continue side 
job activity.16 The undisputed evidence further established that by reason of the 
circumstances which began in April 1995, David has been required to work 50 - 60 
hours per week in addition to being "on call" 24 hours per day17 which generates a 
gross monthly income of $4,955.18 In such circumstances Janna cannot credibly argue 
the David is "underemployed" thereby subjecting him to imputation of additional 
income which he does not and cannot receive. 
In response to this overwhelming evidence, Janna contends that inasmuch as the 
performance of the duties of David's brother prevents David from side jobs, the Court 
should impute 80% of David's brother's salary to David despite the fact that C&G 
does not pay David for performing the duties of his brother and father (Appellant 
Brief, p. 11). Janna cites no authority supporting the argument that a spouse working 
50 - 60 hours per week at a responsible and demanding occupation should be assessed 
14
 Fact Statement, % 18, supra. 
15
 Fact Statement, UK 19-21, supra. 
16
 Fact statement, % 21, supra. 
17
 Fact Statement, 1 21, supra. 
18
 Findings of Fact, % 21(R. 1725). David's gross monthly 
income was computed as follows: $1,020 x 52 = $52,040; $53,040 -r- 12 
= $4,420; $4,420 + $535 (average bonus) = $4,955. 
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with income he does not receive in computing his alimony and child support 
obligation. On the contrary, the law expressly prohibits imputing income to a party in 
tl le absei ice of a fii: idii lg it lat till: le pai i v i , " • »lhr i itai il> i u lei i lplc > eel 01 i n idei 
employed". Utah Code Annotated § 78-4>7.5*7)(a).19 
Imputing to a party income which the party does not receive li 0111 his employer 
\ on lid coil istiti ite a dai lgeroi is and ii leqi litable precedent and would impose a complex 
and onerous burden upon divorce litigants and the courts. Tl le focus ii 1 a divorce 
action would be diverted from the amount a fully-employed payor spouse actually 
t i iould be 
by his employer. Imputing this "phantom income" to the payor spouse would be 
confiscatory The impact of the decision would allow recipient spouses to intrude in 
adequate compensation for duties performed by the obligor spouse. Such a precedent 
would be particularly imprudent in circumstances where there has been a consistent 
i mi II ui in»in fu i f t cn i i i 1 i i " tin p i n in l i i i j i fillet in m II 'i m , I M I 
Janna claims the case of Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1993) 
supports her position inasmuch as this Court held that income from, a second job held 
19
 Even if the authorities allowed imputing income to David, 
it would have no impact on his child support obligation inasmuch as 
income for child support purposes "is limited to the equivalent of 
one full-time 40 hour job". Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5(2). 
2 :! 
alimony.20 However, Plaintiff conspicuously ignores critical facts and conclusions of 
the Court in the Breinholt case which will render it inapplicable to the issues involved 
in the instant case. 
In the Breinholt case the husband derived income from a business which he and 
the wife operated. At the time of the divorce, the husband was also a Carbon County 
Commissioner which produced additional income of $21,000 per year. In the course 
of the opinion, the Court held that the income from the county commission job as well 
as the income from the family business, could be considered in the issue of alimony. 
The Court gave no indication as to the time demands of either job, making it 
impossible to determine the impact of the decision on the husband's post-divorce life, 
i.e., whether the decision compelled him to work on weekends and evenings in excess 
of 50 hours per week as in the instant case. However, by reason of the fact that the 
husband was self-employed in the primary job, it is likely he had some discretion in 
the number of hours devoted to that job. On the other hand, David, being a salaried 
employee, does not have such discretion. 
The critical distinction which Janna ignores in her discussion of the Breinholt 
case is that the husband in the Breinholt case had a second job at the time of trial 
whereas David had no second job by reason of undisputed facts and circumstances 
20
 The only stated basis of the holding in the Breinholt case 
appears to arise from a brief dictum statement in Crompton v. 
Crompton, 888 P.2d 686 (Utah App. 1994). In the Breinholt case, 
the Court offered no explanation as to the reasons why a second job 
income is excluded from child support computation and included in 
alimony consideration. 
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beyond his control. I h e actual existence of the second job at the time of trial was a 
material factor iii the Breinholt decision. 
should not be considered inasmuch as the appointment to the commission occurred 
only six months prior to the time the parties separated and therefore the income should 
mil In misidnvil Tin < mil i i | u t n l Ihr iii'.'iiiiii m nHiliii}." Ilki! in i iiiluiilatiiii1 iilliiii n\\ 
the relevant facts are those existing "at the time of trial'" '. Bi einholt, supra, p . 118, 
Footnote 3 Inasmuch as David had no second job at the time of trial, evidence of 
i : n in 
In an attempt to persuade the court to impute income to David, Janna cites the 
case ofHiV jr" ^ ~ ^ .2d 963 (Utah App. 1994* ~ V case has no Seariny 
or about the time the parties separated, voluntarily terminated a job at Thiokol where 
he earned $2,400 per month and took a job where he made only $6.90 per hour Oii 
the basis of these facts, tl i.e Coui t determined the husband was voluntarily 
Hi ideren lployed ai id int i if >i ited a i i lontl il> in ICOI i ic: of $2,000 for the pi it poses of 
calculating alimony and child support.21 No one can seriously contend that David is 
voluntarily underemployed. 
21
 Janna cites Jenson v Bowcut, 892 P. 2d 1053 (Utah App. 
1995) in support of her position. However, the Jenson case has no 
relevance to the instant case by reason of the fact that the 
obligor spouse failed to object to consideration of income from his 
second job during the evidentiary hearing (See P. 1057 of Opinion). 
Furthermore, the Jenson case is irrelevant inasmuch as David's 
former side job income had no similarity to his primary employment 
(Fact Statement, H 13) . 
2 6 
In support of her argument of imputing income to David which he does not 
receive from C&G, Janna suggests that the "family business began maneuvering to 
minimize Janna's financial recovery from the divorce" (Appellant Brief, p. 15). Janna 
cites no evidence whatsoever in support of this unfounded accusation. On the 
contrary, the evidence overwhelmingly establish the falsity of this unfounded 
accusation (See Fact Statement, t 10, supra). 
On p. 11 of her brief, Janna argues that the trial court's ruling that David's 
"extra efforts at C&G were essential to the viability of the company" was unsupported 
by the evidence. A review of the evidence presented at trial demonstrates such 
argument is without merit (Fact Statement, 11 19,20, supra). 
2. Refusal To Impute Income For Use Of Company Car Was A Proper 
Exercise of Discretion 
In her brief, Janna argues that the trial court should have imputed $10,289.72 
to David's income by reason of the fact that C&G provides him with a company car. 
Janna's argument should be rejected for three (3) reasons: (a) Janna failed to submit 
any evidence as to the value of David's use of the company car; (b) even if Janna had 
submitted evidence as to the value of David's use of the company car, such evidence 
would have no impact on alimony inasmuch as the imputed income would be offset by 
increased living expenses; and, (c) even if Janna had submitted evidence as to the 
value of the company car, such value would have no impact on the computation of 
child support inasmuch as "in kind" benefits of this nature are not included in 
27 
computing income for child support purposes. Each of these grounds will be 
separately addressed. 
Il iippcdi ih,n (.111)111)1 ill 11 ni 11 a I lu i ill in I In IKmlniui ;i , ,ine\peil ' HIM ss lur 
the purpose of quantifying the value of David's access to a company car However, 
on July 22, 1996, the court expressly ordered both parties to exchange witness lists on 
( - * , Ranged 
witness lists. "1 1 le "witness list delivered by Janna was entered nun evidence as Exhibit 
183. Janna's witness list made no mention of ?, ,\ '^rick v. it le commencement 
( 
who had never before been mentioned orally or in w riting. Hie court refused to 
allow Mr. Allred to call Mr. Roderick inasmuch as he was not named on the witness 
1 
Ruling by the trial court was a proper exercise of its discretion. Hill v. Dickerson, 
839 P.2d 309 (Utah App. 1992); Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917 (TTtn.h \vr 1 »- - . 
LMM 11 1,11 in, i In ill il 111 in in il il n! nn l rna .i% In ill in > ilm in I I la \ id s ILTCSS In a 
company car, such evidence would have no bearing on the alimony issue.
 Ai4 . . ^ 
regard, David's statement of living expenses excluded any expenditures for fuel, oil, 
t IL ui\; * - X j 
2
 The only automobile expense noted on David's schedule of 
living expenses were attributable to the automobile used by his 
daughter, Jennifer (Exhibit 168) . Thus, even if Janna had 
submitted evidence as to the value of the company car, it would 
have no impact on David's ability to pay alimony inasmuch as his 
living expenses would be increased in the same amount. 
in-kind "income" does not provide funds to pay alimony inasmuch as the additional 
"income" would be offset by a corresponding increase in living expenses. 
Even if Janna had provided evidence as to the value of David's access to the 
company car, it would have no impact on his child support obligation. Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-45-7.5(1 )(b) provides a comprehensive list of income sources to be 
considered in child support calculation, but makes no reference to "in-kind" 
compensation. All of the categories used to determine "gross income" in Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-45-7.5 involve money with no suggestion of imputing income for use 
of property. Inasmuch as David is not self employed and has no discretion in 
establishing his compensation or benefits, the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-45-7.5(4) are inapplicable. 
Even if Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 were applicable, the primary use of 
the automobile is business-related and there was no basis for the trial court to 
determine the value of the personal use. In this regard, the company car available to 
David is also used by other employees (R. 2400, 2399). Furthermore, inasmuch as 
David is "on call" 24 hours per day, his access to the company car could be 
considered as business use at all times. 
3. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In The Calculation Of 
Bonus Income 
Janna argues that the trial court abused its discretion in assessing David's 
income by averaging his bonus income over the preceding six (6) year period rather 
than using the 1995 bonus of $12,000. In asserting her argument, Janna again ignores 
the applicable standard of review. Her argument does not establish that the trial 
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comt s calculation was so lacking in support to be against the clear weigni of evidence 
thus making the Finding clearly erroneous. Shepherd v. Shepherd wnm 
c
 v o r c e c a s e s an (j their 
Findings will be upheld unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Howell v. 
Howell, supra; Rasband v, Rasband, supra, Janna's argument >-- .e. n^e 
standai cis. 
The undisputed evidence before the ••..« , o u - established tiie reeupi *>r a bonus 
and the amount thereof is dependant on t^e profitabiht} 
pieirdinj.' lisefil UMI il'.nl NLikiiieul, 1 1 1. \/I/II//I I lins, David has no guarantee he 
will receive an annual bonus oi the ai nount thereof (Fact Statement, r * : , supra). 
The undisputed evidence establishes that since 1990 David's annual bonus has 
fluctuated from, zero i " u< li • IM IHIISUIIU1 IIHTC r.ui l»r n-1 credible 
c • -i me trial court's decision to average the bonus over six years was a cleai 
abuse of discretion against the clear weight of the evidence. 
The case of 
t ' ,mt case. Ilie Thronson case involved an established income stream 
of a practicing attorney rather than a contingent annual bonus. Thus, there was no 
realistic risk that the payor spo 
uations in his annual income. Moreover, given the nature of 
the payor's employment, and a comparison of the average amount with the most 
recent amount, it was apparent that f] s 
sle;i 
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If the trial court in the instant case had averaged David's salary over the 
preceding six years, the Thronson case would have some bearing on the issues before 
this Court. However, the trial court averaged only the bonus aspect of David's 
income in recognition to the vast fluctuations in the amount (zero to $15,000) and the 
contingent nature of the payment. Given these circumstances, it is respectfully 
submitted that the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in light of the 
undisputed evidence presented at trial. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD WAS PROPER 
Janna asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount 
of her living expenses by the court's refusal to accept her claim of monthly living 
expenses in the sum of $4,155.44. In the course of her argument, Janna makes no 
mention of substantial and compelling evidence which demonstrated her claimed living 
expenses were inflated. In light of such conflicting evidence, the trial court was not 
bound to accept Janna's testimony. Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 435 (Utah 
App. 1991).23 
There was substantial and persuasive evidence that Janna's claimed living 
expenses were inflated. By her own admissions during cross examinations, she was 
compelled to acknowledge and overstatement of $860 (Fact Statement, \ 24, supra). 
Of greatest significance, after auditing all of Janna's bank statements, cancelled checks 
23
 In the course of the Thronson opinion, the Court stated: 
"Ms. Thronson's actual and necessary monthly living expenses were 
found to be $3,700. She presented a higher figure, but the court 
heard evidence challenging certain items and found them to be over 
stated." 
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and credit card statements during 199524, accountant Ken Christensen found a total 
monthly expenditure for living expenses of $2,700 (Fact Statement, f 25, supra). 
Ken Christensen also audited all of the 1995 bank statements, cancelled checks 
and credit card statements with respect to categories of living expenses claimed by 
Janna. This evidence likewise significantly impeached Janna's claim of living 
expenses (Fact Statement, \ 26, supra). 
On the basis of ail of the evidence the court could have reasonably concluded 
living expenses as low as $2,700 and as high $4,155. The determination of standard 
of living is a "fact-sensitive, subjective task . . . trial courts have discretion to 
determine the standard of living after consideration of all relevant facts and equitable 
principles." Howell v. Howell 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App. 1991) Thus, the 
court's Findings of living expenses in the sum of $2,806 cannot be credibly 
characterized as against the clear weight of the evidence or a clear abuse of discretion. 
In order to assist the Court in reviewing the trial court's basis for its finding on living 
expenses, David has prepared a matrix showing Janna's claim, the court's finding and 
the source of said findings (See Evidence Supporting Findings of Living Expenses of 
Plaintiff of $2,806, Addendum, p. 1, infra. 
24
 Janna's statement on p. 23 of her Brief that the records 
audited by Mr. Christensen were "incomplete" is not supported by 
the references to the record. The only confusion related to 
deposits rather than expenditures. The only unavailable 
information were cash expenditures. However, at no time during the 
trial did Janna offer any testimony or documents as to the amount 
of living expenditures paid in cash. Inasmuch as Janna's paycheck 
is made by direct deposit into Key Bank (Fact Statement, % 23) , and 
cash withdrawals would show on her bank statements, the amount of 
unaccounted cash payments would be negligible. 
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Janna's attempts to mischaracterize the court's conclusion that the living 
expense finding of $2,806 was "undisputed"25 is without merit. It is apparent that the 
word "undisputed" was used to note that under David's testimony, he had no grounds 
to contest the finding. 
Janna's inference that she is compelled to work "two jobs" in order to make 
ends meet is false and misleading. Janna's "second job" involves working "every 
other Saturday" at a convenience store (R. 2153). 
Janna's claims as to the standards applicable to alimony awards is somewhat 
misleading. The only mandatory criteria are: "(i) the financial condition and needs of 
the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and, (iv) the length of the 
marriage." Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(7); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 
1985). The Findings and Conclusions of the court expressly address all of the 
mandatory criteria.26 
A determination as to Janna's standard of living is a factual determination in 
which the trial court has wide discretion. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah 
App. 1991). In applying the mandatory criteria of the Jones case, the trial court 
exercises its discretion on the basis of all of the evidence "to approximate the parties' 
standard of living during the marriage as closely as possible" and to equalize the 
standard of living "to the extent possible" Howell v. Howell, supra. In considering all 
25
 Conclusion of Law, R. 1721. 
26
 Findings, H1 17-19, 21, 33, 34, R. 1726-1720; Conclusions 
of Law, %% 14-16, 24, R. 1714-1711. 
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of the evidence submitted on the matter, Janna has failed to establish the trial court's 
Findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence 
thus making them clearly erroneous. Shepherd v. Shepherd, supra. The court's 
decision to "roughly" equalize the income of parties rather than to precisely equalize 
the income is not clearly erroneous in light of the fact that David is required to work 
50 - 60 hours per week (Fact Statement, if 21, supra) and the continuing pattern of the 
children since the post-separation period in spending considerable time at their 
grandparents home thereby reducing the financial burden upon Janna (Fact Statement, 
130). 
The most credible evidence of Janna's standard of living at the time of trial was 
the total expenditures taken from her bank statements, cancelled checks and credit 
card statements during 1995 which established expenditures of $2,700. (Fact 
Statement, \ 25, supra). Janna has produced no evidence of a clear abuse of 
discretion in addressing these discretionary criteria. 
Janna's statement that alimony is not limited by the needs of the recipient 
spouse, but should be determined by the payor's spouse's ability to pay,27 is inconstant 
with this court's ruling in Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994). 
Inasmuch as Bingham v. Bingham, supra, was decided in 1994, it overrules the 
Howell language to the extent such language is inconsistent with the Bingham opinion. 
However, it makes little difference as to whether the Bingham or Howell case is 
27
 The source of Janna's claim that alimony may exceed her 
needs if David has the ability to pay was supported by a citation 
to Hnw&ll v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991). 
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applied to the instant case inasmuch as Janna has failed to demonstrate the factual 
determination as to the amount of her living expenses and the assessment of alimony 
based thereon is against the clear weight of the evidence making such findings clearly 
erroneous. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DISTRIBUTING 
MARITAL ASSETS 
Janna argues that the trial court abused its discretion by determining the value 
of David's pension and profit sharing plan on the basis of the only available evidence 
- the value stated for the period ending September 30, 1995. In this regard, the 
Court should note that C&G operates on a fiscal year beginning on October 1 and 
ending on the following September 30 (R. 2474-2473). At some point after the fiscal 
year, when the year-end income statements are completed, management makes a 
decision as to the amount of the contribution for the preceding fiscal year. The 
beneficiaries under the plan receive a statement as to the amount of the additional 
contribution in the Spring of the year following the close of the fiscal year 
(R. 2475-2462). 
Thus, at the time of trial, no contribution had been made for fiscal year 1996, 
and the amount of any contribution would not be available until the Spring of 1997. 
In such circumstance, Janna asserts a vague and ambiguous claim that the trial court 
abused its discretion by refusing to determine the value of the plan "on the basis of the 
upcoming evaluation" (Appellant's Brief, p. 26). David respectfully submits that in 
light of the circumstances above-described, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
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in evaluating the pension and profit sharing plan on the basis of the most recent 
evidence available as to the value of the plan.28 
Janna further asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding David 
the entire pension and profit sharing plan, offsetting Janna's share by a 
disproportionate award of other real and personal property.29 The authorities establish 
that the award to David of his pension and profit sharing plan, offsetting Janna's share 
by other property, is not an abuse of discretion. In Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 
841, 845 (Utah App. 1992) this Court held: 
"While the best method for distributing or allocating retirement benefits 
or their value depends on the particular circumstances [citations omitted] 
it is preferable to end the marriage and allow the parties to make as 
much of a clean break from each other as is reasonably possible, 
[citation omitted]. Pursuant to Woodward the preferred method for 
doing so is to fix the other spouse's share of the pension plan, as 
adjusted for all the appropriate considerations and satisfy the other 
spouse's share out of other assets, thereby leaving all pension benefits to 
the employee." Accord, Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 
1988), cert denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1982). 
In addressing the issue, Janna has no cause for complaint. The real and 
personal property which she received was not subject to income tax. On the other 
28
 Although the trial court was unable to determine the value 
of the plan since the report issued in the Spring of 1996, the 
court did not discount the award of the plan to David to reflect 
the fact that the value therein was subject to income taxes at the 
time of withdrawal. Thus, under the circumstances, Janna has no 
cause for complaint that the value was not updated inasmuch as the 
award was not decreased to reflect income taxes which reduced the 
value of the pension and profit sharing plan. 
29
 The value of real and personal property awarded to Janna 
totalled $144,751 (Findings, % 10, R. 1728) . The value of real and 
personal property awarded to David (which included his pension and 
profit plan) was $143,474 (Findings, f 11, R. 1727). 
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hand, David's pension and profit sharing plan is subject to income tax at such time as 
it is withdrawn. Thus, the trial court's decision resulted in Janna receiving benefits in 
excess of the values stated in the Findings of Fact, 1t 10 and 11 (R. 1728-1727). 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AND PROVIDED 
SUFFICIENT FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION IN RULING THAT EACH 
PARTY MUST PAY THEIR OWN ATTORNEYS' FEES 
At the conclusion of Janna's case, the attorneys' for both parties stipulated to 
submit affidavits on all issues relating to attorneys' fees in lieu of oral testimony 
(R. 2082-2083). Thereafter, pursuant to the stipulation, both attorneys' submitted 
affidavits. Mr. Allred's Affidavit is contained in the record at pp. 1523-1502. 
Mr. McDonald's Affidavit is contained in the record at pp. 1582-1524. In accordance 
with the stipulation of the parties, the statement in the affidavits constitutes evidence 
which the trial court could consider in determining issues relating to attorneys' fees.30 
After considering the affidavits of the respective attorneys, the court concluded: 
"The court concludes that the costs and attorneys' fees claimed by 
Plaintiffs attorney in representing Plaintiff in this action are 
unreasonable in light to the complexity (or lack thereof) to the issues 
involved in this litigation, the size of the marital estate, and remedies 
sought by many of the motions filed by Plaintiff in light of the legal 
expense necessary to prepare said motions and supporting memoranda." 
(Conclusion of Law, R. 1710). 
30
 The opinions of opposing counsel in a divorce case may be 
considered by the trial court in determining the obligation for 
payment of attorneys' fees. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P. 2d 13 31 
(Utah App. 1988). 
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On the basis of this Finding, the Court concluded that each party should be solely 
responsible for the payment of their respective costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the 
prosecution and defense of the action (Conclusions of Law, R. 1710). 
The Affidavit of Robert M. McDonald (R. 1582-1572), together with judicial 
notice of the nature and substance of many motions and other actions on the part of 
Janna's attorney, provided the trial court with a sound basis to determine that 
Mr. Alfred's fees were unreasonable. In this regard, the Court should note that 
Mr. Allred's claimed attorneys' fees ($75,533.61) (R. 1523-1502) was the equivalent 
of 52% of the marital property awarded to his client.31 The Court should further note 
that this case involved no serious dispute as to child custody, both parties were 
salaried employees, and, the value of real and personal property were easily resolved. 
In such a circumstance, attorneys' fees in excess of $75,000 are outrageous. 
A review of the Affidavit of Robert M. McDonald (R. 1582-1572), and judicial 
notice of the documents filed in this case, establish that much of the legal service 
involved motions, memoranda, and, orders relating to collateral and irrelevant issues 
which did not advance the case and resulted only in increased attorneys' fees and 
animosity between the parties. A sampling of the nature of the unreasonable and 
unnecessary services are itemized in ff 14(a)-(h) of the Affidavit of Robert M. 
McDonald (R. 1578-1575). 
The unreasonable amount of legal services expended by Mr. Allred not only 
worked to the prejudice of his client, but required responses from David's attorney 
I1 $ 1 4 4 , 7 5 1 -r $ 7 5 , 5 3 3 = . 52 o r 52%. 
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which caused a substantial increase in David's costs and attorneys' fees. In this 
regard, although David's attorney had attorneys' fees of $47,36632, $7,130 of said fees 
were judicially determined to be attributable to bad faith conduct on the part of 
Janna's attorney (Findings of Fact, ft 41-44, R. 1718-1719; Conclusions of Law, 
11 28, 30-32, R. 1710-1709)33. David's attorney refrained from filing other Rule 11 
motions in the hope of avoiding further legal service on collateral issues. 
The authorities establish that the trial court has discretion in awarding 
attorneys' fees in a divorce action. Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 741 (Utah App. 
1992); Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah App. 1988). In order for the 
trial court to order David to pay all or any portion of Janna's attorneys' fees, the court 
must find: 
"(1) The requesting party is in need of financial assistance; (2) the 
requested fees are reasonable; and, (3) the other spouse has the ability to 
pay." Muir v. Muir, supra. (Emphasis added). 
In determining whether the attorneys' fees are reasonable, the court may consider the 
following: 
"The difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in 
presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on 
the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, 
the amount involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise 
32
 R. 1 5 8 2 - 1 5 7 2 . 
33
 At no time has Janna or her attorney contended that David's 
attorneys' fees were unreasonable. The claimed variance between 
the court's order (R. 1626-1625) and the Findings of Fact 
(R. 1710), are of no consequence. State v. Rio Vista Oil, ltd., 
786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990); Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
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and experience of the attorneys involved." Rasband v. Rasband, supra; 
Muir v. Muir, supra. 
It is apparent that the trial court, in ordering each party to pay their own 
attorneys' fees, properly considered all of these factors and made appropriate findings 
and conclusions which were supported by the evidence (Conclusions of Law, 
R. 1710). 
With respect to the need of financial assistance by the requesting party, the 
court expressly found that after awarding child support and alimony, the incomes of 
the parties were roughly equal (Findings, % 34, R. 1721). Furthermore, the marital 
estate was divided equally between the parties (Findings, f1 10 and 11, 
R. 1728-1727). Thus, neither party can claim a "need for financial assistance", which 
could not likewise be claimed by the other party. The trial court's conclusion that 
Mr. Allred's attorneys' fees were unreasonably excessive, has a direct impact on the 
"need for assistance" criteria. The clear impact of the excessive attorneys' fees 
conclusion is that Janna has a meritorious defense against Mr. Allred if he attempts to 
enforce collection of the full amount of his attorneys' fees. Thus, the order that Janna 
pay her own attorneys' fees, is not the equivalent of an order that she pay $75,000. 
The Conclusion that Mr. Allred's attorneys' fees were unreasonable would provide 
Janna with a meritorious claim that her attorneys' fees should be less than those 
charged by David's attorney inasmuch as a large portion of David's attorneys' fees 
were prompted by the actions of Mr. Allred. 
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The second criteria, whether the requested fees are reasonable, was likewise 
directly addressed by the court and supports the court's finding that David should not 
be responsible to pay Janna's attorneys' fees. As noted above, in the Conclusions of 
Law, 1 28, the Court expressly found that Mr. Allred's attorneys' fees were 
unreasonable. This Finding has a sound evidentiary basis after reviewing the frivolous 
claims presented at trial and the repeated filing of frivolous and unjustified motions.34 
The third criteria, whether the other spouse has the ability to pay, is resolved 
by the trial court's order equalizing the distribution of the marital estate and the trial 
court's Finding that after award of alimony and child support, the respective income 
of the parties was roughly equal (Findings, 1 34, R. 1721). Under these 
circumstances, neither party could credibly claim the other spouse has a greater ability 
to pay. 
Inasmuch as the award of attorneys' fees are discretionary with the Court.35 
Janna must establish that the court's Finding was against the clear weight of the 
evidence and thereby clearly erroneously. Under the circumstances described herein, 
Janna has failed to met said burden and the court's ruling with respect to attorneys' 
fees should be upheld. 
V. 
JUDGE ROKICH DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING JUDGMENT AGAINST 
JANNA AND HER ATTORNEY ARISING OUT OF THEIR ATTEMPTS TO 
34
 Af f idav i t of Robert McDonald, % 14 (a ) - (h ) (R. 1578-1575); 
j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of the documents f i l e d with the c o u r t ; and, 
Findings of Fac t , % 42 (R. 1710) . 
35
 Muir v. Muir, supra; Rasband v. Rasband, supra. 
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MANIPULATE THE COURT WHICH RESULTED IN WASTED LEGAL 
SERVICE 
On the first day of trial, March 14, 1996, after Janna's attorney had completed 
his opening statement, Judge Rokich stated that after reading David's Trial 
Memorandum he had discovered that Paul Griffith, David's brother, was to be called 
as a witness at trial. Judge Rokich then revealed that he and Paul Griffith suffered 
from a similar disease and were being treated by the same physician. Judge Rokich 
further revealed that the physician had suggested Paul Griffith call Judge Rokich 
concerning the effects of medication that Judge Rokich was considering. The 
telephone conversation took place approximately a week before trial and lasted 
approximately ten (10) minutes (R. 1953-1951). At the time of the conversation, 
Judge Rokich was unaware that Paul Griffith was David Griffith's brother (R. 1953). 
Immediately after Judge Rokich made the disclosure, Mr. Allred stated, "I have 
no problem with that." (R. 1953)36. The Court prompted further discussion for the 
apparent purpose of assuring the parties were fully advised as to the circumstances and 
substance of the conversation (R. 1953-1952). Mr. Allred then questioned Judge 
Rokich concerning the circumstances and substance of the conversation and the Judge 
candidly responded to each question (R. 1952-1951). At the conclusion of the 
question-answer period, Mr. Allred thanked the Judge with no further comment 
36
 There is some confusion as to the identity of the attorney 
who stated, "I have no problem with that." At the time of the 
preparation of the transcript, the statement was attributed to 
Mr. Allred (R. 1953). At a later point on October 17, 1996, the 
Court reporter claimed that the statement was attributable to 
Mr. McDonald (Appellant's Brief, Appendix, p. 92). However, on 
p. 34 of Janna's Brief, she and Mr. Allred attribute the statement 
to Mr. Allred. 
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(R. 1951). At that point, without objection or further comment from Mr. Allred, 
David's attorney began his opening statement (R. 1951). At the conclusion of the 
opening statement, which involved approximately twenty (20) minutes, wherein 
Mr. Allred had full opportunity to converse with his client, Mr. Allred called his first 
witness and proceeded with the presentation of his case. The trial lasted the entire 
day. 
On the morning of the second day of trial, Mr. Allred informed Judge Rokich 
that he [Mr. Allred] had reconsidered his position and despite his earlier approval was 
now "concerned that perhaps there has been an attempt to unduly influence this 
court." (R. 1762). The suggestion that the court could be influenced left Judge 
Rokich no alternative but to recuse himself from the case. Judge Rokich expressly 
noted that his failure to recuse himself may prompt the parties to later question 
whether they had received a fair trial (R. 1014). 
Thereafter, Judge Rokich concluded that Mr. Allred acted in bad faith in an 
attempt to "manipulate the court which tainted the proceedings and caused the court to 
recuse itself" (R. 1009). On this basis, Judge Rokich entered judgment in favor of 
David and against Janna and Mr. Allred in the sum of $4,542 (R. 1174) to 
compensate David for costs and attorneys' fees incurred during the first day of trial 
and duplicative time necessary to prepare for a second trial in the future 
(R. 1181-1177). It is apparent that the recusal was not based on any bias or prejudice 
for or against either party (R. 1188-1187). 
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In order to obtain a reversal of the judgment, Janna and Mr. Allred argue that 
Judge Rokich violated Canon 3F of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The basis of the 
claimed "violation" is the claim that Judge Rokich failed to leave the courtroom while 
the parties and their attorneys' discussed the issue and in failing to obtain a record of 
the consent of all attorneys and parties to Judge Rokich's presiding over the case 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 37-38). 
Even if it be assumed, for the sake of discussion only, that Judge Rokich 
violated Canon 3F, such violation has no bearing on the subsequent judgment entered 
against Janna and Mr. Allred by withholding their accusation of influence until after a 
full day of trial. 
To the extent that a violation of Canon 3F is deemed to be relevant to the entry 
of the judgment, a careful review of the record and Canon 3F demonstrates there was 
no violation. The relevant wording of Canon 3F is as follows: 
"A juage disqualified by the terms of Canon 3E may disclose the basis 
for the judge's disqualification and ask the parties and their lawyers to 
consider, out of the presence of the judge whether to waive 
disqualification. If following disclosure of any basis for disqualification 
other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties and 
lawyers, without participation by the judge, shall all agree that the judge 
need not be disqualified and the judge is then willing to participate, the 
judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be entered 
on the record, or if written, filed in the case file." (Emphasis added). 
At the outset, it should be noted that the judge did not "enter a disqualification" 
in accordance with Canon 3E. The Judge merely noted the fact of the telephone 
conversation expressly noting, "I want to call that to your attention, but in no way did 
I discuss this case or even know until this morning, I read the - your memorandum, 
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that they were brothers. But I just mentioned that to you." (R. 1953). The Judge 
further noted the innocuous substance of the conversation (R. 1952). At no time 
during the discussion concerning the telephone call, did the Judge even suggest that he 
believed his "impartiality might reasonably be questioned". Inasmuch as Judge Rokich 
did not deem the conversation sufficient to disqualify him, the provisions of Canon 3F 
are inapplicable. 
Even if Canon 3F were applicable, the failure of Judge Rokich to leave the 
courtroom while the parties and attorneys discussed the issue is not a mandatory 
procedure under the wording of the Canon. Furthermore, Mr. Allred's conduct after 
disclosure of the telephone conversation with David Griffith induced Judge Rokich to 
reasonably believe there was no reason to require his absence from the courtroom 
while the parties discussed the issue. This reasonable belief on the part of Judge 
Rokich further induced by Mr. Allred's apparent satisfaction with Judge Rokich's 
answers concerning the circumstances, substance and nature of the conversation. 
In summary, the actions of Mr. Allred upon hearing the court's disclosure 
should preclude him from now claiming his entitlement to a procedure which he 
clearly induced the court to fail to implement. Mr. Allred and his client should not be 
permitted to benefit by their attempts to manipulate and mislead the court, especially 
when such actions resulted in economic loss to David. 
There is no basis whatsoever for Janna's claim that she or her attorney were 
deprived of an opportunity "to consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether to 
waive disqualification." The decision of Janna and her attorney not to confer outside 
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the presence of the court was their voluntary choice, with no colorable claim that they 
were deprived of any opportunities to fully consider and evaluate full disclosure made 
by Judge Rokich before the trial began. 
In a further attempt to obtain reversal of the judgment arising out of 
Mr. Alfred's bad faith attempt to manipulate the court, Janna and Mr. Allred seek to 
persuade the court to consider the matter in the framework of Rule 63(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
This is not a case involving the procedure outline in Rule 63, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Neither Janna nor Mr. Allred filed an affidavit as required by 
Rule 63 and the basis for recusal was not "bias or prejudice, either against such party 
or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the suit . . . " The basis of the 
recusal was Mr. Allred's untimely and bad faith objection to information obtained 
24 hours earlier which cast a "shadow of impropriety over the proceedings" 
(R. 1014). 
Even if Rule 63 were applicable, any action under such Rule was clearly 
waived. Rule 63(b) expressly provides that the objection to the court's participation 
"shall be filed as soon as practicable after . . . such bias or prejudice is known." 
Madsen v. Prudential Savings and Loan Association, 767 P.2d 538 (Utah 1988). The 
obvious purpose of this provision of Rule 63 is to avoid the precise situation arising in 
this case, i.e., z "wait and see" tactic in order to engage in blatant "judge shopping". 
There is no basis whatsoever for the claim of bias or prejudice against 
Mr. Allred or his client, or in favor of David or his attorney. There is nothing in the 
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record or in the actions of Judge Rokich to suggest such bias or prejudice. The sole 
grounds for this claim are the unfounded conclusions stated in Affidavit of Mr. Allred. 
Such conclusory statements are insufficient to establish "bias and prejudice".37 Even if 
this case arose under Rule 63, the Rule expressly provides that Janna or her attorney 
must file an affidavit which "shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that 
such bias or prejudice exists." No such facts exist in the instant case and, prior to the 
subject decision of Judge Rokich, neither Janna nor her attorney filed an affidavit 
stating any such facts. 
The basis for the award of attorneys' fees in this action was "Mr. Allred's bad 
faith conduct in attempting to manipulate the Court" rather than any bias or prejudice 
for proceeding under Rule 63, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In such circumstances, 
there is no authority which precludes Judge Rokich from entering appropriate orders 
to compensate the party damaged by bad faith tactics which result in wasted court time 
and duplicative preparation for a later trial. 
Janna and Mr. Allred cite no authority which precludes Judge Rokich from 
entering appropriate orders and judgments when recusal is not based on bias or 
prejudice against either of the parties or their attorneys. In fact, the authorities 
expressly require that orders and judgments of the kind entered in this case must be 
37
 As noted in the text, a party or an attorney claiming bias 
or prejudice must "state the facts and the reasons for the belief 
that such bias or prejudice exists." Rule 63, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This wording precludes conclusory statements of an 
attorney as a basis for a claim of bias or prejudice. 
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made by Judge Rokich. In Utah Department of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 
1193 (Utah App. 1991), the Court held: 
"An award of attorneys' fees premised on a finding of bad faith is, to an 
extent, a matter within the discretion of the trial court [citations omitted], 
and appellant deference is owed to the trial judge who actually presided 
over the proceeding and has fist-hand familiarity with the litigation." 
(Emphasis added). 
Janna and Mr. Allred further assert that Judge Dever should have vacated Judge 
Rokich's Judgment. Such an argument should be summarily rejected inasmuch as it 
purports to seek "judicial review" of the decision of one district judge by another 
district judge. Such a procedure is prohibited. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 
(Utah 1987); Tanner v. Mecham, 537 P.2d 312 (Utah 1975); Trembly v. Mrs. Field's 
Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah App. 1994). Moreover, as noted in the preceding 
paragraph, Judge Dever had no basis to vacate Judge Rokich's Judgment. 
VI. 
JANNA'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ROBERT M. McDONALD 
CONSTITUTED A CLEAR VIOLATION OF RULE 11, U.R.C.P. 
On January 5, 1996, Janna, by and through her attorney, Mr. Allred filed a 
Motion to Disqualify Robert M. McDonald (R. 634-633). The Motion was supported 
by a 10-page affidavit signed by Mr. Allred (R. 632-623), a 5-page affidavit by Janna 
(R. 622-618), and a 12-page memorandum (R. 647-635). The basis of the Motion 
was that David's attorney had represented Janna's attorney (not Janna, her attorney, 
Mr. Allred) in a divorce action 15 years earlier. In order to provide some credibility 
to this ludicrous claim, Mr. Allred recited a long scenario of hearsay, conjuncture and 
speculation in an attempt to persuade the court that David's attorney would in some 
manner misuse the information he had received 15 years earlier. The outrageous and 
ludicrous basis for the claim can only be appreciated by reviewing the Memorandum 
(R. 647-635), Affidavit of Mr. Allred (R. 632-623) and the Affidavit of Janna 
(R. 622-618). Thus, no attempt to summarize the absurdity of said Motion will be 
attempted in this Brief. 
The filing of the Motion compelled David's attorney to prepare and file a 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Robert M. McDonald 
(R. 706-698); Affidavit of Robert M. McDonald (R. 711-707); Affidavit of Gary 
Griffith (R. 716-712); Affidavit of David Griffith (R. 720-717); and, participation in a 
hearing on the Motion (R. 2338-2364). A review of the responsive documents filed 
by David's attorney further demonstrate the complete lack of merit to the frivolous 
motion. 
By reason of the frivolous nature of the motion, Judge Dever granted 
Defendant's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions and awarded judgment in favor of David, 
and against Janna and Mr. Allred, in the sum of $2,588.50 (R. 1738). 
David respectfully submits that a review of the motion and supporting 
documents and the responses thereto overwhelmingly support the entry of the 
Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence before the court clearly establishes that the legal conclusions 
made by the trial court are correct and that Janna has failed to establish that any 
factual finding was so lacking in support to be against the clear weight of the evidence 
49 
thus making them clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Judgment dated May 24, 1996, 
and the Supplemental Decree of Divorce dated February 10, 1997, should be 
affirmed. 
DATED on this ^ day of January 1998. 
M. McDonald 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ day of January 1998, I caused to be hand 
delivered, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to the 
following: 
J. Franklin Alfred 
321 South 600 Bast 
Salt Lake City, 
a:\wpdocs\ .griffith\appear\brief.fm 
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EVIDENCE SUPPORTING FINDINGS OF LIVING EXPENSE OF PLAINTIFF OF $2,806 
Janna Griffith v. David Griffith; Civil No. 944300281DA; Judge Lee A. Dever; 
Third Judicial District of and for Tooele County; Court of Appeals; Case No. 970123-CA 
Category 
First Mortgage 
Second Mortgage (Aline Griffith) 
Maintenance: home, yard 
Utilities, electric, gas, water, garbage, phone 
Food and household 
Clothing 
Automobile - fuel, oil, tires, taxes 
Automobile - maintenance 
Automobile - depreciation 
Tithing and charitable contributions 
I Cable TV 
Jazz'n'it (daughter's dance) 
other dance expense 
children's lunch money 
children's school activities 
Orthodontist 
Newspaper, books periodicals 
Haircuts 
Family prescriptions & medicines 
Plaintiffs prescriptions 
Laundry and dry cleaning 
Fntertainment - travel, dining out 
Misc. 
Kid's glasses 
Medical Insurance and Expense 
D e n t a l E x p e n s e (insured and uninsured) 
C a r I n s u r a n c e ($45 pei month w out Jennifer) 
Life I n s u r a n c e (J.C. Pennys. Pnmenca) 
[ TOTAL 
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The total of family prescriptions, which included prescriptions for Janna and the children, totaled 
$54 per month (R. 2794). 
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"May" cle.noM s^ discretionary ^ndu«~t or conduct thai is not covered hy spe-
cific proscri]>tn:»s. 
"Political organisation" denotes a political party or other group, the princi-
pal purpose of which is to further the election or appointment of candidates to 
political office. 
"Shall" and "shall not" impose binding obligations to respectively engage in 
or refrain from the described conduct. The failure to act in accordance with 
those obligations can result in disciplinary action. 
"Should" and "should not" are used to indicate conduct that is respectively 
encouraged or discouraged. The failure to engage in or refrain from Buch 
conduct cannot result in disciplinary action. 
'Third degree of relationship" denotes the following relatives: great-grand-
parent, grandparent, parent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, child, grandchild, 
great-grandchild, nephew or niece. 
CANON 1 
A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND 
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY. 
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our 
society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforc-
ing, and shall personally observe, high standards of conduct so that the integ-
rity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of this 
Code are to be construed and applied to further that objective. 
CANON 2 
A JUDGE SHALL AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE 
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES. 
A. A judge shall respect and comply with the law and should exhibit con-
duct that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
B. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence 
the judge's judicial conduct or judgment. A judge shall not lend the prestige of 
the judicial office to advance the private interests of others; nor shall a judge 
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special 
position to influence the judge. A judge shall not testify voluntarily as a 
character witness but may provide honest references in the regular course of 
business or social life. 
C. A judge shall not belong to any organization, other than a religion! 
organization, which practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, religion, or national origin. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Consorting with, or maintaining of decision in which other nondiaqnalifitd 
social relations with, criminal figure as ground judges participated, 29 AXJL5th 722. 
for disciplinary action against judge, 15 Prejudicial effect, in civil case, of coznxnunl* 
AXJLSth 923. cations between judges and jurors, 53 
Disqualification of judge as affecting validity AUU>th 205. 
CANON 3 
A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF THE OFFICE 
IMPARTIALLY AND DILIGENTLY. 
A. Judicial Duties in General The judicial duties of a full-time judgt 
take precedence over all the judge's other activities. The judge's judicial dub** 
include all the duties of the judge's office prescribed by law. In the perfor-
mance of these duties, the following standards apply. 
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities. ^ ^ 
(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except 
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those in which disqualification is required or permitted by rule, or trans-
fer to another court occurs. 
(2) A judge shall apply the law and maintain professional competence. 
A judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of 
criticism. 
(3) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before 
the judge. 
(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, ju-
rors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an 
official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of 
staff, court officials, and others subject to judicial direction and control. 
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A 
judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct 
manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice 
based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual 
orientation or socioeconomic status, and should not permit, and shall use 
all reasonable efforts to deter, staff, court officials and others subject to 
judicial direction and control from doing so. A judge should be alert to 
avoid behavior that may be perceived as prejudicial. 
(6) A judge should require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to 
refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based 
upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orienta-
tion or socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel or others. 
This Canon does not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, reli-
gion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic 
status, or other similar factors, are issues in the proceeding. 
(7) A judge shall accord to every person who is legally interested in a 
proceeding, or that person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to 
law. Except as authorized by law, a judge shall neither initiate nor con-
sider, and shall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning 
a pending or impending proceeding. A judge may consult with the court 
personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out the judge's 
adjudicative responsibilities or with other judges provided that the judge 
does not abrogate the responsibility to personally decide the case pending 
before the court. No communication respecting a pending or impending 
proceeding shall occur between the trial judge and an appellate court 
unless a copy of any written communication or the substance of any oral 
communication is provided to all parties. A judge may obtain the advice of 
a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before the 
court if the judge gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and 
the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportu-
nity to respond. A judge may, with the consent of the parties either in 
writing or on the record, confer separately with the parties and their 
lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge. 
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, 
and fairly. 
(9) A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in 
any court, make any public comment that might reasonably be expected 
to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or make any nonpublic com-
ment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing. A 
judge should require similar abstention on the part of court personnel 
subject to judicial direction and control. This Canon does not prohibit a 
judge from making public statements in the course of official duties or 
from explaining for public information the procedures of the court. This 
Canon does not apply to proceedings in which a judge is a litigant in a 
personal capacity. 
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(10) A judge shall not commend or criticize jurors for their verdict 
other than in a court order or opinion in a proceeding but may express 
appreciation to jurors for their service to the judicial system and the 
community. 
(11) A judge shall not disclose or use, for purposes unrelated to judicial 
duties, information acquired in a judicial capacity that is not available to 
the public. 
C. Administrative Responsibilities. 
(1) A judge shall diligently discharge the judged administrative re-
sponsibilities without bias or prejudice, maintain professional competence 
in judicial administration, and cooperate with other judges and court 
officials in the administration of court business. 
(2) A judge should require staff, court officials and others subject to 
judicial direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and 
diligence that apply to the judge and to refrain from manifesting bias or 
prejudice in the performance of their official duties. 
(3) A judge with supervisory authority for the judicial performance of 
other judges should take reasonable measures to assure the prompt dispo-
sition of matters before them and the proper performance of their other 
judicial responsibilities. 
(4) A judge shall not make unnecessary appointments, shall exercise 
the power of appointment impartially and on the basis of merit, and shall 
avoid nepotism and favoritism. A judge shall not approve compensation of 
appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered. 
D. Disciplinary Responsibilities. A judge should take or initiate appro-
priate disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional 
conduct of which the judge may become aware. This section does not apply to 
information generated and communicated under the policies of the Judicial 
Performance Evaluation Program. 
E. Disqualification. 
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not 
limited to instances where: 
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or 
a party's lawyer, a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case, 
or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding; 
(b) the judge had served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, 
had practiced law with a lawyer who had served in the matter at the 
time of their association, or the judge or such lawyer has been a 
material witness concerning it; 
(c) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, 
or the judge's spouse, parent or child wherever residing, or any other 
member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, has 
an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a 
party to the proceeding, or has any other more than de minimis 
interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; 
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third 
degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a per-
son: 
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or 
trustee of a party; 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(iii) is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis 
interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; 
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness 
in the proceeding. 
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(2) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary 
economic interests, and should make a reasonable effort to keep informed 
about the personal economic interests of the judge's spouse and minor 
children residing in the judge's household. 
F. Remittal of Disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of 
Canon 3E may disclose the basis of the judge's disqualification and ask the 
parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether 
to waive disqualification. If following disclosure of any basis for disqualifica-
tion other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties and 
lawyers, without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge need not 
be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate, the judge may 
participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be entered on the record, 
or if written, filed in the case file. 
(Amended effective April 1, 1997.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- ing, recording, or photographing court proceed-
xnent deleted former Subdivisions (B)(12) and ings, 
(13), which required judges to prohibit televis-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Interest substantially affected. whenever a judge sits on a case in which the 
Under Subdivision (E)(l)(d)(iii) of this canon, judged relative is a partner or otherwise an 
a relative of the requisite degree of relation- equity participant in a firm that represents a 
ship has an "interest" that might be suffi- party to the case. Regional Sales Agency, Inc. 
ciently "affected by the outcome" of a case v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252 (Utah 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note, Judge's previous legal association with attor-
Maintaining Public Confidence in the Integrity ney connected to current case as warranting 
of the Judiciary: State Bar of Nevada v. disqualification, 85 A.L.R.4th 700. 
Claiborne, 1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 283. Removal or discipline of state judge for ne-
A.L.R. — Disqualification from criminal gleet of, or failure to perform, judicial duties, 
proceedings of trial judge who earlier presided 87 A.L.R.4th 727. 
over disposition of case of coparticipant, 72 Disciplinary action against judge on ground 
ALJL4th 651. of abusive or intemperate language or conduct 
Abuse or misuse of contempt power as toward attorneys, court personnel, or parties to 
ground for removal or discipline of judge, 76 or witnesses in actions, and the like, 89 
A U U t b 982. A.L.R.4th 278. 
Disciplinary action against judge for engag- Prejudicial effect, in civil case, of communi-
ing in ex parte communication with attorney, cations between judges and jurors, 33 
party, or witness, 82 A L i U t h 567. AJLR.5th 205. 
CANON 4 
A JUDGE SHALL SO CONDUCT THE JUDGE'S EXTRA-
JUDICIAL ACTIVITIES AS TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF 
CONFLICT WITH JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS. 
A. Extra-judicial Activities in GeneraL A judge shall conduct the judge's 
extra-judicial activities so that they do not: 
(1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a 
judge; 
(2) demean the judicial office; 
(3) interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties; or 
(4) exploit the judge's judicial position. 
B. A vocational Activities. A judge may speak, write, lecture, teach and 
participate in other extra-judicial activities concerning the law, the legal sys-
tem, the administration of justice and non-legal topics subject to the require-
ments of this Code. 
C. Governmental, Civic, or Charitable Activities. 
(1) (a) A judge shall not appear at a public hearing before, or otherwise 
consult with, an executive or legislative body or official except on 
matters concerning the law, the legal system, or the administration 
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<d) All hearings and trials for dnorce ^iall be held before the court or 
the court commi^ioner as proxided b\ Section 78-3-31 and rules of the 
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall 
enter the decree upon the evidence or. in the case of a decree after default 
of the respondent, upon the petitioner's affidavit. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by order of the court 
upon the motion of either party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the 
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of 
record or attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office of 
Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving 
public assistance, or the court have full access to the entire record. This sealing 
does not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1211; L. The 1997 amendment by ch. 47, effective July 
1909, ch. 60, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 2999; R.S. 1933 1, 1997, substituted "petitioner" for "plaintiff" 
& C. 1943, 40-3-4; L. 1957, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, and "respondent" for "defendant" throughout 
ch. 59, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 2; 1983, ch. 116, the section. 
§ 1; 1985, ch. 151, § 1; 1989, ch. 104, § 1; The 1997 amendment by ch. 157, effective 
1990, ch. 230, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, § 35; 1992, ch.
 M ay 5, 1997, in Subsection (l)(c) deleted "and 
98, § 1; 1992, ch. 290, § 3; 1995, ch. 62, § 1;
 t h e p i ajn t i ff has filed an action in the judicial 
1997, ch. 47, § 2; 1997, ch. 157, § 1. district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the 
Amendment Notes . — The 1995 amend-
 p i l o t p r o g r a m sHall be administered" after 
ment, effective July 1, 1995, added the second « c h l l d o r c h i l d r e n » i n th e first sentence and 
sentence of Subsection (1Kb) and m the second
 m a d e s t y l i s t i c changes. 
sentence of Subsection (l)(d) substituted "shall -- . ^ .. •
 M f „„f o e ^ ^ ^ M I J u,r *i,-» 
. . , , » . r « i _ i i i J ^ I ^ J l"is section is set out as reconciled by the 
enter the decree for shall make and file find- ^~. -
 T . , .. 0 , j , n i j , „ J j J o *i. i v - Office of Legislative Research and General 
mgs and decree and added the language begin-
 r . " 
ning "or, in the case o f at the end. 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Determination of ali-
mony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable, orders relating, to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasc>nable and 
necessary medical and dental, expenses of the dependent children; 
(b). if coverage is" or becomes available at a reasonable cost; an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance, of appropriate health,, hospital, 
w 4 " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ . i ^ % ^ % : ^ the dependent children; £ 
^S})* ^5^4^?PkcL^S?SJK^c^P^y.^resPOn8ible.fbrthepirjrmentof joint debts,: obligations, or; liabilities*^ tKe^partjes. contracted or 
.inciOT^ djiring,marriage;
 t,r 4.».I>\*L-L« "-^ "1 i j . . . ' Vc 
_J*^fi)IiSfcw,der requiring the; p ^ i e s to^notoi^, re^^ or 
-*. obligees; regarding i£e court's division' of debts, 'obligations, orliabili-* 
•'. ties^and jegarding^the par tes separate,, current^.ad^esses^anjl 
_ n ' - d ^ ^ B ™ ^ * 0 " ^ enforcement
 vof^es^pjders;oand rW f^tr* 
(dJ^rdvisibn^.foriT^ inv accordanceVitliVTS'tle. 62A7 
•**»V.Chapter* 11,.Recovery.-Servicesr - - 4% . - *--- — 
.expenses^ 
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incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
<T training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
<3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by 
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the 
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
other partes failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The'court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage, 
(b) TheJcourt "may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimonyl-
(c)> As;a* general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing^ a f t h \ time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (a)%. Howeverj the'courtfshaU consider air relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may* ih its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living" that" existed ^t*tKe~trmVof trial. In mafri'ages of short 
durationJVwhen^no children have been conceived rpr,- born', during the 
mamagettHe court"may*consider the standarcTof living that existed at the 
timer6£ ffie'mamage; 
(d) -THef coiirt may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equal-
ize tJie^plaHi¥an^i^ctiv^^ ?^***?\ 
(e) Vmer^d^amagh'of lbng'duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major'cRa^e*-in ^ 
efTortsffifVotK^^ 
p r o p e ^ £ i & ^ i ^ alimdnft'*' If' one1 spouse's 
earningtH^aty^Has.been greatly^enHanced*lhrougErthe-effoVtsf oflx>th 
spotise^dtunng^ther marnage,^toej ^urtr.mayr make: a; compensating 
adjus£ment:in. dmdin^tKe.majrital property1 and.lawarding 'alimony.7* 
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< f) In determining alimony \\ hen a marnaee of short duration di^oh e>, 
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(g) (1) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time 
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circum-
stances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse 
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this 
subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial 
ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse 
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number 
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination 
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights 
are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
History: R.S. 1898 & CX. 1907, § 1212; L: Subsections (7) to (9); renumbered former Sub-
1909; ch. 109, § 4; C L ' 1917, § 3000; R.S. sections (7) and (8) as (5) and (6); and made 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; stylistic changes. 
1975,'ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984,' cK The 1997 amendment, effective"July 1,1997, 
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, * 1; 1985,* ch. 100, § 1; substituted "Recovery Services" for Tar t s 4 
1991^ ch. 257/ § 4; 1993, ch. 152f § 1; 1993, and 5" in Subsection (l)(d) and deleted Subsec-
ch.261, § 1; 1994, chi'284, § 1;'1995, ch. 330, tion (l)(e) which" provided fors an assesment 
§ 1; 1997, ch. 232, $ 4 , - against the obligor for a check handling fee. 
^-Amendment K o t e s V ^ T h e 1995 aznendf ~ Compiler's Note'sT-p Laws, 1995, chv330, 
meht; effective May 1,1995,'deleted a'proyisibii ' wrlich"\ amended this section," provides' in §^2 
from Subsection (3) for ^support^and. mainte^ - that^the. Legislature* does notintend that tef-
naiicerordera;^deletedrform*erTSubsections^5).*:h znination of alimony, based 'on cohabitation, in 
and^fefc. crowding'* tKa£.alimony„terminates accordance with Subsection (9)V"be interpreted 
upon remarriage, or cohabitation with a mem- in any way to.condone such » relationship for 
be* of the opposite Bex, py. the payee; added' any purpose. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
C o m p i l e r ' s No tes . — In 1997, the Utah 
l^p^lature changed the designation of parties 
in domestic relations cases from "plaintiff* and 
'defendant" to "petitioner" and "respondent." 
Annotations from decisions before the amend-
ments will not reflect these changes in termi-
nology 
ANALYSIS 
Alimony and support. 
— Amount 
Imputed income. 
— Cohabitation by payee. 
Attorney fees. 
Child custody. 





— Preliminary orders. 
— Retirement funds. 
—Unilateral transfer. 
Stipulations and agreements of parties. 
Al imony and support . 
—Amount . 
Imputed income. 
Trial court, relying on evidence sufficiently 
detailed in its findings of fact, did not abuse its 
discretion in imputing income to defendant 
spouse for purposes of determining her alimony 
award. Willey v. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). 
—Cohabi ta t ion by payee . 
Findings by trial court that former spouse 
and person of the opposite sex had a sexual 
relationship, shared living expenses, had open 
access to each other's condominiums, ate to-
gether and shared food expenses, kept clothing 
in the same condominium, used the same fur-
niture and otherwise lived as though they were 
husband. and wife supported the finding of 
cohabitation." Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah 
Ct. App? 1995). 
Evidence thaMonnej^wif efe. current lover had 
a key to fier touse, spent four or five nights a 
week there ^even if.sKe was\ away^and, kept 
clothmg'ancVother personal effects at her home 
supported; "conclusion^ that*' theucb\iple* were1 in 
fact residing together!'and this'/combined with* 
sexual^relationship, was. enough..to, terminate. 
the former husbancTsjobligatipn^to pay alimony^ 
under* tEe- "divorcer decree."** Pendleton*2" v.* 
Pendleton? 918 P.2d"159 (Utah' CC AppT~ 1996).^' 
At torney lees.;, 
Because wife'didjnqt.comply with* visitation,' 
order^contained in tier decree; there was no1 
abuse of discretion by couit in awarding attor-' 
ney fees to husband, the prevailing party. Sigg 
v Sigg 905 P2d 906 »Utah Ct App 1995) 
Child custody. 
— Fac to r s cons ide red . 
In a child custody suit, the maternal grand-
parents failed to prove that no strong mutual 
bond existed between the child and the natural 
father, that the natural father was unwilling to 
sacrifice his own interest and welfare for his 
child's, and that the father lacked the sympa-
thy for and understanding of the child that is 
generally characteristic of parents; conse-
quently, the maternal grandparents failed to 
rebut the parental presumption, which favored 
the child's natural father. Duncan v. Howard, 
918 R2d 888 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Child support. 
—Estoppel. 
Former wife's delay in claiming former hus-
band was making insufficient payments was 
not enough to estop her from seeking reim-
bursement for payments former husband was 
legally obligated to make to his children. Ball v. 
Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Health insurance. 
The trial court has broad discretion under 
this section to credit one or both parents, as the 
court deems equitable, for the coverage pro-
vided by a third party; thus, trial court could 
credit wife for current husband's insurance 
coverage of wife's and her former husband's 




Decedent's unilateral self-conveyance sever-
ing joint tenancy and her conveyance of her 
interest in the residence to the trustees of a 
revocable trust did not violate the trial court's 
order that she and her husband, parties to a 
divorce action, neither sell, encumber,,, nor 
mortgage theirassets pending the proceedings, 
because, it did not result^ in the removal of 
property * from * the • court's -> jurisdiction. 
Knickerbocker v.-Cannon," 912 ~P.2d 969 (Utah 
x996).« 
—Retirement funas . 
^ tetireme'nt^fund? Vcamulafaf ixr a' 40l(al 
plan"dliiringT*marriage'are marital^assets^and 
were" appropriately considered byr the" trial 
court! Jefferies'v: Jefferies. 895~P.2d ~835 "(Utafi 
C t Ann.* 1995). 
—Unilateral transfer. ' 
; In a^divorce proceeding, tHe trial court was 
without jurisdiction to reach funds transferred 
by the husband to the children pursuant to the 
Uniform Transfers to Minors Act; however, in 
making equitable division between the spouses, 
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<b) For purposes of Subsection (7)<a), a s.ub>tantial change in circum-
stances may include 
(1) material changes in cu*tod\. 
hi) material changes in the re la tne wealth or a<^et* of the parties, 
hn) material changes of 30'/? or more in the income of a parent; 
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn, 
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; and 
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent 
for the support of others, 
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (7)(a), the court shall, 
taking into account the best interests of the child, determine whether a 
substantial change has occurred. If it has, the court shall then determine 
whether the change results in a difference of 15% or more between the 
amount of child support ordered and the amount that would be required 
under the guidelines. If there is such a difference and the difference is not 
of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust the amount of child support 
ordered to tha t which is provided for in the guidelines. 
(8) Notice of the opportunity to adjust a support order under Subsections (6) 
and (7) shall be included in each child support order issued or modified after 
July 1, 1997. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.2, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
1989, ch. 214, § 4; 1990, ch. 100, § 3; 1990, ment, effective July 1,1997 rewrote Subsection 
ch. 275, § 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 4; 1997, ch. 232, (6) and added Subsections (7) and (8). 
§ 72. 
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
t rus t income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"noumeaus-tested" government programs. 
(2). Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if during the, t ime prior to the 
original support order, the parent^normally and consistently worked more than 
40 .hours at his-job,, the court may Consider this extra time as a^ pattern in 
calculating the parent's ability,to provide child support. * ^ " \ 
(3). Specifically!excluded from gross income are:.*-'• \ ^ V 
(aL'c&lfassistance provided under, Title 35Ai Chapter 3, Part 3, Family 
Employment Program;;- ~ -_" — : - -t ,- rl: 
(W benefits received Hinder a housing subsidy program, the Job Training 
Partnership Act, Supplemental Security. Income, Social Security Disabil-
ity^Insu*!^ Staftips^or! General Assistance; and;;. 
_ (cjijbjfief si inilatmeans-t^s^ by, a parent. 
(4)1 (a)" Gross income ffom*self-employinerit or operation of a business^shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses "required for self-employ-
ment or-business^operation from gross receiptsJThe income and expenses 
fixx^self-"employmentr or" operation.; oLa;business^shall be^reviewed to 
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determine an appropriate le\el of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly 
income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each 
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer s ta tements and 
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the 
court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of 
income from records maintained by the Department of Workforce Services 
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax 
re turns . 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made tha t the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least a t the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents ' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
* (iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to 
establish basic job skills; or . . -
(iv).- unusual, emotional or. physical needs, of. a child, require the 
.custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject, of a child support .'award nor benefits. to_ a.child, in the. child's own 
right such as Supplemental-Security Income; ' 
- 0>). Sorial_Securitx benefits^receiyed by a child due^ tp^tHe earnings of a 
parent shall be credited as child support to the parent upon whose'earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount "against tKepotential obligation 
of,that parent. Other unearned!"income oi'a^ child may be considered as 
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case^ 
'History: C. 1953, 78^7 i , U enac ted by L. .8 1; 1997, ch. 174, j , 68; 1997, c £ 375, §^322. 
1989?ch; 214, 5 7;1990?chu 100,' $ 5; 1994, Amendment' Notes: —"The° 1997 amend-" 
ch. 118,1 7; 1996/ch. 171; § 1; 1997, ch. 29/ xncnt by'ch.* 29,'effective Ma/''5/1997, substi- * 
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tu ted '^h . i i r for *m.»\" in Su l^c i ion t8>'bi The J997 amendment by ch 375, eflfectne 
Die 1997 amendment b\ ch 174. efTecme «)ul> 1. 1997. substituted Department of 
•luh 1 1^97. reuni te Sub-ection <3>'a) which Workforce Services" for "Office of Employment 
tend * Aid to Families with Dependent Children Security' in Subsection <5>(b) 
'AFDCT and substituted 'Supplemental Secu- This section has been set out as reconciled bv 
ntv Income, Social Security Disability Insur- the Office of Legislative Research and General 
ance~ for ~S S I " in Subsection (3Mb) Counsel 
78-45-7.11. Reduct ion for e x t e n d e d vis i tat ion. 
(1) The child support order shall provide that the base child support award 
be reduced by 507c for each child for time periods during which the child is with 
the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written agreement of the 
parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a 
client of cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family 
Employment Program, any agreement by the parties for reduction of child 
support during extended visitation shall be approved by the administrative 
agency. However, normal visitation and holiday visits to the custodial parent 
shall not be considered an interruption of the consecutive day requirement. 
(2) For purposes of this section the per child amount to which the abatement 
applies shall be calculated by dividing the base child support award by the 
number of children included in the award. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.11, enacted by L. of cash assistance provided under Title 35A, 
1989, ch. 214, § 13; 1990, ch. 100, § 9; 1994, Chapter 8, Part 3, Family Employment Pro-
ch. 118, § 12; 1997, ch. 174, § 69. gram* for "recipient of Aid to Families with 
Amendment Notes . — The 1997 amend- Dependent Children" in the second sentence of 
ment. effective July 1, 1997. substituted "client Subsection (1). 
78-45-7.13. Advisory commit tee — Membership and func-
t ions . 
(1) On or before March 1, 1995, the governor shall appoint an advisory 
committee consisting of: 
(a) one representative recommended by the Office of Recovery Services; 
(b) one representative recommended by the Judicial Council; 
(c) two representatives recommended by the Utah State Bar Associa-
tion; 
(d) two representatives of noncustodial parents, one male and one 
female, appointed by the governor; 
(e) two representatives of custodial parents, one male and one female, 
appointed by the governor, and 
(f) an uneven number of additional persons, not to exceed three, who 
represent diverse interests related to child support issues, as the governor 
may consider- appropriate. However, none of the individuals appointed 
under this subsection may be members of the Utah State Bar Association. 
(2) (a). Except as required by Subsection (b); "as terms of current committee 
memBefs'expife, the governor shall'appoint each'neW?memfeer or reap-
pointed member to"a fpur:yeaf term:- ^! _/:„-.. ^m ^ . - v ~ : -
(b): Notwithstaiidiiik thVr^uiremehts 'of. Subsection (a)/ the governor 
shalli at. the time of appointment br.reap'pointine"ht,' adjust the length of 
terms £o"e"nsufe that the terms of cbnfmift^7mefQl^ra are'staggered so 
that approximately half of the committee is appointed every two years. . 
(3) When a vacsmcy/occiirs.in the membership.for/ahy, reason, tHe replace-
ment shall be .appointed for the. unexpired term. 
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the papers should not be deemed to violate ihe Paragraph (f). The changes in this para-
rule merely because they were prepared in a gTaph make it clear that the clerk must accept 
dot matrix printer. Ae currently written, this R11 papers for fihng, even though they may vio-
paragraph also removes any confusion concern- late the rule, but the clerk may require counsel 
ing the top margin and left margin require- to
 Bubstitute conforming for nonconforming pa-
roenta (now 2 inches and 1 inch respectively), ^ ^ jyie c ] e r k iB ^ v e n discretion to waive re-
and this paragraph imposes new requirement*
 q u i r e m entf i of the rule for parties who are not 
for right and bottom margins (both one-half
 r e p r e g e n t e d b y counsel; for good cause shown, 
* «
 L M « . , , . , . the court may relieve parties of the obligation Paragraph (e). This paragraph, which is an . . ... ., _/, ^ ^ „ ^ . + .«. JJ^« / « u - i • f J • * to comply with the rule or any part of it. 
addition to the rule, requires typed signature ~ *r. ,
 VT . e . . . . . , w , x 
i-" -~A . ; ^ i t „ * J . ;~ ~*™^\^T~* ki«^u „ Compiler'* Notes.--Subdivisions (a) to (c) 
lines ana signatures in permanent black or #. „.. , . . i * » , ,
 rt -o « /^  r> 
blue ink o f t h l B r u J e a r e 8 U n i l a r ^ R u l e 10» F R C P -
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS of a pleading to clarify or explain the same, an 
. . . exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose 
Exhibits. of supplying necessary material averments nor 
~V*e as pleadings.
 c a n t h e GOnUni o f t h e e x h i b i t ^ ^ ^ aB p a r t 
C l t e d
' of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard 
Exhibit*, v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). 
—Use as pleadings. Cited in State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646 
While an exhibit may be considered as a part P.2d 727 (Utah 1982). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading Propriety and effect of use of fictitious name 
§§ 23 to 56, 69, 117. of plaintiff in federal court, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 369. 
OJ.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 5,9, 63 to 98, Key Numbers. — Pleading «- 4, 13, 15, 
371 to 375, 418. 38 Va to 75, 307 to 312, 340. 
A.L.R. — Propriety of attaching photo-
graphs to a pleading, 33 A.L.R.3d 322. 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; 
representations to court; sanctions. 
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, 
if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. 
Each paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if any. 
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need 
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be 
stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being 
called to the attention of the attorney or party. 
(b) Representations to court By presenting a pleading, written motion, 
or other paper txf the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later 
advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best 
of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass 
or^caWf linneceBsaiy delay dr~needless increase in*the cost of litigation; 
(SO\: thie 'claims/ defeases,^ and, otherc legaT contentions^ therein "are7 war: 
ranted.by.existingJaw: or.by^a^noiifrivolous argument for the extension, 
modification, pr reversal of existing law or the>steblisHment of new law; 
(3),' the allegations" and oti&er factud contentions have evidehtiary sup-
port or, if specific^y so identified, are likely to haveJeydentiaryvsupport 
after a reasonable opp<)rturuty'for further investigation or discovery; and 
(4£the^denials of ftcti^ warranted 6ii the7 evidence or; 
^ if specifically so~ identified/are* reasonably based on* a lack of information 
"or- belief.'~ 
.(c)" Sfmctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond,'the 
courj£ <de$erp^ has ^ n * violated," the^coiirt may^subject 
to the conditions stated below, impose anappropriate sanction upon thVattor-
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neys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible 
for the violation. 
(1) How initiated. 
(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be 
made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe 
the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be 
served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented 
to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such 
other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, 
defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appro-
priately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party 
prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees 
incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate circum-
stances, a law firm may be held jointly responsible for violations 
committed by its partners, members, and employees. 
(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter 
an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdi-
vision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause 
why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto. 
(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for viola-
tion of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of 
such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject 
to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist 
of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a 
penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective 
deterrence, an order dirscting payment to the movant of some or all of the 
reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of 
the violation. 
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented 
party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2). 
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initia-
tive unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary 
dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party 
which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned. 
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the con-
duct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis 
for the sanction imposed. 
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule 
do not'apply to disclosures.and discovery requests, responses, objections, and 
motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules, 26 through 37. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985;. April 1, 1997.) 
Advisory; Committee Note. —• The" 1997 
amendments, conform state Rule, 11 with fed-
eral Rule_117J)ne difference between the rules 
concerns holding a law firm jointly responsible 
for violations by a'membef of the firm. JFederal 
Rule"; ltfSUXATsteteW^AbsenY exceptional 
circunistahceaf a law firm aball be held jointly 
respon^letfortyiote kyj its 
partners,-associates,-and employees." Under 
the fedefal:%l^VJoint''re^nsibiUtyV prW' 
sumed jBdesT the judgif determiheTnbt to im? 
pose pomtj^spo^bili^ State Rule_ll(c)(lXA)' 
provide«gln appr^riat£dpcumstances, a law 
finn'fnayBe^Held jomt3y3*^l^l«/or#"viola-, 
tions committed by"its>ar&enrmemtors; and 
employees." Under the state rule, joint respon-
sibility is not presumed, 'and the judge may 
impose joint responsibility in_ appropriate cir-
cumstances. What constitutes appropriate cir-
cumstances is left to the discretion of the judge, 
but might include: repeated violations, espe-
cially., after ' earlier : sanctions;' firm-wide 
sanctionable practices; or a sanctionable prac-
ice approved_by_ a supervising attorney and 
committed by a subordinate. 
Amendment Notes.'— The 1997. amend-
ment rewrote this rule. 
Compiler's Notes, — This rule is similar to 
Rule 11, FitCJP. 
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Amendment of complaint 
Appeals. 
Nature of duty imposed. 
Reasonable inquiry. 
Sanctions not warranted. 
Violation. 





In an adoption proceeding, the trial court 
properly imposed Rule 11 sanctions against at-
torney who failed to make reasonable inquiry 
into existing law, made allegations in the 
amended petition that were not well grounded 
in fact, failed to obtain a preplacement adop-
tive study or temporary placement order, failed 
to comply with the Interstate Compact on the 
Placement of Children, knew or should have 
known the natural mother's consent was 
flawed, knew the natural father would not con-
sent to the adoption, and failed to make a rea-
sonable inquiry as to whether the natural fa-
ther's parental rights were terminable. Giffen 
v. R.W.L., 913 P.2d 761 (Utah Ct App. 1996). 
Amendment of complaint 
" Amendment by an attorney of the facts 
stated in a complaint was sufficient to estab-
lish those facts as they would have been by a 
verified complaint before the changes made by 
this rule making verification unnecessary. 
Calder v. Third Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Salt 
Lake County, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168 
fc (1954). 
* Appeals* 
; After voluntary dismissal by plaintiffs, the 
trial court's retention of jurisdiction to enforce 
sanctions under this rule did not legally preju-
^dice plaintiffs and there was no final appeal-
*able order. Barton v. Utah Transit Auth,, 872 
-P.2d "1036 (Utah 1994). 
Nature of duty imposed. 
^ This rule emphasizes an attorney's public 
fduty as an officer of the court, si opposed to the 
^attorney's private duty to represent a' client's 
: interest zealously. Clark v. Booth, 821 P.2d 
Reasonable inquiry, 
^Certificationby an attorney "that to the best 
Lofihis'* knowledge, information, and belief 
[formed* after a1 reasonable inquiry the~com-
j^laint? is j well ^ grounded in* fact; and~ is* war-
tranted by.existing law" does hot require him to, 
[obtain" a favorable expert medical opinion be^ 
i(ore-fil£xg.(' a ^ medical, malpnfctlce.raction.* 
iDes&amprv: PulleV, 784 P.2d 471 (Utah Ct< 
FXSi?1989).%- ^ _ i r / - - . 
x
 Underl this rule, Ja* party- need: not have 
,. reached. the- correct.conclusiqn;^he need;only' 
naye^made a reasonable inquiry/ Barnard v.*% 
Utah* State" Bar: 857 R2dl 917 (Utah 1993)r 
Because attorney's'reading" of the law as it 
existed when he commenced his action was at 
least plausible, sanctions'under this rule were 
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 11 
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not warranted Barnard v Utah State Bar, 857 
P2d 917 (Utah 1993) 
Sanctions not warranted. 
On motions to impose sanctions against 
plaintiff Utah State Bar filed by defendants 
engaged in practice of public adjusting and 
based on the grounds that (1) the original com-
plaint named as plaintiff the "Board of Com-
missioners of the Utah State Bar** instead of 
the "Utah State Bar," (2) there were no facts to 
support the claim that one defendant was en-
gaged in public adjusting, and (3) there was no 
basis in the law to support the Bar's assertion 
in its original complaint that first-party ad-
justing constituted the unauthorized practice 
of law, motions were properly denied since the 
misnomer of plaintiff in the original complaint 
was a technical error which did not cause de-
fendants any prejudice and was corrected in 
the Bar's amended complaint, since Bar coun-
sel had evidence that defendants were engaged 
in public adjusting, and since law as to first-
party adjusting was unsettled. Utah State Bar 
v. Sorensen, 910 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1996). 
Violation. 
—Question of law. 
Whether specific conduct amounts to a viola-
tion of this rule is a question of law. Taylor v. 
Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
—Sanctions. 
This rule gives trial courts great leeway to 
tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of 
the particular case. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 
770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct App. 1989); Giffen v. 
R.W.L., 913 P.2d 761 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Attaching the wrong document to a com-
plaint violated this rule because a reasonable 
inquiry would have revealed the mistake; 
award of attorney fees was appropriate because 
the error caused defendants to incur legal ex-
pense in researching the validity of an irrele-
vant document and preparing a motion to dis-
miss based on i t Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 
770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct App. 1989). 
Award of costs and attorney fees was an ap-
propriate sanction for attempting to go forward 
with a class action that, in light of the com-
plete resolution of the matter eleven months' -
prior," was."unconscionable and beyond, rea-
son." Schoney vl Memorial Estates.' Inci, 863 
P.2d 5? (Utah C e App.' 1993). " 
—Standard. 
Sanctions were improper "against *ui attor-
ney, where opposing parties'conceded that no * 
particular document was signed in violation or 
the rule, but simply^ argued* that even if the 
'attorney believed thecase'was well/grounded. 
when he filed* the* complaint,' he' should have 
known after'helmet with^counsel for'defen-
dants^ that, the? case; could - not*, go' forward. -
Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct App. -
1991). 
"' Utah appellate courts should use the three-
standard approach in reviewing a trial court's 
Rule 11 findings. This approach includes: (1) 
reviewing the trial court's findings of fact un-
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der the clearly erroneous standard, (2) review-
ing the trial court's ultimate conclusion that 
Rule 11 was violated and any subsidiary legal 
conclusions under the correction of error stan-
dard; and (3) reviewing the trial court's deter-
mination as to the type and amount of sanction 
to be imposed under the abuse of discretion 
standard. Barnard v. SutlifT, 846 P.2d 1229 
(Utah 1992); Giffen v. RW.L, 913 P.2d 761 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
The determination of whether conduct vio-
lates Rule 11 is made on an objectne basis 
Giffen v R W L , 913 P 2d 761 (Utah Ct App 
1996). 
Cited in Walker v Carlson, 740 P 2d 1372 
(UtahCt App 1987), State v Perdue, 813 P 2d 
1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Rimensburger v. 
Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — At-
torney's Fees, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 342. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Curbing 
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough Is 
Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 579. 
Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: 
We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 597. 
Note, Appellate Review of Rule 11 Issues — 
De Novo or Abuse of Discretion? Thomas r. 
Capita] Security Services, Inc., 1989 B.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 877. 
Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 
1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 959. 
Fines Under New Federal Civil Rule 11: The 
New Monetary Sanctions for the "Stop-and-
Think-Again" Rule, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 879. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading 
§§ 339 to 349. 
C.J.S. — 71 CJ.S. Pleading §§ 339 to 366. 
A.L.R. — Liability of attorney, acting for cli-
ent, for malicious prosecution, 46 A.L.R.4th 
249. 
Inherent power of federal district court to 
impose monetary sanctions on counsel in ab-
sence of contempt of court, 77 A.LJR. Fed. 789. 
Comment Note — General principles regard-
ing imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 A L.R. Fed. 
107. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in ac-
tions for defamation, 95 A.L.R Fed. 181. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in action 
for wrongful discharge from employment, 96 
A.L.R. Fed. 13. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, m ac-
tions for securities fraud, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 107. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in ac-
tions for infliction of emotional distress, 98 
A.L.R. Fed. 442. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in anti-
trust actions, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 573. 
Procedural requirements for imposition of 
sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 556. 
Key Numbers. — Pleading *» 287 to 304. 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty 
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless other-
wise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto 
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his 
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the 
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service 
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under 
this rule alters theseperiods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed 
by "order"of the court 
(1 j If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within, ten 
days after- notice'of the court's* action; 
(2) If the'court* grants a motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading~shallj>6 served within ten davs after the service of 
the more definite statement- -
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact,* 10 claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether'aJclaim*counte^ or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted, in^ the ^ responsive pleading'thereto if one is>equired/except 
th^t&e'foUowing1defenses1 ma£ at the bption~'of.tlie" pleader, be made by 
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subjedfmatter', (2) lack of jurisdiction 
over the person, (3) improper venue; (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffi-
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fixed b\ these rules, by CJA 4-501, or bv order of the court Such an order may 
for cause shown be made on ex parte application When a motion is supported 
by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion, and, except as 
otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later 
than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at 
some other time. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail Whenever a party has the right or 
is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period 
after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is 
served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment inserted "by CJA 4-501" in the first 
sentence of Subdivision (d). 
PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
Rule 9. P l e a d i n g special matters . 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Conditions precedent, tifFs compliance with the particular require-
Where the complaint alleged compliance ments not alleged Shunk v. State, 924 P.2d 
with some, but not all, statutory requirements, 879 (Utah 1996). 
the defendant was not obligated to deny plain-
Rule 11. S ign ing of pleadings, motions , and other papers; representa-
t ions to court; sanct ions. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Violation. seeking attorney fees from landowners after 
—Sanctions. obtaining^ quitclaim deed from landowner for 
Attorney fees. the disputed property, could not be supported 
. under either § 78-27-56(1) or this rule, because 
Violation.
 w h e n a(}jacent landowners filed their claim 
Sanctions. there was there was no clear prohibition on the 
recovery of attorney fees in undisputed quiet 
——Attorney fees. title actions and finding was not made as to 
Award of attorney fees to landowners bad faith on part of the adjacent landowner. 
against adjacent landowners, on the basis.that Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158 (Utah Ct. 
the adjacent landowners acted in bad faith by App. 1997). 
Rule 12. D e f e n s e s and object ions. 
NOTES.TO DECISIONS 
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. drafting, filing, and disposition of habeas cor-
—Habeas corpus. pus' petitions,*" Subdivision (bX6) of this rule 
*» A . *~ *. . * * .i * , applies"" to habeas corpus^  petitions -ir/'which 
Motion toLdismxss for.failure.to.state a petitioner,fails Uf stated claim.upon' which 
relief could be granted! Alvarez v7 Galetka, 933 
—Habeas corpus. P-2d $*l (tf tah 1997)-
- Although" Rule 65BJ generally, governs* the 
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\ i e u , judgment or order re\ok,ng or Pu-»pwid-
mg professional, trade, or occupational license, 
42 A L R 4 t h 516 
Constitutionality, construction and applica-
tion of statute as to effect of taking appeal, or 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 63, F.R.C.P., and to the federal statute on 
disqualification of judges, 28 U.S.C. § 144. 
ANALYSIS 
Action on affidavit. 
Basis for disqualification. 
Effect of affidavit 
Failure to file affidavit 
Findings entered by successor. 
Nature of affidavit 
"Other, disability." 
Sufficiency of affidavit 
Timeliness of motion. 
Untimely filing of, affidavit 
Validity of prior rulings. 
Written* findings not required. 
Cited: 
Action on affidavit 
By characterizing and ruling on the affidavit 
filed under Subdivision (b) as if it were a mo-
tion, and by. making reference to his decisions 
in other cases; judge risked improperly influ-
encing the review by another judge after certi-
fication!-The'order went beyond the procedure 
outlined in Subdivision (b) and thus was va-
«ta\ing execution on right to redeem from exe-
cution or judicial sale, 44 A L R 4th 1229 
Key Numbers. — Execution •=» 75, 158 to 
177, Judgment *» 851 to 656 
Cross-References. — Disqualification for 
interest or relation to parties, § 78-7-1. 
cated. Barnard v. Murphy, 852 P.2d 1023 
(Utah Ct App. 1993), cert denied, 878 P.2d 
1154 (Utah 1994). 
The requirement of Subdivision (b) — that, 
once an affidavit is filed questioning the neu-
trality of a judge, the judge must either certify 
the affidavit to another judge for review or 
transfer the case — must be followed even if 
there is only minimal judicial action remain* 
ing to be taken in the case. Barnard v. Murphy, 
882 P.2d 679 (Utah C t App. 1994). 
„ A blanket, prospective direction of automatic 
recusal is beyond the scope of Subdivision (b); 
thus, the appellate'court would not issue an 
order that a district court judge disqualify him-
self immediately in any future case in which 
plaintiff filed an affidavit Barnard v. Murphy, 
882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct App. 1994). 
Basis for disqualification. 
' Judge's forming"'of impressions as to the 
merits of the controversy at a pretrial hearing 
and comments^ thereafter do not in' and of 
themselves justify disqualification to proceed 
Rule 63. Disability or disqualification of a judge. 
(a) Disability. If by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, a judge 
before whom an action has been tried is unable to perform the duties to be 
performed by the court under these rules after a verdict is returned or find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, then any other judge regularly 
sitting in or assigned to the court in which the action was tried may perform 
those duties; but if such other judge is satisfied that he cannot perform those 
duties because he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he may 
in his discretion grant a new trial. 
(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil 
or criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit that the judge 
before whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or 
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite 
party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call in 
another judge to hear and determine the matter. 
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that 
such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after the 
case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is known. If the judge against 
whom the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he 
shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to 
another judge (naming him) of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, 
which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit. If the 
judge against whom the affidavit is directed does not question the legal suffi-
ciency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified finds 
that it is legally sufficient, another judge must be called in to try the case or 
determine the matter in question. No party shall be entitled in any case to file 
more than one affidavit; and no such affidavit shall be filed unless accompa-
nied by a certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and application are 
made in good faith. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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vnth the tnal. Orderville Irrigation Co v 
Glendale Irrigation Co, 17 Utah 2d 262, 409 
P.2d 616 (1965). 
Effect of affidavit 
If, after a party files an affidavit of bias or 
prejudice, a judge denies removal of the cause 
to another judge, as contemplated by Subdivi-
sion (b), any order of judgment based on evi-
dence thereafter taken by the judge is ineffec-
tive against the affiant. Anderson v. Anderson, 
13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962;. 
Failure to file affidavit 
This rule requires that a party alleging judi-
cial bias or prejudice must first file an affidavit 
to that effect in the trial court; and the issue 
will not be considered when it is raised for the 
first time on appeal. Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 
9 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Findings entered by successor. 
Where original trial judge died before sign-
ing or even noting any findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, and second judge ordered a new 
trial but did not indicate whether he meant the 
successor judge to rehear the testimony of the 
witnesses, third judge did not abuse his discre-
tion or act improperly in reversing the new 
trial order and rendering a decision based upon 
his review of the transcript of the prior trial, 
supplemented by oral arguments and memo-
randa of law, where the trial was complete to 
the point of all evidence being in and the origi-
nal judge advising the parties of his decision, 
there was no material conflict in the testimony 
of the witnesses respecting the only issue of the 
case, the third judge did not have to determine 
the credibility of the witnesses nor determine 
which witness to believe over another witness, 
but was left with the task of determining what 
conclusions were to be drawn from the testi-
mony which had been given. In re Estate of 
Cassity, 656 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1982). 
Where original judge had entered his ruling 
in' writing at conclusion of trial and had noted 
what his findingB would be, the trial and con-
viction of defendant was complete even though 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law were 
entered by a successor judge. State v. Kelsey, 
532 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1975). 
Nature of affidavit 
f. Affidavit of bias or prejudice is neither mo-
tion'nor action, although the filing of the affi-
davit more closely resembles a motion in its' 
implementation and effect than it resembles 
an action. State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760 (Utah 
1984). 
."Other disability." 
/The phrase "or other disability^ in Subdivi-
sion (a) is not limited to mere mental or physi-
cal disability, but extends to any disability 
whatsoever, including resignation of the judge. 
State>^Kelsey, 532 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1975)." 
Sufficiency of affidavit - f «* --* 
Court did not err in refusing to grant plain} 
tiffs motion for change of judge bt-caube the 
affidavit of prejudice in support of the motion, 
reciting that judge "wa« personally acquamttd 
with the plaintifT and had knowledge of her 
business transaction and her past personal 
life," was not sufficient compliance with rule 
requiring that every such affidavit state farts 
and reasons for belief that bias or prejudice 
exists. Christensen v. Chri6tensen, 18 Utah 2d 
315, 422 P.2d 534 (1967). 
Timeliness of motion. 
Timeliness is essential in filing a motion to 
disqualify. To be timely, a motion to disqualify 
should be filed at counsel's first opportunity 
after learning of the disqualifying facts. Only if 
good cause for a delay is demonstrated in the 
motion seeking disqualification should a delin-
quent motion even be considered. Madsen v. 
Prudential Fed. Saw & Loan Ass'n, 767 P.2d 
538 (Utah 1988). 
Motion to disqualify was not timely filed, 
where movant waited 39 days after the trial to 
file a formal motion to disqualify. Madsen v. 
Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 767 P.2d 
538 (Utah 1988). 
Motion to disqualify was not timely filed, 
where movant waited 88 days after an alleged 
demonstration of bias by the judge to file his 
motion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
Untimely filing of affidavit 
Where affidavit cf prejudice filed by defen-
dants was filed after the trial had commenced 
and its contents had to do with matters alleged 
to have existed long before the trial and with a 
statement made by the court during the trial, 
the filing of such affidavit was untimely. 
LepasioteB v. Dinsdale, 121 Utah 359, 242 P.2d 
297 (1952). 
Validity of prior rulings. 
Where timely motion to vacate ex parte or-
der on grounds of lack of notice and excusable 
neglect was placed on the general law and mo-
tion calendar at direction of the judge who had 
issued the order, rulings of judge who assumed 
jurisdiction were valid and effective, and could 
not be overruled by another district judge. Tan-
ner v. Mecham, 537 P.2d 312 (Utah 1975). 
Written findings not required. 
- Rulings on affidavits to disqualify a judge for 
bias and prejudice are not required to be ac-
companied by specific written findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. State v. Poteet, 692 
P.2d 760 (Utah 1984). 
, Cited in Pons v. Faux, 16 Utah 2d 9$, 396 
P.2d 407 (1964); Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 
1244 (Utah 1987); Mann v. Wadsworth, 776 
P.2d 926 (Utah Ct App. 1989); Onyeabor v. 
Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah Ct App. 
1990); Young v;* Patterson, 922 P.2d 1280 
(Utah" 1996). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 46 Am Jur 2d Judges Wai\er or loss of right to disqualify judge by 
§§ 86 et eeq , 248 et &eq participation in proceedings, 24 A L R 4th 870 
C.J.S. — 49 C J.S. Judges §§ 8, 72 et seq , Disqualification of judge because of assault 
91, 98 to 108 o r threat against hun by party or person asso-
A.L.R. — Pcmer of successor or substituted Clflt*<* * ^ h P * 1 ^ 25 A L R 4th 923 
judge, m civil case, to render decision or enter Disqualification of judge because of political 
judgment on testimony heard by predecessor, f f c ' a t l ? n ° r r e l a t l o n to a t t*™ey m «»•• 6$ 
22 A.L.R.3d 922. A.L.R4th ,3 
r* i r „•,«« «r ««^~«i 4.««i „ , J ^ •« „,• Form and requirements of certificate and af-
Disqualification of original trial judge to Bit
 f d o f ^ ^ a l l f l c a t l o n o f t r i a l j u d g e ^ ^ 
0 n
T p £ a 7 A ^ ° r 28U.SC. 5 144,23 A.L.R. Fed. 637 
A.L.R.3d 176. Timeliness of affidavit of disqualification of 
Disqualification of judge, justice of the peace, ^
 j u d g e ^ ^ 2 g u s c § 144> 2 4 A L R 
or similar judicial officer for pecuniary interest fed. 290. 
in fines, forfeitures, or fees payable by liti- Key Numbers. — Judges *» 13 to 19, 21, 39 
gants, 72 A.L.R.3d 375.
 e t seq. 
Rule 63A. Change of judge as a matter of right. 
(a) Notice of change. Except in small claims proceedings, in any civil 
action commenced after April 15,1992 in any district court, all parties joined 
in the action may, by unanimous agreement and without cause, change the 
judge assigned to the action by filing a notice of change of judge. The parties 
shall send a copy of the notice to the assigned judge and the presiding judge. 
The notice shall be signed by all parties and shall state: (1) the name of the 
assigned judge; (2) the date on which the action was commenced; (3) that all 
parties joined in the action have agreed to the change; (4) that no other 
persons are expected to be named as parties; and (5) that a good faith effort 
has been made to serve all parties named in the pleadings. The notice shall 
not specify any reason for the change of judge. Under no circumstances shall 
more than one change of judge be allowed under this rule in an action. 
(b) Time. Unless extended by the court upon a showing of good cause, the 
notice must be filed within 90 days after commencement of the action or prior 
to the notice of trial setting, whichever occurs first. Failure to file a timely 
notice precludes any change of judge under this rule. 
(c) Assignment of action. Upon the filing of a notice of change, the as-
signed judge shall take no further action in the case. The presiding judge shall 
promptly determine whether the notice is proper and, if so, shall reassign the 
action. If the presiding judge is also the assigned judge, the clerk shall 
promptly send the notice to the Chief Justice, who shall determine whether 
the notice is proper and, if so, shall reassign the action. 
(d) Nondisclosure to court No party shall communicate to the court, or 
cause another to communicate to the court, the fact of any party's seeking 
consent to a notice of change. 
(e) Rule 63 unaffected. This rule does not affect any rights under Rule 63. 
(Added effective April 15, 1992; amended effective November 1, 1996.) 
...Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- Court provided that this rule, "originally 
ment substituted "any district court" for "any adopted on an emergency basis effective April 
district or circuit court" in the first sentence in 15, 1992, has now been published for public 
Subdivision (a). comment No amendments are made to the 
!"' Compiler's Notes. — In a minute 'entry April 15, 1992 version of the rule." 
dated January 21; 1993, the Utah Supreme 
PART vm. 
PROVISIONAL AND FINAL REMEDIES AND 
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. 
Rule 64A. Prejudgment writs of replevin, attachment and 
garnishment 
Prejudgment writs of replevin, attachment and garnishment may be issued 
under the following conditions and circumstances: 
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except the creation of a lien on real proptm \\ ht n the vamc i*> -igmd «ind filed 
as herein abo\e presided The ekik >hall immediatelx make a notation of the 
judgment in the r en te r of actions and the judgment docket 
(d) Notice of signing or cntr\ of judgment A copv of the signed judgment 
shall be promptly served by the party preparing it in the manner pro\ ided in 
Rule 5. The time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the lequirement 
of this provision 
(e) Judgment after death of a party If a party dies after a \erdict or decision 
upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be 
rendered thereon. 
(0 Judgment by confession Whenever a judgment by confession is autho-
rized by statute, the party seeking the same must file with the clerk of the 
court in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, verified by the 
defendant, to the following effect: 
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to become due, it shall 
concisely state the claim and that the sum confessed therefor is justly due or 
to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of securing the plaintiff 
against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim and that the 
sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same; 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for a specified sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and enter in the 
judgment docket, a judgment of the court for the amount confessed, with costs 
of entry, if any. (Amended effective September 4, 1985; January 1, 1987; 
November 1, 1997.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment, in Subdivision (d), rewrote the first 
sentence, which had read "The prevailing 
party shall promptly gi\ e notice of the signing 
or entry of judgment to all other parties and 
Incompetence or negligence of counsel. 
Newly discovered evidence 
Cited. 
Incompetence or negligence of counsel. 
The evidence supported the finding that the 
plaintiff received the benefit of his lawful bar-
gain and that he failed to demonstrate that he 
was prejudiced by the actions of his counsel or 
of the trial court. Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ven-
tures, Inc.. 931 P.2d 122 (Utah 1997). 
Newly discovered evidence. 
Where plaintiff failed to* show* that newly 
Basis for disqualification. 
Timeliness of motion. 
Basis for disqualification* 
No reasonable inference of bias was raised 
xnerely because a judge lieard ^ case in which 
the judge's former firm'represented one' of the 
shall file proof of service of such notice with the 
clerk of the court," and in the second sentence 
deleted "However," from the bepnmng and 
deleted "notice" before "requirement " 
discovered evidence could not, with due dili-
gence, have been discovered and produced at 
trial, and that the evidence was not merely 
cumulative of the evidence presented at the 
trial, denial of plaintiffs motion for a new tna^ 
was not an abuse of discretion. American Ru-
ral Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communication 
Corp., 318 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Cited in Commercial Inv. Corp. v. Siggard, 
936 P.2d 1105 (Utah Ct- App. 1997). 
parties,- since the judge, no. longer ^had any 
financial interest in, the firm, had^not main-
tained close personal relationships with mem-
bers of the firm or its employees, had -not 
represented(the party^in,the instant case or 
any"other matter, and it had been 13"years 
since the judge was a member of the finri? In re 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment . 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Rule 63* Disability or disqualification of a judge. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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AiTjdavit. 319 Utah Adv Rep 3 'Ct App 1997) become a\* are of a justice's past affiliation with 
.i !.<* firm repre>enting one of the parties in 
Timel iness of motion. the ca«-e until after the opinion was issued In 
An affidavit of bias filed after the court's re Affidavit. 319 Utah Adv Rep. 3 tCt. App. 
opinion was timely when the affiant did not 1997' 
PART VIII. PROVISIONAL AND FINAL 
REMEDIES AND SPECIAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Habeas corpus. drafting, filing, and disposition of habeas cor-
— Failure to state claim. pus petitions, Rule 12(bX6) applies to habeas 
corpus petitions in which petitioner fails to 
Habeas corpus .
 g U t e a d a i m u p o n w h j c h r e l i e f c o u l d b e 
—Fai lure to s tate c laim. granted. Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987 
Although this rule generally governs the (Utah 1997). 
Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental thereto. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Choses in act ion subject to execut ion. Even if a legal malpractice action could not 
This rule does not restrict a judgment cred- have been voluntarily assigned, the right to 
itor's ability to reach choses in action to those collect money based on the already-asserted 
that have been reduced to judgment or those action could be levied upon by a judgment 
that would be voluntarily assignable in the creditor of the plaintiff in the action. Tanasse 
hands of the judgment debtor. Tanasse v.
 v. Snow, 929 R2d 351 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Snow, 929 R2d 351 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
PART X. DISTRICT COURTS AND CLERKS 
Rule 77. District courts and clerks. 
(a) District courts always open. The district courts shall be deemed always 
open for the purpose of filing any pleading or other proper paper, of issuing and 
returning mesne and final process, and of making and directing all interlocu-
tory motions, orders, and rules. 
(b) Trials and hearings; orders in chambers. All trials upon the merits shall 
be conducted in open court and so far as convenient in a regular courtroom. All 
other acts or proceedings may be done or conducted by a judge in chambers 
without the attendance of the clerk or other court officials and at any place 
t within the state, either within or without the district; but no hearing, other 
thaii one exparte, shall be conducted outside the county wherein the matter is 
pending without the consent of all the parties to the action affected thereby. 
f (c) Clerk's office and order* by clerk. The clerk's office with" the clerk or a 
deputy in attendance shall be open during business hours on all days except 
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. All motions and applications in the 
clerk's office for issuing mesne process, for issuing final process to enforce and 
execute judgments, for entering defaults or judgments by default, and for other 
proceedings' which do riot requireTallowance or order of the court aregrantable 
of course by the clerk; but his action may be suspended or altered or rescinded 
by the.court upon cause shown. 
(d) No fee where copies furnished. In every case where, a copy of'the 
pleadings, or other papers is to be certified, neither the sheriff, constable nor 
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DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant, 
MINUTE ENTRY, 
CASE # 944300281 
JUDGE DEVER 
The court takes exception to Mr. Allred's comments about the judge's tirade. There 
was no tirade. The court asked Mr. Allred into it's chambers and told him that he was 
dispicable for causing the court's recusal and at no time did the court mention any other case 
to Mr. Allred. 
About a month prior to being assigned to this case, Mr. Allred, another attorney, and 
myself had a very friendly visit in their law offices. We discussed my disease, Mr. Allred's 
property holdings in Tooele County, and other pleasantries. 
The court was dumb founded to read in Mr. Allred's objections that I had extreme 
animosity for him for years which is untrue. Furthermore, the court does not recall making 
any statements about Paul Griffith's disease which an ordinary and prudent person could 
interpret to mean that the court would be influenced. 
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The court made it clear to Mr. Allred in a civil manner in the clerk's office that at his 
age and with his disease he would not jeopardize his good reputation by doing anything in a 
case that even had any appearance of impropriety. 
The court advised the parties that it would rule on the issue of attorney fees as part of 
its recusal order. 
Dated this 3 0 day of V\Wt, 1996. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 




GRIFFITH, DAVID GARY 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 944300281 DA 
DATE 07/22/96 
HONORABLE L. A. DEVER 
COURT REPORTER VIDEO 11:52 
COURT CLERK JPK -
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. ALLRED, J FRANKLIN 
D. ATTY. MCDONALD, ROBERT M 
THE MATTER NOW BEFORE THE COURT IS A HEARING ON THE STATUS OF 
THIS CASE. COUNSEL BRIEFED THE COURT ON VARIOUS MOTIONS AND 
ISSUES. THE COURT ORDERS THAT THE EXCHANGE OF WITNESSES TO BE 
COMPLETED BY FRIDAY 7/26/96. COUNSEL ARE TO ORGANIZE AND PRE-
MARK EXHIBITS FOR TRIAL. THE COURT WILL TAKE UNDER ADVISEMENT 
THE ISSUES REGARDING STAYING THE JUDGMENT AND THAT OF THE CD. 
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J. Franklin Allred #0058 
Edward K. Brass #0432 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102 
Telephone (801) 531-1990 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
DISQUALIFY ROBERT M. MCDONALD 
DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 94430028IDA 
Judge John A. Rokich 






Mr. Robert M. McDonald is currently counsel for David Gary Griffith, the Defendant and 
Counter claimant in this case. J. Franklin Allred is counsel for Janna Griffith, and entered his 
appearance of counsel on her behalf well before Mr. McDonald appeared on behalf of Mr. 
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Griffith. 
In 1981, Mr. Robert M. McDonald, who was then working for the law firm of Jones, 
Waldo, Holbrook and McDonough, was counsel for J. Franklin Allred, in a protracted divorce 
and custody battle. During the course of representing J. Franklin Allred, Mr. McDonald was 
privy to all manner of highly sensitive and confidential information regarding Mr. Allred, 
including psychological evaluations of Mr. Allred, information regarding Mr. Allred's real and 
personal property, and a broad spectrum of potentially damaging personal allegations which arose 
during the course of the divorce. In representing Mr. Allred in these proceedings under Mr. 
Allred's careful direction, Mr. McDonald was also privy to confidential information regarding Mr. 
Allred's strategy in conducting divorce litigation, and regarding Mr. Allred's methods of obtaining 
and preparing witnesses in divorce litigation. Mr. McDonald is using a witness in the instant 
litigation, to whom he was introduced by Mr. Allred during the Allred divorce. 
Mr. Allred's contact with Mr. McDonald since the divorce has been virtually non-existent. 
Both David Gary Griffith and his father, Gary Griffith, have made statements indicating 
that Mr. McDonald's intimate knowledge of Mr. Allred will prove advantageous to Mr. Griffith in 
the Griffith divorce litigation.1 
In an affidavit recently filed with the Court, Mr. McDonald himself makes veiled reference 
to his prior representation of Mr. Allred, euphemistically characterizing it as his "long association 
with Mr. Allred." Affidavit of Robert M. McDonald, p.2 ^3. Inasmuch as this affidavit seeks to 
establish an unprecedented, broad stipulation regarding discovery which Mr. Allred never enter 
1
 This allegation is not asserted here to prove the truth of their statements, but is included to 
demonstrate their state of mind, their awareness of Mr. McDonald's prior representation of Mr. 
Allred, and their anticipation that this prior litigation will redound to their benefit in the instant 
litigation. 
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into,2 Mr. McDonald's reference to his "long association with Mr Allred," coupled with his 
statement that he had "complete confidence that [Mr Allred] would strictly honor the stipulation" 
can be interpreted as blackmail, or as a tacit threat that Mr. McDonald will use the information 
gleaned in his representation of Mr. Allred to gain advantages in the litigation against Mr. Allred 
in the Griffith case. 
Plaintiff and Mr. Allred, although wary, did not initially object to Mr. McDonald's 
representation of Mr. Griffith, but the cumulative effect of recent steps by Mr McDonald show 
in clear relief the problems endemic to the conflict of interest involved in Mr. McDonald's prior 
representation of Mr. Allred and current role as an adversary to Mr. Allred in the Griffith divorce 
proceedings. After thoroughly researching the issue, Mr. Allred must now move to disqualify Mr. 
McDonald. 
ARGUMENT 
The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct contain numerous provisions demonstrating the 
impropriety of Mr. McDonald's acting as counsel against Mr. Allred in the Griffith divorce. 
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 governs confidentiality of information. It states, 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a 
client except as stated in paragraph (b), unless the client consents after disclosure. 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer believes 
necessary: 
(1) To prevent the client from committing a criminal or 
fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's services had 
been used; 
(2) To rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or 
fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's services had 
2
 McDonald characterizes this purported stipulation in one instance, as encompassing Mr. 
Alfred's agreement to produce "any and all documents relating to any financial issue in the 
litigation" and in another instance, as excluding "financial documents not expressly stipulated 
during the deposition." Affidavit, pp. 1 and 2, ffij 2 and 4. 
This contradiction undercuts the existence of any such stipulation. 
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been used; 
(3) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in 
a controversy between the lawyer and the client or to establish a 
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based 
upon conduct in which the client was involved; or 
(4) To comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct or 
other law. 
(c) Representation of a client includes counseling a lawyer(s) about the 
need for or availability of treatment for substance abuse or psychological or 
emotional problems by members of the Utah State Bar serving on the Law. 
See also Utah Rule of Evidence 504 (attorney client privilege); Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8 
(attorney client privilege). 
If Mr. McDonald is revealing information to the Griffiths regarding his prior 
representation of Mr. Allred, this is in clear violation of Rule 1.6 and the privileges. 
Mr. McDonald's use of any information gleaned in his prior representation of Mr. Allred 
in litigating against Mr. Allred is forbidden by Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(b), which 
provides, "A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the 
disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation." Given Mr. McDonald's 
exposure to Mr. Allred's confidential techniques and strategies in conducting divorce litigation, it 
is virtually inconceivable that Mr. McDonald would be able to avoid using this knowledge in this 
case. Mr. McDonald has not consulted with Mr. Allred concerning this problem. Mr. Allred does 
not consent to the use of this knowledge. 
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9 governs conflicts of interest involving former 
clients. It states, 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter: 
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially 
factually related matter in which that person's interests are 
materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the 
former client consents after consultation; or 
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(b) Use information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would permit 
with respect to a client or when the information has become 
generally known. 
The Tenth Circuit has formulated a reasonable test for determining when successive 
representations are impermissible under Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 1.6 and 1.9. The 
court must determine whether there is a substantial factual relationship between the two 
litigations. A "substantial relationship" exists if the two litigations are "similar or related" in their 
factual contexts, or "'[i]f there is a reasonable probability that confidences were disclosed which 
could be used against the client in the later, adverse representation.'" SLC LTD. V v. Bradford 
Group West. Inc., 999 F.2d 464, 466 and n.3 (citation omitted). 
In that the Allred divorce and the Griffith divorce involve facts and issues that are 
common to most divorce cases, they are substantially related for purposes of Rule 1.9. 
Particularly because confidences were disclosed by Mr. Allred in the Allred divorce which could 
be used against Mr. Allred in an effort to gain tactical advantages in the Griffith divorce, 
disqualification of Mr. McDonald is necessary. See Bradford Group West, at 466-467 (Tenth 
Circuit upheld a bankruptcy court's disqualification of an attorney in successive litigations 
because in the first representation, the attorney was privy to confidential information about the 
client's financial situation, negotiation strategies, and ability to settle the suit); State v. Holland, 
876 P.2d 357, 359-360 (Utah 1994)(in a capital homicide case, wherein the Utah Supreme Court 
disqualified the attorney representing Mr. Holland because the attorney had asserted in defending 
another capital Defendant that Mr. Holland was a "prime candidate for the death penalty," the 
court stated, "At a minimum, an attorney's duty of loyalty to his or her client requires the attorney 
to refrain from acting as an advocate against the client, even in a case unrelated to the cause for 
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which the attorney is retained.") (citations omitted). See also State v. Larsen. 828 P.2d 487 
(Utah App.)(convictions affirmed because Defendant failed to demonstrate that successive 
representations were sufficiently related), aff d on other grounds. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355 
(Utah 1993). 
Rule 8.4 defines professional misconduct, stating, 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to. 
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; 
(b) Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 
(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation; 
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; 
(e) State or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency 
or official; or 
(f) Knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation 
of applicable Rules of Judicial conduct or other law. 
In interpreting 8.4(d), the court of appeals has stated, "When a lawyer engages in 
irresponsible or improper conduct, the public's confidence in the bar and in the legal process is 
eroded." State v. Johnson. 823 P.2d 4844, 490 (Utah App. 1991). Johnson involved a defense 
attorney who should have been disqualified because his performance was impaired because he was 
implicated in the crimes with which his client was charged. The court adopted a test from the 
former Canons of Professional Responsibility for determining when an attorney should be 
disqualified because of an appearance of impropriety: 
First, the court must find that there is "at least a reasonable possibility that some 
specifically identifiable impropriety" occurred because of the representation. There 
need not be proof of actual wrongdoing, however. Second, the court must balance 
"the likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy" against the social interest in 
allowing the Defendant to continue being represented by the lawyer of his own 
choice. "[T]he interest in permitting a criminal Defendant to retain counsel of his 
choice is strong and deserves great respect. The right to counsel of choice is not 
absolute, however, and must give way where its vindication would create a serious 
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risk of undermining public confidence in the integrity of our legal system." An 
attorney should be disqualified if both prongs are met. 
Id. at 490. 
In the instant case, improprieties are occurring as a result of Mr. McDonald's prior 
representation of Mr. Allred. Whether Mr. McDonald is disclosing confidential information 
gained during the course of his representation of Mr. Allred or not, Mr. David Griffith is 
threatening Mrs. Griffith that Mr. McDonald's intimate knowledge of Mr. Allred will accrue to 
Mr. Griffith's advantage in the Griffith divorce.3 Mr. McDonald's allegation that Mr. Allred is in 
violation of a broad and nonexistent discovery stipulation, and reference to his "long association 
with Mr. Allred" which gave him "complete confidence" that Mr. Allred would comply with the 
stipulation demonstrates a serious impropriety. Particularly in light of the Griffiths' gentlemen's 
belief that Mr. McDonald will use his knowledge of Mr. Allred in this case, the allegations in the 
McDonald affidavit are reasonably read as a tacit threat that Mr. McDonald will use the 
information gleaned in his representation of Mr. Allred to gain advantages in the litigation against 
Mr. Allred in the Griffith case. Particularly where there is no Sixth Amendment right to 
counterbalance against society's interest in a legal system free of such improprieties, as there was 
3
 Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 addresses conflicts of interest. It states, 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client 
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a 
third person or by the lawyer's own interest, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will 
not be adversely affected; and 
(2) Each client consents after consultation. 
Under this rule, Mr. McDonald should explain to Mr. Griffith his duties of confidentiality 
regarding his prior representation of Mr. Allred, and of his duty to abstain from using information 
gained during his representation of Mr. Allred against Mr. Allred. 
The content of Mr. Griffith's statements to his wife indicates that this consultation has not 
occurred. 
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in Johnson, disqualification of Mr. McDonald is appropriate. 
In Parkinson v. Phonex Corp., 857 F Supp. 1474 (D. Utah 1994), a simultaneous 
representation case, Judge Sam described the factors to consider in determining whether a 
violation of the ethical rules justifies disqualification, as follows: 
The sanction of disqualification of counsel in litigation situations should be 
measured by the facts of each particular case as they bear upon the impact of 
counsel's conduct upon the trial. The egregiousness of the violation, the presence 
or absence of prejudice to the other side, and whether and to what extent there has 
been a diminution of effectiveness of counsel are important considerations. In 
addition, equitable considerations such as the hardship to the other side and the 
stage of trial proceedings are relevant. The essential issue to be determined in the 
context of litigation is whether the alleged misconduct taints the lawsuit. For 
instance, in Beck v. Board of Regents of State of Kan.. 568 F.Supp. 1107 (D. Kan. 
1983) the court withheld its "inherent power" to disqualify stating that: 
The court should not act unless "the offending attorney's conduct 
threatens to 'taint the underlying trial' with a serious ethical 
violation." [citation omitted]. Whether or not the underlying trial 
may become tainted must be addressed in each case based on its 
own specific facts, 
[citation omitted]. 
Id. at 477-78. 
Parkinson at 1476. The court may also wish to consider how the prior representation may effect 
the attorney's performance, to assess whether continuing representation would risk a violation of 
the attorney-client privilege, and to assess whether the attorney might be reticent to vigorously 
advocate for his current client, in an role adversarial to his past client. Cf. e ^ United States v. 
Vjtfdez, 149 F.R.D. 223 (D.Utah 1993)(court denied prosecution's motion to disqualify defense 
counsel, who had previously represented government witness, finding that the defense attorney's 
client had waived potential conflicts, and that it was unlikely that the attorney-client privilege 
would be breached or that the defense attorney would be inhibited in representing his client by his 
past representation of the government witness). 
Mr. McDonald's continued representation of Mr. Griffith would taint the divorce 
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proceedings, because Mr. McDonald is in possession of highly confidential and sensitive 
information regarding Mr. Allred's personal and financial matters, and regarding how Mr. Allred 
conducts divorce litigation. His client is currently boasting about his expectation that Mr. 
McDonald's intimate knowledge of Mr. Allred will lead to a tactical advantage in the litigation. 
Given Mr. McDonald's recent allegations of a non-existent discovery stipulation, and all of the 
innuendo attendant thereto, his continued representation risks a violation of the attorney-client 
privilege between him and Mr. Allred, and portends to taint the entire Griffith divorce. There is 
sufficient time prior to trial for Mr. Griffith to retain conflict-free counsel, and no substantial 
prejudice would be incurred by an order disqualifying Mr. McDonald. 
Finally, a review of Margulies by Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985), 
demonstrate why Mr. McDonald should be disqualified. In Margulies. the law firm of Jones, 
Waldo, Holbrook and McDonough were representing the Margulies family in a medical 
malpractice suit against St. Mark's Hospital and Dr. Woolsey, Dr. Chichester, and Dr. Upchurch 
in Third District Court, which sought damages that were likely in excess of the insurance 
coverage of the hospital and doctors. Id. At 1198. Simultaneously, Jones Waldo was 
representing a limited partnership, including Dr. Woolsey, Dr. Chichester and Dr. Upchurch, in a 
civil suit in federal court. Id. In participating in the limited partnership, the doctors were required 
to provide personal financial information. Id. Jones Waldo failed to fully inform the clients of 
the conflict of interest, and did not obtain their consent, but none of the clients objected to the 
representation, although some of them were aware of certain aspects of the conflict of interest. 
Id. at 1198-99 and n.l. When Jones Waldo sought to discover personal financial information 
from one of the doctors during discovery proceedings in the Margulies case, the doctor moved to 
have Jones Waldo disqualified from the Margulies case. Id. At 1199. The trial court found an 
Addendum p. 34. 000-330 
unintentional conflict of interest stemming from Jones Waldo's representation in both cases, and 
found that there was no effective waiver of the conflict of interest. The court then allowed Jones 
Waldo to withdraw from the federal litigation and continue as counsel in the Margulies case, 
ordering them not to use the financial information gleaned during the course of Jones Waldo's 
representation of the doctors' limited partnership. Id- At 1199. 
The Utah Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that trial courts have discretion in 
ruling on motions to disqualify counsel based on violations of ethical rules governing attorneys. 
Id. at 1199-1200. The court agreed that Jones Waldo had a conflict of interest that was not 
sufficiently waived by the clients, and rejected Jones Waldo's argument that the doctors should be 
estopped from making an untimely motion to disqualify. The court found that there was no 
evidence of bad faith in the filing of the disqualification motion, which was filed shortly after the 
filing of the federal case, and months before trial in the Margulies case, when the full effect of the 
conflict of interest became apparent. Id- At 1201. See also Zions First National Bank v. B. 
Jensen Interiors. 781 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1989)("A motion to disqualify counsel must be 
immediately filed and diligently pursued as soon as the party becomes aware of the basis for 
disqualification, and it may not be used as a manipulative litigation tactic"). 
The court quoted with approval the language of the trial court, '"The law has long 
recognized that an attorney is held to the highest duty of fidelity, honor, fair dealing and full 
disclosure to a client.'" Id. at 1201. The court then proceeded to explain the canons of ethics 
bearing on the issues, those requiring attorneys to preserve confidential communications of the 
clients, those requiring attorneys to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the 
clients, and those requiring attorneys to avoid the appearance of impropriety. Id. at 1202-1203. 
In discussing the canons of ethic pertaining to confidentiality, the court stated, 
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Canon 4's prohibitions against disclosure of client confidences and secrets have 
generally been interpreted to forbid an attorney from representing a client against a 
former client in a matter substantially related to the former client's representation. 
This rule is intended to prevent the possibility that an attorney might use 
information given in confidence by a former client in a later action against that 
client. Allowing later adverse representation when the former client's disclosures 
might be used against him could inhibit the free exchange of information between 
attorney and client which our legal system presupposes. 
Id- at 1202 (citation omitted). 
Mr. McDonald should not be allowed to represent Mr. Griffith, where there is a 
substantial threat that Mr. McDonald will use information given in confidence to him by Mr. 
Allred. 
The Margulies court indicated that it was not satisfied to ground its ruling solely in Canon 
4, however, because large law firms often litigate against former clients, and because of conflicts 
in the case law interpreting the canons, some of which required the issues in the two litigations to 
be identical or substantially the same, and some of which required only a substantial relationship 
between the two litigations. Id- at 1202. 
Rather than analyzing the case under the canon pertinent to representation of former 
clients, the court chose to view the case as one involving simultaneous concurrent representation, 
and found that Jones Waldo could not successfully represent both clients, and that Jones Waldo 
had not obtained an informed consent from the clients. Id. at 1203-04. 
The court reversed the trial court's order allowing Jones Waldo to continue as counsel in 
the Margulies case. In so doing, the court stated, 
Motions to disqualify opposing counsel present the court with two 
important but often opposing policy considerations: one the one hand, the 
undesirability of separating litigants from the counsel of their choice and, on the 
other, the necessity of ensuring that litigants and the public perceive lawyers and 
courts as possessing the integrity necessary for the disposition of justice. We are 
especially mindful of the latter consideration, as this Court is charged by law with 
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approving and administering rules of conduct and discipline governing the practice 
of law in the State of Utah. Among the guidelines for professional conduct which 
we have approved is Canon 9, which states: "A lawyer should avoid even the 
appearance of professional impropriety." The basis of this tenet is that society's 
perception of the integrity of our legal system may be as important as the reality, 
since it is the perception that will be dispensed. Litigants are highly unlikely to be 
able to maintain their confidence if their attorney in one matter is allowed 
simultaneously to sue them in another. 
Id. at 1204 (citation omitted). 
While Mr. Griffith would undoubtedly like to continue to be represented by Mr. 
McDonald, who has intimate knowledge of Mr. Allred, which might be beneficial during the 
course of the litigation, the appearance of professional impropriety attaching to this circumstance 
should not be tolerated by this Court. 
The Margulies court cited a passage from In re Hanson. 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978), which 
should guide this Court in ruling on the disqualification motion in this instant case. It states, 
The practice of law is a profession whose members are granted a special 
privilege of holding themselves out as having the education, the skills and the 
integrity to give help and guidance to others in their affairs and particularly when 
they are in trouble. This includes that the attorney will become unreservedly 
identified with his client's interests and protect his rights. It means not only in 
dealing with the client's adversary, but also that the attorney will adhere to the 
ideals of honesty and fidelity with the client himself; and that he will not use his 
position to take any unfair advantage of the special confidence which the client is 
entitled to repose in him. 
Margulies. 696 P.2d at 1204, quoting Hanson. 586 P.2d at 416. 
In the Allred divorce, Mr. Allred reposed in Mr. McDonald that same special confidence 
that every client is entitled to repose in their attorney. To prevent Mr. McDonald from taken 
unfair advantage of that confidence, and to prevent any appearance of impropriety stemming from 
the prior representation and current adversarial position of Mr. Allred and Mr. McDonald, this 
Court should disqualify Mr. McDonald. 
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Respectfully submitted this 
/t 
day of 
Edward K. Brass 
Attorneys for Janna Griffith 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this 0 Day of January, 1996, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
ROBERT M. MCDONALD to be hand-delivered to: 
Robert M. McDonald 
McDonald & West 
3269 South Main, Suite 270 
Salt Lake City UT 84115 
DATED this J)_ day of January, 199 
000335 
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J. FRANKLIN ALLRED, P.C. #A0058 
EDWARD K. BRASS #00432 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANNA GRIFFITH, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, ] 
Defendant. ) 
i AFFIDAVIT OF J. FRANKLIN ALLRED 
i Judge John A. Rokich 
> Case No.94430028 IDA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
J. Franklin Allred, being duly sworn on his oath deposes as follows: 
1. As an Attorney for the Plaintiff above named, I have personal knowledge of all matters 
hereinafter stated. 
2. As indicated in my prior affidavit, Plaintiff and her counsel initially hoped that Mr. 
McDonald's prior representation of me would not pose a conflict situation, and did not anticipate the 
problems which have arisen. 
3. On the 15th day of December, by Mr. McDonald false allegations against Plaintiffs 
counsel, he has made the conflict intolerable, and necessitated the filing of a motion to disqualify Mr. 
McDonald. 
^ T . - . . 
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4. The motion is made neither for the purpose of delay or distraction, but solely for the 
purpose of protecting Plaintiffs interest in this case, and to alleviate the taint and compromise caused 
by the conflict of interest of Mr. McDonald. 
5. The motion is filed in good faith on legitimate grounds and because of the patent and 
per se conflicts Mr. McDonald created by undertaking the representation of one client, which pits him 
as a direct adversary against Mr. Allred, his former client, to whom he owes legal and ethical duties 
which are now in jeopardy by virtue of the current conflicts. 
PATF.P this day nf January, 1,996,, 
STATE OF UTAH ] 
:SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, ) 
On the rf(fl day ofJanuary, 1996, J. Franklin Allred personally appeared before me who 
having read the foregoing Affidavit swore that the contents thereof are true and correct and based 
on his own personal knowledge and that he has executed the same. 
Notary Seal: 
^fNattfrv/Puhlic vJ ^ NOTAW^stifrJip blic 
SUZANNE LGRIGGi 
c/c Edward K. Bras? 
32'. South 600 Ear. 
Sail Lake City, Utah 84102 . 
Mv Commission Expires 10/10/93 U 
STATE O F UTAH _ j i 
K > csa na era c a c=a c=2 cr1 
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this^T/V Day of January, 1996, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF J. FRANKLIN ALLRED to be hand-delivered to: 
Robert M. McDonald 
McDonald & West 
3269 South Main, Suite 270 
Salt Lake City UT 84115 
'DATED this ;££ day of January. 1996 
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J. FRANKLIN ALLRED, P.C. #A0058 
EDWARD K. BRASS #00432 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-1990 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANNA GRIFFITH, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JANNA GRIFFITH 
Judge John A. Rokich 
Case No.944300281 DA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS. 
COUNTY OF TOOELE ) 
The Plaintiff above named, Janna Griffith, being duly sworn on 
her oath, deposes and says in support of her MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
ROBERT M. MCDONALD as follows: 
1. That I am the Plaintiff in the above named case, and as 
such have personal knowledge of the matters herein stated. 
2. That on numerous occasions prior to obtaining Mr. Allred 
as my Counsel, I was urged by my husband, the Defendant, and his 
father, Gary Griffith not to obtain counsel, but to work out a 
settlement with them. They insisted that they would be fair, but 
that if I sought Counsel, I would come out the worse for it. 
3. After I retained Mr. Allred, I was criticized by the 
c- r 
n ILL. . 4 -
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Defendant and by his father, Gary Griffith for taking the step to 
further my interest through Counsel. 
4. My father-in-law, Gary Griffith told me that since I had 
retained Counsel, there was "no way he could help me now", and that 
he "could do nothing for me", the implication to me being I would 
regret the step. 
5. Sometime in November of 1994, the Defendant called me and 
told me he was obtaining new Counsel, and that he "knows your 
attorney, very, very well". 
6. At the time I felt that the advice that his new attorney 
knew my attorney "very, very well" was made in such a gloating 
manner and with intonation and inflection meant to threaten me by 
their having retained an attorney who held some special 
relationship, power or dominance over my attorney. 
7. I advised Mr. Allred prior to the time when the identity 
of the new attorney was revealed that Mr. Richards was no longer 
representing the Defendant. I told him the statement that a new 
attorney was coming on board was delivered as a threat and made me 
feel insecure as to whether Mr. Allred would zealously represent 
me. 
8. Mr. Allred assured me that the new attorney would have to 
file an Appearance of Counsel, and we would know soon. 
9. After the time that we became aware that Robert M. 
McDonald was representing the Defendant, I asked Mr. Allred what 
the nature of his relationship with him had been and would be, and 
2 
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Mr. Allred advised that Mr. McDonald had represented him in his 
domestic matter in 1980 and 1981. 
10. I questioned at that time, and Mr. Allred and I 
discussed, whether it was appropriate for Mr. McDonald to be 
representing my ex-husband, given the relationship between Mr. 
McDonald and Mr. Allred, and we decided that if Mr. McDonald 
conducted himself honorably, there would be no threat to my 
relationship with Mr. Allred. 
11. On or about September 14th, Mr. Allred called me after 
returning from a short vacation to advise that he had been 
contacted by my father-in-law, who had made threats against me and 
inquiries about Mr. Allred's having been represented by Mr. 
McDonald at an earlier time. We discussed the possible 
implications of both the Defendant and his father, Mr. Gary 
Griffith having information that Mr. Allred was previously 
represented by Mr. McDonald, and although our concern was 
heightened at that point, I did not feel that the threat to my 
relationship with my attorney was such as would interfere with the 
pursuit of the litigation. 
12. On the 15th of December, 1995, Mr. McDonald filed an 
affidavit which I have read and reject as totally false. He 
alleges that my attorney has entered into an agreement with him 
which would be a violation of Mr. Allred's obligation to me, and 
would make my attorney into an instrument at the will and direction 
of the Defendant as opposed to giving me his full and undivided 
3 
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attention. Such a claim is nevertheless very unsettling and causes 
me substantial fear that further attempts will be made to damage 
me, and will be made based on information he holds regarding my 
attorney. 
13. I have discussed at length with Mr. Allred at this time 
the possibility of taking steps to remove Mr. McDonald so that my 
relationship with Mr. Allred will be immune from any future threat. 
14. I feel that because I originally contacted Mr. Allred, 
that the Defendant was represented by Counsel other than Mr. 
McDonald, and that Mr. McDonald voluntarily undertook this case, 
knowing that his client, Mr. Allred, represented me, that Mr. 
McDonald should not be allowed to continue to represent the 
Defendant, given the vicious statements made in his affidavit about 
my attorney and his claim that my attorney has breached his duty to 
effectively represent me. 
15. I am fearful that the continued representation of the 
Defendant by Mr. McDonald, with his apparent reliance on the trust 
that my present attorney once reposed in him, being used as a point 
to validate his false claims, will not stop at this point, and that 
further and more damaging actions will be taken by Robert M. 
McDonald to attempt to capitalize on his position of confidence 
with my Counsel by revealing further confidences, by further 
relying on his relationship with my attorney to my detriment and 
the benefit of his client, and by using improper methods to obtain 
an advantage over me. 
4 
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16. I do not feel that I should have to change Counsel 
because Mr. McDonald was last on the scene, and voluntarily placed 
himself in a conflict between the Defendant whom he now represents 
and Mr. Allred, whom he previously represented, all of which was 
done with the design and for the purpose of improperly influencing 
my interests in this litigation. 
DATED this day of January, 1996. 
JANNA GRIFFITH 
STATE OF UTAH 
:SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the Q — day of January, 1996, Janna Griffith personally 
appeared before me who having read the foregoing Affidavit swore 
that the contents thereof are true and correct and based on her own 
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J. FRANKLIN ALLRED P.C. A0058 
Edward K. Brass #0432 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANNA GRIFFITH, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ) 
DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, ] 
Defendant. ] 
i AFFIDAVIT OF JANNA GRIFFITH 
i Judge John A. Rokich 
) Civil No.94430028 IDA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS. 
COUNTY OF TOOELE ) 
The Plaintiff above named, Janna Griffith, being duly sworn on her oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Plaintiff above named, and have personal knowledge of all matters herein 
stated. 
2. Mr. Allred and I did not anticipate the extent of the problems caused by Mr. 
McDonald's choice to represent the Defendant, as the adversary of my attorney, whom he previously 
represented. 
3. I now realize the prior representation of the Defendant's counsel of my present 
counsel encroaches on and threatens to disrupt in the future, my opportunity to effectively pursue my 
P'--
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interests. 
4. I have no interest in delaying matters or in distracting the Court from the merits of my 
case. 
5. I have asked Mr. Allred to take all steps possible to relieve the conflict by moving to 
disqualify Mr. McDonald, and have done so in good faith and because of my belief that I am unfairly 
opposed by*Mr, McDonald. 
DATED this day of January, 1996. 
z 
- " " ) 
7/ 
K GRIFFITH' 
STATE OF UTAH 
:SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
On the J* a. day of January, 1996, Janna Griffith personally appeared before me who 
having read the foregoing Affidavit swore that the contents thereof are true and correct and based 
on her own personal knowledge and that she has executed the same. 
1 ^ ^ o r r j j j w 
roEBPw pMtt#!# 
^ ^ £ £ £ 2 ^ ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 1 
LINDA L BROWN 
201 North Main 
Tooela, Utah 64074 
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on t h e ^ £ ^ day of January, 1996, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JANNA GRIFFITH was personally delivered to: 
Robert M. McDonald 
McDonald & West 
3269 South Main, Suite 270 
SaltLakeGity UT 841 IS 
DATED this ^ ^ _ day of January, 1996. 
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J. FRANKLIN ALLRED, P.C. #A0058 
EDWARD K. BRASS #004 32 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-1990 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY 




DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 
) AFFIDAVIT OF J. FRANKLIN ALLRED 
i Judge John A. Rokich 
Case No.944300281 DA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
J. Franklin Allred, being duly sworn on his oath makes this 
his Affidavit in support of Plaintiff's MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ROBERT 
M. MCDONALD and alleges as follows: 
1. I am the Attorney for the Plaintiff above named, and as 
such, have personal knowledge of all matters herein stated. 
2. I commenced the above entitled action as Counsel for the 
Plaintiff in September, 1994. The Defendant appeared with Counsel, 
Bruce L. Richards, shortly after the commencement of the action, 
answered, and filed a counter claim. 
3. On September 27, 1994, the Parties, each with Counsel, 
appeared before the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, and stipulated to a 
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temporary order, which was entered on November 21, 1994. 
4. On November 26, 1994, I received an Appearance of Counsel 
from Robert M. McDonald. Mr. McDonald had previously represented 
me in a highly personal matter. 
5. At the time, I was apprehensive that because of my prior 
client-attorney relationship with Mr. McDonald, his appearance in 
this case might conflict with my rights as his prior client, and 
might damage the interests and confidence in me of my present 
client. 
6. I set my fears aside, and did not move to disqualify Mr. 
McDonald at that time, in the hope that our client-attorney 
relationship would be held inviolate, and not interfere with this 
litigation. 
7. Prior to the time when Mr. McDonald filed his Appearance 
of Counsel, my client Janna Griffith had advised me that her 
husband, the Defendant, had told her that he was getting a new 
attorney who "knows your attorney very, very well.". (See Affidavit 
of Janna Griffith). She expressed concern to me about whether that 
alleged knowledge would affect her interests. 
8. On the fifth day of September, 1995, the Defendant's 
father, Gary Griffith, contacted me at my office by telephone, and, 
among other statements, asked if my prior representation by Mr. 
McDonald was an impediment to or was preventing the Parties from 
reaching a settlement in this case. 
9. Gary Griffith further questioned whether Mr. McDonald's 
2 
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prior representation of me was making it a grudge match or 
creating a conflict in this case. 
10. Prior to the time of the discussion with Mr. Gary 
Griffith, I had knowledge that he had attempted on many occasions 
to dissuade his daughter-in-law, the Plaintiff, from obtaining 
Counsel, and that when she did so, he dismissed, in a threatening 
way, the possibility of "'helping her in this matter nowr/. (See 
Affidavit of Janna Griffith). 
11. In the subject telephone call September 5, 1995, Mr. 
Griffith also made a veiled threat to use the economic influence of 
his corporation, Christensen & Griffith Construction Company, Inc. 
as a substantial client of Key Bank, the Plaintiff's employer, to 
"have the Plaintiff transferred from the bank" on the specious 
claim that her access to Christensen & Griffith's account created 
a risk to them. 
12. Because this discussion took place immediately on my 
preparations to travel for a few days, I indicated to Mr. Griffith 
that I would call him later regarding his statements. 
13. I subsequently spoke to Gary Griffith on or about 
September 15th, 1995, and told him that his veiled threats against 
my client were improper, that if any action resulted adverse to her 
position by her employer, I would hold him directly responsible, 
and that no further intermeddling in this lawsuit would be 
tolerated by my client or me, 
14. Depositions were taken of Gary Griffith, Christensen & 
3 
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Griffith Construction Company, Inc., and other Christensen & 
Griffith employees on October 11, 1995, wherein Mr. McDonald 
claimed that he represented the corporation, Gary Griffith, and 
other Parties who had been subpoenaed by Plaintiff for their 
depositions. 
15. At the deposition of my client on August 24, 1995, she 
had agreed to provide, and I had agreed to facilitate the 
transmission of, certain answers to questions posed by Counsel, the 
creation of or delivery of certain lists, the updating of some 
documents obtained since they were requested in January of 1995, as 
is reflected solely of record in the deposition of the Plaintiff. 
16. In early December, 1995, I had agreed with Mr. McDonald 
to exchange the information and answers provided by my client in 
accordance with her statement of record, for certain documents 
agreed by the Defendant to be produced in his deposition on August 
24th. 
17. On December 12, 1995, Mr. McDonald forwarded a letter 
purporting to grossly expand the scope of what my client had 
promised to do in her deposition, and I corrected his misimpression 
by letter December 14, 1995, copies of which are attached as 
Exhibits to Plaintiff's MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR AN ORDER COMPELLING PRODUCTION, etc. 
18. On December 15, 1995, Mr. McDonald telephoned me and 
acknowledged, first, that he had requested from that body of 
information made available pursuant to my responses to his 
4 
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discovery requests, copies, only of the checking account statements 
from 1994, and none of the checks, deposit slips or other related 
documentation then held for examination and copying. Second, he 
acknowledged that he had expressly declined to avail himself of the 
opportunity to look at the documents which had been available to 
him for some five months, but wanted them produced again, and 
thirdly, that I had copied and provided all he asked for. 
19. During that conversation of December 15th, 1995, no 
mention was made of the claimed "agreement" to provide any and all 
financial documentation made at the time of the deposition on 
August 24th of the Parties nor of the claimed reaffirmation thereof 
at the depositions of the Christensen & Griffith witnesses on 
October 11th. (See affidavit of McDonald filed in support of 
Defendant's Motion to Compel, etc. dated December 15, hereinafter 
the "affidavit"). 
20. Later the afternoon of the 15th, I received the affidavit 
of Robert McDonald falsely relating the existence of an agreement 
with Robert M. McDonald which I did not make at any time or ever. 
In the affidavit, Counsel accuses me of "reneging" on an agreement 
which is totally a fiction created by him. 
21. In his affidavit, he refers to a "long association" with 
me, which is a mischaracterization of the actual relationship. I 
have had no association with Mr. McDonald socially, have never been 
in his home, seen him for a snack or social get-together, met him 
at any appointed social time, nor had any contact whatsoever with 
5 
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Mr. McDonald, save one occasion during the holidays in 1981, when 
he was representing me and he came to a party at my home. 
22. There has been no occasion since 1981 when I saw Mr. 
McDonald professionally, nor has there been a time when we have 
been on opposing sides or otherwise involved in any way in the same 
lawsuit, litigation, matter, or negotiation. 
23. His statement of "long association" is untrue, and the 
affidavit relies on that for the premise that he has been misled 
into believing the rules would not be followed in this litigation 
by virtue of that association, when in fact, during 1980 and 1981, 
I retained Mr. McDonald among several other attorneys to represent 
me in a domestic action in which I was the Defendant, and which 
generated approximately $25,000.00 in gross fees to Robert M. 
McDonald. 
24. Mr. McDonald has concocted the agreement claimed in the 
affidavit to cover his failure to conduct the discovery when he had 
an opportunity, and to attempt to obtain a third chance to correct 
his negligence during the discovery process. He misleads the Court 
as to the true nature of our prior relationship, which was strictly 
as client and attorney, and in so doing, he violates his 
responsibility to me. His reference to his association with me is, 
while he was employed by me as my attorney, and in calling that 
relationship into issue in this lawsuit, he violates the client-
attorney privilege, which I assert against him to prevent 
disclosure of any claim of a long association or information about 
6 
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me. 
25. During his representation of me in the domestic affair 
for which he was employed, many of the facts, circumstances and 
issues were and are identical with those raised in the present 
case, and include numerous confidential and personal facts about 
me, numerous confidential and business facts about me, numerous 
confidential and potentially damaging personal allegations about 
me, numerous pieces of information and facts concerning my 
substantial property holdings in Tooele, my interests in the 
community of Tooele, my methods in conducting litigation, and he 
had access to much of what at this juncture can be used directly 
against my client through attacking me. The potential disclosure 
of this information poses a real and substantial threat that my 
client cannot fairly pursue her interests in this matter, while Mr. 
McDonald holds the information which he does. 
26. It is likely, also, that Mr. McDonald has a commitment to 
his client to use his knowledge of my matter to the benefit of his 
present client, which further conflicts his interests. 
27. It is apparent from the statements of his client, the 
Defendant, to my client about "knowing me very, very well", from 
the statements of his client, Mr. Gary Griffith's questioning me 
about my previous representation by Mr. McDonald, that he has 
violated my confidence and discussed my affairs with at least those 
two individuals. 
28. It is apparent that he will fabricate a claim that I took 
7 
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steps directly opposed to the interests of my client in this case 
to provide him carte blanche access to my client's financial 
documents, unlimited in scope and time, and without the knowledge 
or consent of my client. 
29. The real possibility of damage being done to the 
Plaintiff in this case by further revelation of matters 
confidential between myself and Mr. McDonald as evidenced by the 
tenor of the affidavit, now casts a pall over the entire 
litigation, and although I have heretofore gritted my teeth and 
hoped for the best, I am prompted to action by the threat that as 
between me and his present client, his knowledge of my situation 
gained by his intimate connection on an attorney/client basis has 
been used, and can and will again be further used, to undermine my 
relationship with the Plaintiff, and to benefit his position and 
that of his client in this case. 
30. I believe in now reading the extent to which Mr. McDonald 
has gone in the affidavit, that he has traded information about me 
to secure the employment with his present client, that he has made 
assurances that he would be able to use that information and 
benefit the client, and that he has violated his confidence owed to 
me for the benefit of his client and to the detriment of mine. 
31. Because of the confidence that I reposed in Mr. McDonald, 
the substantial involvement he has had in my affairs, his violation 
of his responsibility to me by fabricating the agreement in his 
affidavit, and anchoring that to his prior relationship to me, he 
8 
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has abused the trust reposed in him, violated the cannons of 
ethics, and disqualified himself from further acting in any manner 
in this case. 
32. Having taken the step evidenced by the affidavit, the 
substantial risk of further harm to the Plaintiff above named can 
only be obviated by removing Mr. McDonald from the position of 
conflict between his present client and me as his prior client, to 
whom he owes a present and continuing obligation. 
DATED this f day of January, 1996 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
:SS. 
On the V**- day of January, 1996, J. Franklin Allred 
personally appeared before me who having read the foregoing 
Affidavit swore that the contents thereof are true and correct and 
based on his own personal knowledge and that he has executed the 
same. 
Notary Seal: 
c/c Edward K Brass 
32" South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
 f 
My Commission Expires 10/10/98 U 
STATE ORiJTAH _jj 
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this £. rt-Day of January, 
1996, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT 
OF J. FRANKLIN ALLRED to be hand-delivered to: 
Robert M. McDonald 
McDonald & West 
3269 South Main, Suite 270 
Salt Lake City UT 84115 
DATED this Z? day of 
10 
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J. FRANKLIN ALLRED, P.C. #A0058 
EDWARD K. BRASS #00432 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801)531-1990 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANNA GRIFFITH, ) AFFIDAVIT . .OF RICHARD G. 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
) Judge John A. Rot 
DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, ) Case No.944300281 DA 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Richard G. MacDougall, being duly sworn on his oath and having personal knowledge of the 
following matters makes this his Affidavit and deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah since 1976, and I worked 
closely with J. Franklin Allred in domestic litigation entitled Allred v. Allred in 1980 and 1981. 
2. Throughout the entirety of that litigation, the direct control of litigation strategy, 
tactics and witness preparation was exercised by Mr. Allred, not Mr. McDonald. 
3. The entirety of the strategy and the tactics were conceptualized and implemented by 
Mr. Allred and myself, as a consequence of intensive and long-range planning and operation 
r - i 
^ 
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generated primarily by Mr. Allred's extensive knowledge and experience in domestic matters. 
4. Prior to preparing for trial, Mr. McDonald took no part in any planning, strategy 
development, or tactical steps, although he was advised of the development of strategies and the 
theories behind them. His primary role was to conduct the direct and cross-examination of witnesses. 
Mr. Allred and I explained the testimony of each witness to aid in Mr. McDonald's understanding 
of the theory and purpose for the evidence. 
5. Because of Mr. McDonald's intimate involvement in the proceedings, he necessarily 
familiarized himself with Mr. Allred's personal and professional circumstances In addition, he was 
privy to every other aspect of that contested domestic matter. 
6. Mr. McDonald knew of and understood how Mr. Allred retained the two Tooele 
witnesses and one Salt Lake witness on real property evaluation in Tooele, and saw how those 
witnesses were prepared, and how their testimony was to be implemented in the litigation. 
7. Mr. McDonald knew of the steps taken by Mr. Allred and myself in obtaining and 
preparing an expert witness to evaluate Mr. Allred's pension and profit sharing plan, and was briefed 
by Mr. Allred and me as to how the expert's testimony was to aid Mr. Allred's position in the 
litigation. 
8. Throughout the preparation phase of the trial, McDonald was kept abreast of witness 
selection and strategic and tactical decisions made by Mr. Allred. 
9. During the course of Mr. McDonald's representation of Mr. Allred, much information 
of a critical confidential nature was divulged to Mr. McDonald and the issues and allegations were 
far ranging, unflattering and potentially damaging to Mr. Allred. 
10. I have read the AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT M. MCDONALD dated January 19, 1996, 
2 
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and specifically dispute Paragraph 4 insofar as Mr McDonald claims he was "solely responsible" for 
conducting the litigation Mr Allred controlled the litigation and employed Mr McDonald solely as 
trial counsel charged with the responsibility of implementing the trial strategy and tactics designed 
by Mr. Allred and of conducting the examination of witnesses who were obtained and prepared for 
trial by Mr. Allred and me. In connection with the presentation of the witnesses' testimony, Mr. 
McDonald was briefed by Mr. Allred, with my assistance, and Mr McDonald was provided with 
exhibits and suggested direct examination questions 
11. I did not perceive, at that time, that Mr. Allred and Mr. McDonald were "friends", 
however, there was a working relationship which was cordial, intimate, and effective, and one in 
which Mr. Allred reposed the greatest trust and belief that Mr McDonald would hold his confidences 
inviolate. 
DATED this £{(@ day of January, 1996. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On thec^L day of January, 1996, Richard G MacDougall personally appeared before me who 
having read the foregoing Affidavit swore that the contents thereof are true and correct and based 
on his own personal knowledge and that he has executed the same. 
Notary Seal: 
A > ^ f \ SUZANNE L GRIGGS 
A S ' V ^ ^ Y-> C/L Edward K Brasf 
Y £ i ( w f l 32' South600Ear 
^ p ^ ^ a ^ Public ^ 
^ :! Sail Lakf City Utah 841C2 / * • ' ^ Q M U U m ^ . . J u n t i l . ^ - - r . w * . 
VV Mv Commission Expires 10/10/98 L 
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this +& Day of January, 1996, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD G. MACDOUGALL to be hand-delivered 
to: 
Robert M. McDonald 
McDonald & West 
3269 South Main, Suite 270 
Salt Lake City UT 84115 
DATED this ^ _ day of January, 1996. 
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.':. '.V. 
Robert M. McDonald (2175) 
MCDONALD & WEST 
Attorneys for Defendant 
3269 South Main, Ste. 270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 485-5500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 





MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
DISQUALIFY ROBERT M. 
MCDONALD 
Civil No. 944300281DA 
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs 
This memorandum in submitted in opposition to Plaintiffs Memorandum Supporting 
Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Robert M. McDonald dated January 4, 1996. 
Plaintiffs attorney (hereinafter "Allred") claims that Defendant's attorney (hereinafter 
"McDonald") should be disqualified from representing Defendant in this action because 
McDonald represented Allred in a divorce action 15 years ago. This claim is patently 
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absurd and Defendant should be awarded costs and attorneys fees in being required to 
respond to such a claim. 
In order to create some semblance of merit to this absurd claim, Allred asserts that 
during his divorce action McDonald was "privy" to all manner of highly sensitive and 
confidential information regarding Allred, including psychological evaluations of Allred, 
information regarding Allred's real and personal property, and a broad spectrum of 
potentially damaging personal allegations which arose during the course of the divorce." 
(Plaintiffs memorandum p. 2). Even if Defendant's attorney had any recollection 
whatsoever of confidential information concerning Allred, which he does not1, such 
information has no bearing whatsoever with respect to the issues involved in this litigation. 
In a further attempt to create some semblance of merit to his absurd claim, Allred 
asserts that during his divorce action "Mr. McDonald was privy to confidential information 
regarding Mr. Allred's strategy in conducting divorce litigation, and regarding Mr. Allred's 
methods of obtaining and preparing witnesses in divorce litigation." This claim adds to the 
absurdity in Allred's claims. In the prior divorce action, Allred was the client and 
McDonald was the attorney. Thus, to the extent there was any revelation of "strategy in 
conducting divorce litigation" the advantage would go to Allred rather than McDonald2. 
The most outrageous of Allred's claims is the unfounded and defamatory claim that 
McDonald has attempted to "blackmail" Allred by a "tacit threat" that McDonald will use 
information gleaned in his representation of Allred to gain advantage in the litigation 
xSee McDonald Affidavit, H 3 
2
 See McDonald Affidavit, H 4. 
•
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against Allred3 in the Griffith case. There is no factual basis whatsoever for this slanderous 
accusation which originates solely from delusions on the part of Allred4. If anything can be 
concluded from Allred's unfounded fears, it is that he should withdraw as counsel for 
Plaintiff in this action. 
McDonald has never revealed to Defendant or any other person any information 
whatsoever which was obtained by representing Allred in his divorce case, and has never 
given the slightest suggestion of an intent to do so.5 
There has been no violation of Rule 1.6 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
inasmuch as McDonald has not revealed any information concerning Allred to Defendants 
or any other person.6 There is no violation of Rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct inasmuch as the interests of David Griffith in this action are not materially adverse 
to the interests of Allred in his capacity as attorney for Plaintiff in this action. There is no 
violation of Rule 8.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct inasmuch as there is no 
evidence whatsoever that McDonald is engaged in any improper conduct. There is no 
violation of Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct because McDonald's 
representation of David Griffith has no bearing whatsoever on the personal interests of 
Allred. 
3
 Throughout his argument, Mr. Allred appears to consider himself a "party" to this action rather than the 
attorney for a party to the action. 
4
 The sole basis for this outrageous accusation is Plaintiffs self-serving description of Defendant's 
demeanor and intonation when he informed Plaintiff that the two attorneys knew each other (Janna Griffith Aff, 
H 6; Allred Aff, U 27). 
5McDonald Affidavit H 6; David Griffith Affidavit, H 5; Gary Griffith Affidavit, U 6. 
6See McDonald Affidavit, U 6, David Griffith Affidavit, U 5, Gary Griffith Affidavit, H 6. 
"
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Allred's characterization of SLC Ltd vs. Bradford Group West Inc., 999 F.2d 464 
(Tenth Circuit 1993), is false and misleading. In that case, the "substantial relationship" 
leading to the disqualification was not a mere similarity in the types of cases or types of 
legal issues involved. The attorney in that case was disqualified because, as attorney for 
Loran in a debt restructuring, he had knowledge of Loran's financial circumstances which 
were a direct issue when the same attorney tried to represent a creditor in Loran's 
bankruptcy case. Allred's financial condition 15 years ago has no bearing whatsoever on the 
issues between Janna Griffith and David Griffith. 
Allred's characterization of State vs. Holland. 876 P. 2d 357 (Utah 1994) is likewise 
false and misleading. The attorney in the Holland case was disqualified to protect the 
interests of a current client not a former client. The basis of he Court's decision was based 
on the client's sixth amendment rights to an attorney, an issue which is not involved in the 
present case. 
The case of State vs. Larsen, 828 P. 2d 487 (Utah App. 1992) provides no support 
whatsoever to Allred's claims. The attorney in the Larsen case was not disqualified, even 
though he was currently working for the Office of the Attorney General at the time said 
office was prosecuting his former client. The Court expressly held that there was no 
"substantial factual relationship between the former and present matters" and the mere 
appearance of impropriety was not sufficient to warrant disqualification. In the instant case, 
there is likewise no substantial factual relationship between the former and present matters. 
The case of State vs. Johnson, 823 P. 2d 484 (Utah App. 1991) likewise provides no 
support to Allred's claims. The Johnson case was a criminal case in which the 
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ineffectiveness of counsel was the basis for the client's appeal. The claimed "appearance of 
impropriety" was a direct conflict of interest between the attorney and the client in that the 
attorney's interests in exonerating himself was in direct conflict with the client's grounds for 
appeal. On the basis of the Johnson case, there is no basis to disqualify McDonald because 
there is not even a "reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable impropriety" has 
occurred and there is no "likelihood of public suspicion obloquy." 
The case of Parkinson vs. Phoenix Corporation, 857 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Utah 1994), 
likewise provides no support for Allred's allegations. The Court refused to disqualify the 
attorney even though the ethical rule against a law firm simultaneously representing both 
Plaintiff and Defendant had been violated. The Court was persuaded by the fact that one 
of the clients had subsequently been dismissed from the lawsuit and by the fact that the two 
clients had received legal assistance for completely unrelated matters. Specifically, the 
attorney's estate planning assistance to the client did not put the client at a disadvantage 
when the same firm sued him for breach of contract. Thus, the attorneys representation had 
not been "tainted". This ruling is persuasive in the instant case inasmuch as no Court could 
find a "taint" in McDonald's representation of Griffith by reason of knowledge of Allred's 
finances and personal matters occurring 15 years earlier in an unrelated matter. 
The case of United States vs. Valdez. 149 F. R. D. 223 (D. Utah 1993) likewise 
provides no support for Allred's position. In that case, the Court refused to disqualify the 
attorney who had previously represented an important witness. Inasmuch as this case 
involves the representation of a non-party, it is the most factually similar case bearing on 
-5-
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the issue raised by Allred. The Court found no conflict between the witness and the current 
client. Of greatest significance to Allred's claim in the instant case, the Court held: 
"Where the prior representation did not involve the Defendant 
and pertained to an unrelated matter and where there was 
nothing to suggest antagonism to the Defendant, the conflict is 
speculative and does not provide a basis for Complaint". 
Allred persists in overlooking the real lesson of the Valdez case which is that 
"representation is not prohibited it if there is no actual or realistic potential for a conflict 
of interest." 
The case of In Re Hansen, 586 P. 2d 413 (Utah 1978) has no bearing whatsoever on 
the issues raised by Allred's motion. The case did not involve any issue of disqualification 
of an attorney. The case involved a disbarment proceeding against an attorney who had 
simultaneously represented Plaintiff and Defendant in the same case. Inasmuch as the 
attorney represented one client in a breach of contract case and the other in a criminal trial 
completely unrelated to the breach of contract, the Court neither disbarred nor suspended 
the attorney. 
The case of Margulies vs. Upchurch* 696 P. 2d 1195 (Utah 1985), has no bearing 
whatsoever on the issues involved in this litigation. That case involved a situation where the 
lawyers were simultaneously suing a physician and representing a partnership in which the 
physician was a limited partner. Thus, access to current financial information obtained from 
the partnership matter could be used against the physician the case in which the lawyers 
were suing the physician. In the instant case, Allred is not a party to the action and his past 
or present financial condition have no bearing whatsoever on any issue in this case. 
-6-
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There is no evidence whatsoever in this action of any improper conduct on the part 
of McDonald. The entire basis for Allred's claims stem from his unjustified subjective fears 
which have no basis in fact. There is no authority which even suggests that an attorney who 
previously represented another attorney in an unrelated matter may not thereafter 
participate in a later case where his former client is an advocate'. 
It is readily apparent that Allred's purpose in filing this Motion is to delay the 
proceedings and distract the Court's attention from the real issues in this litigation.7 
McDonald entered his appearance for Defendant/Counterclaimant on November 21, 1994. 
At that time, it must be presumed that Allred had full recollection of the fact that 
McDonald had previously represented Allred in his divorce action. Despite this knowledge, 
Allred has made no mention of any problem during the intervening 13 months. As noted 
in Zions First National Bank vs. B. Jensen Interiors* 781 P. 2d 478 (Utah App. 1989), the 
Court held that a Motion to Disqualify counsel must be made as soon as the basis for 
disqualification is discovered. It is apparent that McDonald's representation of Allred in 
1980-1981 was fully known to Allred at the time McDonald entered the case in November, 
1994. 
The delay in making any objection, coupled with Allred's other actions in this case, 
clearly demonstrate his bad faith and improper motive in bringing this motion. Defendant 
This purpose is further revealed by Plaintiffs recent cancellation of the exchange of financial information 
and his resistance to producing documents clearly relevant to the proceedings. See Defendant's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Compel; Motion for Sanctions; Motion to Shorten Time for Production of Documents filed 
December 15, 1995. 
-7-
Addendum p. 70. 0 0 0 7 0 0 
respectfully submits that he should be awarded all costs and attorneys fees in defending this 
motion. 
DATED on this _J*j day of January, 1996) 
m 
Robert M. McDonald 
-8-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this [^ day of January, 1996, I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, U.S. mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ROBERT M. 
McDONALD to the following: 
J. Franklin Allred 
321 South 600 East 
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Robert M. McDonald (2175) 
MCDONALD & WEST 
Attorneys for Defendant 
3269 South Main, Ste. 270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 485-5500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 






DAVID G. GRIFFITH 
Civil No. 944300281DA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
David G. Griffith, being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
fun 
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1. I am the Defendant/Counterclaimant in this proceeding and have personal 
knowledge of all facts stated herein. 
2. In November, 1994, I contacted Robert M. McDonald to request that he 
represent me in this pending litigation. 
3. During the initial conference, Mr. McDonald reviewed various pleadings and 
other documents which I had obtained from my former attorney. After a brief review of the 
docuraejUSr^Mr. McDonald stMed-^t4ieH£ft4re«wraii)^ lliarHe-ftatt 
represented Mr. Allred in his personal divorce action many years ago and that a friendship 
had developed during the period of the litigation. Mr. McDonald assured me that his 
association with Mr. Allred since that time had been casual (brief greetings and 
conversations during chance meetings at the court house or on the street) and therefore 
wanted my assurance that I was comfortable with this circumstance. I assured Mr. 
McDonald I felt comfortable that Mr. McDonald's association with Mr. Allred would not 
be detrimental to my interests and instructed him to proceed in representing me in the 
matter. 
4. At some point after the meeting with Mr. McDonald, I casually mentioned to 
Plaintiff that my new attorney was a friend of her attorney noting that their mutual 
friendship may help expedite a resolution of our dispute. I categorically deny that said 
statement was made in a "gloating manner and with intonation and inflection meant to 
threaten [her] . . . having retained an attorney who held some special relationship, power 
or dominance over [her] attorney." Although I do not recall the exact substance of the 
2 
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conversation, I would not have stated that Mr. McDonald knew Mr. Allred "very, very well" 
inasmuch as such a statement would be inconsistent with the information Mr. McDonald 
transmitted to me. At the time of the statement, and at the present time, I had no reason 
to believe my attorney had any special relationship, power or dominance over my wife's 
attorney. In fact, on the basis of my observations since Mr. McDonald entered the case, it 
is apparent there is no such special relationship, power or dominance. 
5. At no time has Mr. McDonald made any statement concerning any aspects! 
the divorce action between Mr. Allred and his former wife, or any statement concerning any 
fact or circumstance involved in the divorce action. At no time has Mr. McDonald made 
the slightest suggestion or inference that he had any leverage or influence upon Mr. Allred 
by reason of the divorce action. 
DATED on this / 7 day of January, 1996. 
David Gary Griffith 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / 9 day of January, 1996. 
n 
— — — ~*mJP£E2FWrAH I 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this \*\ day of January, 1996, I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, U.S. mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
DEFEND ANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT to the following: 
J. Franklin Allred 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
/ 
a:\wpdocs\griffith\aff3.dav 
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Robert M. McDonald (2175) 
MCDONALD & WEST 
Attorneys for Defendant 
3269 South Main, Ste. 270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 485-5500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 





DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 







Civil No. 94430028IDA 
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Gary Griffith, being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. I am the father of David Gary Griffith, the Defendant named in this 
proceeding. I have personal knowledge of all facts stated herein. 
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2. A short time after my son engaged Robert M. McDonald to represent him in 
this action, David casually mentioned to me that his new attorney was a friend of Janna's 
attorney and expressed hope that the friendship would lead to a prompt resolution of the 
matter. I expressed the same hope. I have no recollection of David mentioning that Mr. 
McDonald had previously represented Janna's attorney in his personal divorce action. 
However, such statement could have been made. 
3. In late August, 1995, after David's deposition had been taken, David expressed 
extreme disappointment over the slow manner in which the case was proceeding. More 
specifically, he noted that Janna's attorney appeared to be making ever effort to delay and 
complicate the proceedings. During this conversation, David made specific mention of the 
fact that his attorney had previously represented Janna's attorney in the divorce and 
wondered if there was some fact or circumstance in that proceeding which was causing the 
behavior in the part of Mr. Allred. David further mentioned that Mr. Allred seemed to 
have information concerning Christenson & Griffith which neither he nor Mr. McDonald 
had transmitted to Mr. Allred. David's statement prompted concern on my part that Janna, 
an employee of Key Bank, with access to the checking account records of Christenson & 
Griffith, may be transmitting information to Mr. Allred concerning Christenson & Griffith. 
I felt strongly that if Janna was using information in her capacity as an employee of the bank 
to assist Mr. Allred in the divorce action, that such conduct was highly improper. 
4. By reason of my concern about Janna's access to Christenson & Griffith 
financial information, I decided to telephone Mr. Allred to express my concern. I do not 
-2-
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recall the date of the telephone conversation, but have no reason to dispute the date of 
September 5, 1995, suggested by Mr. Allred. During the conversation, I asked Mr. Allred 
to assure me that Janna was not improperly transmitting to Mr. Allred financial information 
concerning Christenson & Griffith which he obtained by reason of her employment at the 
bank where Christenson & Griffith held its account. Mr. Allred refused to give me such 
assurance. In response to his refusal, I informed him that in the event I discovered that 
Janna was improperly transmitting information concerning Christenson & Griffith, I would 
report the same to the bank. Any characterization of this conversation as a "veiled threat 
to use economic influence" or to unjustifiably jeopardize Janna's employment with the bank 
is a categorical falsehood. My sole purpose was to assure that confidential financial 
information of Christenson & Griffith was not being improperly disclosed. 
5. During the telephone conversation with Mr. Allred, I have no recollection of 
asking whether Mr. Allred's prior association with Mr. McDonald was preventing the parties 
from reaching a settlement or resulting in a grudge match in the case. However, as noted 
previously in this affidavit, I did have such concerns at that time and may have expressed 
those concerns to Mr. Allred. 
6. Since Mr. McDonald began representing my son, I have met with him on 
approximately three occasions. At no time has Mr. McDonald made any statement to me 
concerning any aspect of the divorce action between Mr. Allred and his former wife, or any 
statement concerning any fact or circumstances involved in that action. At no time has Mr. 
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McDonald made the slightest suggestion or inference to me that he had any leverage or 
influence upon Mr. Allred by reason of the divorce action. 
DATED on this jc] day of January, 1996. 
Gtffy<friffith 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / 7 day of January, 1996 
V 
NOTARY" PUBLIC"" "1 
APRIL PERRY I 
r r 3 South Main 1270 • 
. C^mr-^ sstoo Expires atV&8 1 
STATE OF UTAH f 
n 
NOTARY PUBLIC 4 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this [4 day of January, 1996, I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, U.S. mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
GARY GRIFFITH to the following: 
J. Franklin Allred 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
a :\\vpdocs\gri ffi t h\a ff ga r 
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I 
Robert M. McDonald (2175) 
MCDONALD & WEST 
Attorneys for Defendant 
3269 South Main, Ste. 270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 485-5500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 





DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 






ROBERT M. McDONALD 
Civil No. 944300281DA 
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Robert M McDonald, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
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1. I am an attorney for Defendant/Counterclaimant Gary Griffith in this action. 
I have personal knowledge of all facts stated herein. 
2. I represented John Franklin Allred in a divorce action many years ago. I have 
no records to reflect the date that the case was filed or tried, so I must accept Mr. Allred's 
statement that the date was 1980-1981, more than 15 years ago. 
3. I am certain I received information concerning Mr. Allred's financial condition 
at the time, but have no recollection whatsoever of any aspect of such information. I have 
no recollection of receiving any "highly sensitive and confidential information regarding Mr. 
Allred including psychological evaluations" and no recollection of any "potentially damaging 
personal allegations which arose during the course of the divorce." In summary, I recall 
conducting the trial of the matter, but have no recollection as to any specific facts 
concerning any aspect of the case and I do not have access to any files or records which 
would refresh my recollection as to such facts. Any files pertaining to the case would be in 
the possession of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. 
4. I was lead counsel in the case, and was solely responsible for the conduct of 
the case with some input by James Loweiy. I did not obtain any "confidential information 
regarding Mr. Allred's strategy in conducting divorce litigation" or "regarding Mr. Allred's 
method of obtaining and preparing witnesses in divorce litigation" inasmuch as I, rather than 
Mr. Allred, was control of the litigation. To the extent Mr. Allred had any input, advise or 
strategy, I have no recollection whatsoever of any facts or statements relating thereto. 
Addendum p. 83. 
000710 
Moreover, with the passage of 15 years, I would strongly suspect that any of Mr. Allred's 
strategy and conducting divorce litigation and related matters would have substantially 
changed. During the course of the Allred divorce litigation, a close friendship developed 
between myself and Mr. Allred. As noted in the following paragraph, after the divorce 
concluded, we had increasingly less frequent contact. However, I nevertheless regarded Mr. 
Allred as a personal friend and perceived a relationship of mutual respect, confidence and 
trust. 
5. Since representing Mr. Allred in the divorce action, I have maintained a casual 
relationship with him over the years consisting of brief friendly greetings or conversations 
when passing in the courthouse or on the street. I am generally familiar, by association with 
other attorneys, of Mr. Allred's general reputation and competence as an attorney. I regard 
this relationship as a "long association" and such association prompted my belief that Mr. 
Allred is a reputable, competent and reliable attorney. It is my custom in dealing with such 
attorneys to rely on their oral commitments and stipulations, a practice which I followed in 
this action. 
6. When Defendant David Griffith requested that I represent him in the action, 
I felt compelled to advise him of the fact that I had represented Mr. Allred in his divorce 
action many years ago in order to assure myself that Mr. Griffith was aware of the situation 
and had no objection thereto. However, at no time, have I revealed to David Griffith or 
-3-
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any other person any information whatsoever which I obtained as a result of representing 
Mr. Allred. 
7. Mr. Allred's unfounded and defamatory statement of "blackmail" and a "tacet 
threat" that I would use information obtained in the course of representing Mr. Allred to 
gain advantage in this litigation is an outrageous categorical falsehood. I have never made 
any statement or performed any act that any reasonable mind could possibly construe as a 
threat to reveal confidential information obtained while representing Mr. Allred. There is 
not a scintilla of evidence before the Court which would provide any support whatsoever for 
this outrageous, irresponsible and defamatory accusation. 
DATED on this \°\ day of January, 1£9§. 
\(\\ 
Robert M. McDonald 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /"/ day of January, 1996. 
A 
NOTARYPUBUC •
 /y , r - , „ . 
APRILPERRY I Krki&Pmmiir ' 
3269SouthlMnl270 | NOTARY PUBLIC 
<i--OL 
Sa« Lake C ty. Utah 84115 
My Commlnlon Cuplm 6/24/M | 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this \\ day of January, 1996, I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, U.S. mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
ROBERT M. McDONALD to the following: 
J. Franklin Allred 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
a .\wpdocs\gri f fi th\aff3. rm m 
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J. Franklin Allred #0058 
Edward K. Brass #432 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102 
Telephone (801) 531-1990 
r. ~> 
•0_ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
•JAlJNA'GRirnTIL 
Plaintiff, 
RF.PT Y MFMOR AND! TM 
•SUPPORTmO MOTION TO 
DISQUALIFY ROBERT M. 
MCDONALD 
DAVID GARY GRIFFITH 
Defendant. 
DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Counter claimant, 
Civil No. 944300281DA 




Mrs. Griffith stands by facts previously alleged in the original memorandum supporting the 
disqualification of Robert M. McDonald and the original supporting affidavits. 
In reply to the memorandum and affidavits submitted by Mr. McDonald, Mrs. Griffith 
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submits the affidavit of J. Franklin Allred to confirm that the motion to disqualify Mr. McDonald 
was not filed in bad faith or for purposes of delay or to distract the Court from other issues in the 
litigation, but because circumstances have reached a point where the conflict stemming from Mr. 
McDonald's prior representation of Mr. Allred must be addressed by the Court. Mis. Griffith 
submits her own affidavit to demonstrate that she has no interest in protracting this litigation or in 
distracting the Court from material issues, and did not submit the motion to disqualify Mr. 
McDonald for puiposes of delay. Mis. Griffith also submits the affidavit of Richard G. 
MacDougall to demonstrate that Mr. McDonald was not in control of Mr. Alfred's divorce, but 
was acting on Mr. Alfred's detailed instructions. 
ARGUMENT 
Mrs. Griffith stands by all arguments previously asserted in the original memorandum 
supporting the motion to disqualify Robert M. McDonald. 
In Mr. Griffith's Memorandum Opposing the Motion to Disqualify Robert M. McDonald, 
he distinguishes the facts of the instant case from the cases cited by Mrs. Griffith, and argues that 
because of factual distinctions, the cases are rnischaracterized, are unsupportive of Mis. Griffith's 
position, or have no bearing on this case. Opposition at 4-6. 
While all cases cited by Mis. Griffith are factually distinct from the instant case, the law 
stated in those cases still governs. Mrs. Griffith stands by the cases cited in her original 
memorandum for the propositions for which she originally cited them 
Mrs. Griffith will now reiterate the rules of professional conduct and cases which call for 
the disqualification of Mr. McDonald. Finally, she will address the timeliness of the Motion to 
Disqualify Robert M. McDonald. 
2 
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Rule 1.8, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
Mr. McDonald does not dispute the allegation that Mr. McDonald's use of any 
information gleaned in his prior representation of Mr. Allred in litigating against Mr. Allred is 
forbidden by Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(b), which provides, "A lawyer shall not use 
information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client 
consents after consultation." 
While Mr. McDonald maintains that he was the attorney in control of the Allred divorce 
case, and thus eained no insiaht into Mr. Alfred's methods of conducting diyorcejitigation, the 
affidavit of Richard G. MacDougall confirms that Mr. McDonald was acting on Mr. Allred's 
explicit instructions during the entire course of proceedings in the Allred divorce. Given Mr. 
McDonald's exposure to Mr. Alfred's confidential techniques and strategies in conducting divorce 
litigation, it is virtually inconceivable that Mr. McDonald would be able to avoid using this 
knowledge in this case. The danger posed by Mr. McDonald's use of other confidential 
information about Mr. Alfred gained during the course of the Alfred divorce compounds the 
problems posed by his adversarial posture in this case. Mr. McDonald has not consulted with Mr. 
Alfred concerning these problem, and Mr. Alfred does not consent to the Mr. McDonald's use of 
any knowledge gained during the course of Mr. McDonald's representation of Mr. Alfred. 
Rule 1.8 thus bars Mr. McDonald from proceeding as the attorney litigating the Griffith 
divorce against Mr. Alfred. 
Rule 1.9. Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
Mr. Griffith claims that there is no violation of Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9 
because "the interests of David Griffith in this action are not materially adverse to the interests of 
3 
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Allred in his capacity as attorney for Plaintiff in this action." Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Robert M. McDonald, hereinafter "Opposition," at 3. 
This argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of our adversarial system of 
justice. Mr. Allred represents Mrs. GriflSth, who is the party opposing Mr. Griflfith in the instant 
case. Inasmuch as Mr. Allred owes Mrs. Griflfith allegiance in his zealous representation of her 
interests, he is in fact in a position directly adverse to both Mr. Griflfith and his attorney. 
Mr. Griflfith claims that Mis. Griflfith mischaracterizes SLC, Ltd. v. Bradford Groups 
West. Inc., 999 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1993). 
As noted in the original memorandum supporting the Motion to Disqualify Robert M. 
McDonald, Bradford is useful for the Court's determination of whether Utah Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.9 supports the disqualification of Mr. McDonald. The rule states, 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a chent in a matter shall not 
thereafter: 
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially 
factually related matter in which that person's interests are 
materially adverse to the interests of the former chent unless the 
former chent consents after consultation; or 
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the former chent except as Rule 1.6 would permit 
with respect to a chent or when the information has become 
generally known. 
Bradford explains that a "substantial relationship" exists if the two litigations are "similar 
or related" in their factual contexts, or 4U[i]f there is a reasonable probability that confidences 
were disclosed which could be used against the chent in the later, adverse representation.'" SLC 
LTD. v. Bradford Group West. Inc.. 999 F.2d 464, 466 and n.3 (citation omitted). 
In that the Allred divorce and the Griflfith divorce involve facts and issues that are 
4 
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common to most divorce cases, they are substantially related for purposes of Rule 1.9. 
Particularly because confidences were disclosed by Mr. Allred to Mr. McDonald in the Allred 
divorce which could be used against Mr. Allred in an effort to gain tactical advantages in the 
Griffith divorce, disqualification of Mr. McDonald is necessary. While private details concerning 
the Allred divorce should have no bearing on the Griffith htigation, because Mr. McDonald was 
privy to many such details, which could be used against Mr. Allred, under Bradford, 
disqualification is appropriate. 
Rule 8 4 Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 
State v. Johnson. 823 P.2d 484 (Utah App. 1991) is important to the Court's 
determination of whether rule of professional conduct 8.4 calls for disqualification of Mr. 
McDonald. Rule 8.4 defines professional misconduct, stating, 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; 
(b) Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 
(c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation; 
(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; 
(e) State or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency 
or official; or 
(f) Knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation 
of applicable Rules of Judicial conduct or other law. 
In interpreting 8.4(d), the court of appeals stated in Johnson. ccWhen a lawyer engages in 
irresponsible or improper conduct, the public's confidence in the bar and in the legal process is 
eroded." State v. Johnson. 823 P.2d 4844, 490 (Utah App. 1991). The Johnson court adopted a 
test from the former Canons of Professional Responsibility for determining when an attorney 
5 
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should be disqualified because of an appearance of impropriety: 
First, the court must find that there is "at least a reasonable possibility that some 
specifically identifiable impropriety" occurred because of the representation. There 
need not be proof of actual wrongdoing, however. Second, the court must balance 
c
"the likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy" against the social interest in 
allowing the defendant to continue being represented by the lawyer of his own 
choice. "[T]he interest in permitting a criminal defendant to retain counsel of his 
choice is strong and deserves great respect. The right to counsel of choice is not 
absolute, however, and must give way where its vindication would create a serious 
risk of undermining public confidence in the integrity of our legal system." An 
attorney should be disqualified if both prongs are met. 
Id. at 490. 
-In-the-instant c«sc,'ijQipropricticyaict!>ccuiiing as a lcsullvf Mi: McDonald's piiui 
representation of Mr. Allred. Whether Mr. McDonald is disclosing confidential information 
gained during the course of his representation of Mr. Allred or not, Mr. David Griffith is 
threatening Mrs. Griffith that Mr. McDonald's intimate knowledge of Mr. Allred will accrue to 
Mr. Griffith's advantage in the Griffith divorce.1 Mr. McDonald's allegation that Mr. Allred is in 
violation of a broad and nonexistent discovery stipulation, and reference to his "long association 
1
 Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 addresses conflicts of interest. It states, 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client 
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a 
third person or by the lawyer's own interest, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will 
not be adversely affected; and 
(2) Each client consents after consultation. 
Under this rule, Mr. McDonald should explain to Mr. Griffith his duties of confidentiality 
regarding his prior representation of Mr. Allred, and of his duty to abstain from using information 
gained during his representation of Mr. Allred against Mr. Allred. 
The content of Mr. Griffith's statements to his wife indicates that this consultation has not 
occurred, and nothing in any affidavit before the Court indicates that this consultation has 
occurred. 
6 
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with Mr. Allred" which gave him "complete confidence" that Mr. Allred would comply with the 
stipulation demonstrates a serious impropriety Particularly where there is no Sixth Amendment 
right to counterbalance against society's interest in a legal system free of such improprieties, as 
there was in Johnson, disqualification of Mr. McDonald is appropriate. 
General cases on Disqualification 
Under Parkinson v. Phonex Corp., 857 F.Supp. 1474 (D. Utah 1994), disqualification is 
proper because the conflict stemming from Mr. McDonald's prior representation of Mr. Allred 
threatens tojajnt thslGxifl5thiiyQic,e.piQpepdings. and bec^ge? no rigpjfipfflt prejudjpe \you1d fre 
occasioned by his disqualification. It is important to note that Mr. Griffith has articulated no 
hardship or prejudice that would befall him in the event that the Court granted the Motion to 
Disqualify Robert M. McDonald. See Parkinson at 1476. 
United States v. Valdez, 149 F.R.D. 223 (D.Utah 1993), is another case providing factors 
for the Court's consideration in the disqualification equation. See id. (considering waiver of 
conflicts of interest, likelihood of breach of attorney- client privilege, likelihood that past 
representation would inhibit attorney's current representation of client with interests adverse to 
those of attorney's former client). 
Mr. Griffith claims that In Re Hansen. 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978), and Margulies v. 
Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985), have no bearing on this case. Opposition at 6. 
Mrs. Griffith cites Hanson for this proposition: 
The practice of law is a profession whose members are granted a special 
privilege of holding themselves out as having the education, the skills and the 
integrity to give help and guidance to others in their affairs and particularly when 
they are in trouble. This includes that the attorney will become unreservedly 
identified with his client's interests and protect his rights. It means not only in 
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dealing with the client's adversary, but also that the attorney will adhere to the 
ideals of honesty and fidelity with the client himself; and that he will not use his 
position to take any unfair advantage of the special confidence which the client is 
entitled to repose in him. 
Hanson, 586 P.2d at 416. While the facts of Hanson, and all other cases cited by Mrs. GriflBth are 
distinguishable from the instant one, the law stated in Hanson and all other cases is applicable to 
this case. 
Margulies is important in its discussion of canons of ethics governing confidentiality, the 
avoidance of impropriety, and the exercise of independent professional judgement. Id- at 1202-
~D37" Margulies is important in its discussion'of the interests to be balancedbya Court fa^edlvithT 
motion to disqualify: the interest of the htigant in having counsel of his choice, and the interests of 
clients and the public in the integrity of attorneys and the legal system Id. at 1204 (citation 
omitted). All of these interests are obviously at stake in this case. 
Timeliness of the Motion to Disqualify 
Margulies is also helpful in disposing of Mr. Griffith's last complaint, that the timing of the 
filing of the Motion to Disqualify reflects bad faith. Opposition at 7-8. Margulies demonstrates 
that parties must file motions to disqualify as soon as they become aware of the fiill effects of the 
conflicts of interest. 696 P.2d at 1201. 
As the affidavits of J. Franklin Allred and Janna GriflBth demonstrate., the Motion to 
Disqualify Robert M. McDonald was filed only when it became apparent that the motion was 
necessary. While Mr. Allred had initially hoped that such a motion would not be necessary, the 
statement of Mr. GriflBth to Mrs. Griffith concerning his attorney's intimate knowledge of Mr. 
Allred, followed by Mr. McDonald's affidavit referring to a non-existent discovery agreement and 
Addendum p. 94 ^ ^ ^ _ P
 000773 
to a non-existent "long association" with Mr. Allred, have brought Mr. Allred to the sad 
conclusion that the Court must intervene to prevent further improprieties from occurring. 
As the affidavits of Mr. Allred and Mrs. Griffith further affirm, neither Mrs. Griffith nor 
Mr. Allred have any interest in prolonging the litigation, or in distracting the Court from the 
merits of this case. Mrs. Griffith has been timely in all of her filings in this case, and it appears 
that the merits of this case will redound to Mrs. Griffith's benefit. 
The Motion to Disqualify Robert M. McDonald was filed in good faith and should be 
granted. 
Respectfully submitted this l^fttyAJIrtL ffite 
Allred 
Attorney for Mrs. Griffith 
Respectfully submitted this TJ^T day of •^hM'O&V^ . lffifl> . 
EdWaf d K. Brass 
Attorney for Mrs. Griffith 
CERTIFICATE OF MAftJfWC/DELIVERY 
<z+<sf«£ to be 
I hereby certify that I mailed/delivered a copy of the foregoing to Robert M. McDonald, 
McDonald and West, 3269 South Main, #270, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84115 this * ^ day of 
gfi*»«».x . <*+A. 
Dated this Qdf day of January, 1996. 
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Robert M. McDonald (2175) 
McDonald & WEST 
Jennifer P. Lee (6765) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
3269 South Main. Ste. 270 
Salt Lake Citv. Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801)485-5500 





DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 






ROBERT M. McDONALD 
Civil No. 944300281 DA 
Judge John A. Rokich 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Robert M. McDonald, being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
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1. I am an attorney at law licensed to practice in the State of Utah and represent 
Defendant/Counterclaimant (hereinafter "Defendant") in this proceeding. 1 have personal 
knowledge of all facts stated herein except as to those facts expressly designated to be based 
upon information and belief. 
2. I was admitted to the practice of law in the State of Utah in October. 1996. 
44raverbeeirccmtimiously-eiigaged'in therpracticeof law-iirtheState of Utah^since t^hat-date^ 
3. During the period October, 1966 to March, 1969, I was employed as an 
associate in the law firm of Worsley, Snow and Christensen (now Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau). During the period of my employment, the vast majority of all domestic 
relations cases accepted by the firm were referred to me. 
4. During the period March. 1969. to April. 1985. I was employed by the firm oi 
Jones. Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. At the time of the termination of my employment 
in April, 1985.1 was a senior shareholder in the firm. During the period of my employment 
with Jones. Waldo. Holbrook & McDonough. all domestic relations cases accepted by the 
tirm were rcterred to me for prosecution or defense. 
5. Since April, 1985, I have been engaged in the sole practice of law or practice 
in partnership with Hershell Bullen (1986-1993) and Suzanne West (1993-1996). 
6. Since April, 1995, approximately 70% of my practice involves the prosecution 
and defense of domestic relations cases and I hold myself out to the public as a specialist 
in divorce, annulment and custody cases. By reason thereof, I am intimately familiar with 
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the standard of care, custom and practice generally followed by attorneys in the State of 
Utah and domestic relations cases. 
7. In November, 1994, Defendant engaged me to represent him in the instant 
action. A copy of my entrance of appearance is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
^^^^^-SiiKe^HiHdertakfflg^ha^^pfesentati^ 
expended 324.1 hours in performing said legal services; Jennifer Lee has expended 15.50 
hours in performing said legal services; Joseph F. Orifici has expended .25 hours in 
performing said legal services: and, Frances Palacios has expended 6.5 hours in performing 
said legal services. The nature of the service performed, and the amount of time 
attributable to each service, is itemized on the attached Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein 
by reference. As noted therein, the billings for legal services total $47,366.50 as of the date 
of this affidavit. 
9. On the basis of my experience in the prosecution and defense of domestic 
relations cases, all of the sen ices described on Exhibit "B" were reasonable and necessary 
to adequately represent Defendant and protect the interests of Defendant and the time 
devoted to each service is fair and reasonable. The hourly rate for such services is $140 per 
hour and said hourly rate is fair and reasonable in light of my experience in the field of 
domestic relations law. The hourly rate for the services of Jennifer Lee is $85 per hour and 
said hourly rate is fair and reasonable in light of her experience in the field of domestic 
-3-
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relations law. The hourly rate for services performed by Joseph Orifici is $100 per hour and 
said hourly rate is fair and reasonable in light of his experience in the field of domestic 
relations law; the hourly rate for services performed by Frances M. Palacios is $100 per 
hour and said hourly rate is fair and reasonable in light of her experience in the field of 
domestic relations law. 
W?*^ Durrngi:hexourse^fm^ 
and expenses which are itemized on the attached Exhibit "C" which is incorporated herein 
by reference. All of the costs and expenses noted on Exhibit "C" were necessary in order 
to property protect the interests of my client in this action and the amount of each charge 
is fair and reasonable. As noted therein, the billings for costs total $3,123.96 as of the date 
of this affidavit. 
11. On the basis of my experience in the practice of domestic relations law in the 
State of Utah, it is the generally accepted standard to consider the size of the marital estate 
and the complexity of the issues as a material factor in determining the nature and quantity 
of legal service which is prudent to bring the matter to conclusion; to accurately inform the 
client as to his/her rights and obligations in order to avoid the client formulating unrealistic 
expectations which would preclude a reasonable resolution of the dispute; taking all 
necessary measures to avoid any unnecessary animosity between the parties (especially when 
children are involved); to make good faith efforts to resolve issues with opposing counsel 
before expending the legal service necessary to bring the matter before the Court; and, 
-4-
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avoiding the filing of frivolous or unnecessary motions which would needlessly increase the 
cost of litigation. 
12. On the basis of my involvement in this litigation, 1 am appalled by the manner 
in which attorney John Franklin Allred has handled the case. He has knowingly and 
willfully violated each and every aspect of the standard of practice noted in the preceding 
ptrrmtfapir^^ t^Ptefatiffttf Defendant "Hiifl thcrthildreit bonr 
to the parties, Mr. Allred created unrealistic expectations on the part of Plaintiff that she 
would leceive a large block of Christenson & Griffith stock; she would receive alimony and 
child support payments in excess of $3,000; that Defendant was attempting to evict her and 
the children from the family home; that any settlement proposals made by Defendant in 
sums less than Plaintiffs expectations should be summarily rejected. 
13. All attempts to settle the case, or resolve selected issues in the case were 
summarily rejected. In this regard, Mr. Allred stated that any settlement offer which did 
not involve an alimony and child support payment in excess of the amount stated in the 
temporal") order were unacceptable. 
14. Plaintiffs attorney filed a barrage of frivolous and unnecessary motions which 
required me to respond thereby unnecessary and substantially increasing the cost of this 
litigation. I respectfully request the Court to take judicial notice of the Court file which will 
reveal the extent in frequency of the unnecessary and frivolous motions. In this regard, I 
specifically request the Court to observe the following: 
-5-
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Mr. Allred filed numerous frivolous motions to strike memoranda and 
affidavits during the course of the litigation. In light of Plaintiffs continuous 
threats of criminal prosecution if Defendant did not comply with her 
demands, I requested Mr. Allred to stipulate to a protective order prior to 
responding to his written discovery in order to facilitate the discoxery process. 
MrrAITTgd^ose^^ 
and hearing. With full knowledge as to the reasons for my withholding 
disanery until a protective order was entered, Mr. Allred filed a motion to 
compel requiring responsive memoranda and hearing. At the hearing on the 
motion for protective order, the Court granted the order and I stipulated to 
the motion to compel. 
On January 4. 1996, Plaintiff moved the Court to disqualify me as Defendant's 
attorney on the grounds that I had "represented Mr. Allred (not Plaintiff) 15 
years ago. There was no factual or legal basis for the motion, but said motion 
required me to prepare memoranda and appear at a hearing in order to resist 
the motion. 
On December 28, 1995, Plaintiff moved for an order of contempt on the 
grounds that Defendant was paying alimony directly to Plaintiff rather than 
through Defendant's employer. At no time prior to the motion had Plaintiff 
-6-
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voiced any complaint whatsoever concerning the direct payments which were 
current at that time. 
On December 28, 1995, Plaintiff moved the Court to find Defendant's 
attorney in contempt for failing to deliver three exhibits taken in a deposition. 
In response to the memorandum, I produced three letters, all preceding the 
motion^ whereirr V hadn3ffered^to^d^hVer^^g^bif s^^^fee^sep^TSre' 
occasions. 
Plaintiff refused to produce documents expressly identified in document 
requests previously served upon Plaintiff. Plaintiffs refusal resulted in 
Defendant being required to file a motion to compel on December 15, 1995. 
Defendant's motion was granted. 
Shortly after I entered the case, I sought a motion to amend the pleadings on 
January 31, 1995, only four months after the case had been filed/ In such a 
situation, every attorney with whom I have dealt in the past has stipulated to 
motions to amend in the early stages of the proceeding. However, Mr. Allred 
vigorously resisted the motion requiring memoranda and hearing. 
During the course of the first trial on March 13, 1996, after being fully 
advised as to the occurrence and details of a telephone conversation between 
Judge Rokich and Paul Griffith, Mr. Allred unequivocally waived any 
objection to the communication. However, apparently dissatisfied with 
-7-
Addendum p. 102. 
0015V 
evidentiary rulings made by Judge Rokich, on the second day of trial Mr. 
Allred demanded a ruling that Paul Griffith's testimony was irrelevant as a 
condition to Judge Rokich continuing to preside oxer the trial. This tactic 
required Judge Rokich to recuse himself from the case, thereby wasting an 
entire da\ of trial and requiring duplicative preparation for the second trial. 
•fc iVhetrifte^cfu^ 
Alfred's bad faith disruption of the trial, Plaintiff filed an appeal as of right 
with full knowledge that the order was not a final order. This appeal required 
me to file a motion to dismiss the appeal. After I had expended the time to 
prepare the motion to dismiss, Mr. Allred voluntarily dismissed the appeal 
acknowledging the lack of merit. These are only a few examples of the 
fiivolous motions filed for the purpose of unnecessarily increasing the cost of 
this litigation. 
15. The Court file will reveal Mr. Allred's continual practice of raising collateral 
motions requiring a substantial expenditures ot legal services on collateral matters distracting 
the time and attention from the relevant issues involved in the litigation. 
16. On the basis of my knowledge and experience in the field of domestic relations 
law, the maximum cost and attorneys fees which should have been expended in full 
prosecution and defense of this case should not have exceeded, at the maximum, $20,000. 
In this regard, the Court should note that both parties are salaried employees, thereby 
-8-
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removing the necessity existing in many cases to determine the income and expenses of a 
self-employed party. All of the factors bearing on custody of the children were undisputed 
thereby relieving the parties from discovery with respect to the best interests of the children 
and no such discovery was conducted. There was no dispute as to property values inasmuch 
as Defendant accepted Plaintiffs opinions as to personal property values. Defendant readily 
produced ^ veiy-document^req^^ 
Defendant and his employer have produced documents far beyond relevant issues. On the 
basis of these circumstances, the case was relatively simple and attorneys fees in excess of 
$20,000 is unreasonable and the direct result of Mr. Allred's obsession with the irrelevant 
issues and the barrage of frivolous and unnecessary motions. 
DATED on this 1U day of August/199* 
Rpbert M. McDonald 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of August, 1996. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
1
 The only motion to compel arose from Plaintiffs refusal to stipulate to a protective order and to take 
delivery- of documents which had been proffered prior to the motion to compel. 
-9-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this IU day of August, 1996,1 caused to be hand delivered, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT M. McDONALD to 
the following: 
J. Franklin Allred 
321 South 600 East 
-Salr£al^€ityrutarr84101 
a \\pdo-*«.^i'Hith a'l^ mini 
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Robert M. McDonald (2175) 
McDONALD & WEST 
Attorneys for Defendant 
The Hermes Building 
455 East 500 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-0999 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Delendant 





[ APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL 
Civil No. 944300281DA 
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs 
Robert M. McDonald and McDONALD & WEST hereby enter their appearance for 
and on behalf of Defendant and Counterclaimant David Gary Griffith. 
DATED this 3U day of November, 
ONALD & WEST 
Lobert M. McDonald 
A , , , . ^ Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^&_ day of November, 1994,1 caused to be mailed, U.S. 
mail, postage prepaid, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing APPEARANCE OF 
COUNSEL.to. the_following named-persons: 
Bruce L. Richards 
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES 
1805 South Redwood Road 
P<fsTOmee-Bor2578fr 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84125-0786 
C:\wpdata\gri\APP.COU 
J. Franklin Allred, P.C. 
32TSputh 600 East 
/Salt liake City, Utah 84102 
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Conference with client 
Memorandum to file 
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IMONTH 
DECEMBER, 1994 
B*^rs>-^»«»t»'Tt^g'u.' r»j&m j^^ g»7r*g i^fe 
JTOTAL 
DESCRIPTION 
Telephone conference with client. 
Review and analysis of documents delivered by 
client; correspondence to client 
.Conference with client;^telephone.conference, with^ 
accountant; preparation of interrogatories; . - • . 
preparation of document requests. 
Correspondence to opposing attorney. 
Telephone conference with client 
Conference with Client. 
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Review of discovery requests; correspondence to 
client 
Telephone conference with client 
Telephone conference with client regarding 
discovery requests; review of discovery requests 
Review^ of answer fi]?dJ^prec^ 
"telephone conference with client; Telephone \ " ~ 
conference with opposing counsel, preparation of 
Motion to Amend Answer; preparation of 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend 
-Answer^preparation^Amended^ 
Conference with client; preparation of responses 














Review of new materials provided by client; 
telephone conference with client; telephone 
conference with client; telephone conference with 
Hal Swenson; completion of Answer to 
Interrogatories 
Telephone conference with Hal Swenson; 
supplement answer to Interrogatories. 












Preparation of Motion to Compel and Supporting 
Memorandum. 
Preliminary review of discovery request, 
correspondence to Client. 
Conference with Client regarding discovery 




















Conference with client. 
Telephone conference with opposing attorney 
Telephone conference with client and opposing 
counsel. 
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[MONTH i 
JUNE, 1995 
TOTAL _ _ _ 
DESCRIPTION 
Review of file, preparation of Settlement proposal 
Conference with Client regarding Settlement letter 
Conference with Client, revision of Settlement 
letter. 












Nothing incurred this month 
HOURS 1 
9 








Conference with Client, preparation of Protective 
Order, preparation for hearing. 
Preparation of Supplementary Responses to 
discovery 
Preparation for hearing on Motion to Compel. 
Appearance at hearing on Motion to Compel in 
Tooele. 
Review of documents delivered by Client, 
telephone conference with opposing attorney, 
jelepio^e_cojnferencej^ith4client 
Conference with Client. 
Preparation of Amended Answers to 
Interrogatories, conference with client, 
correspondence to opposing counsel. 
Conference with Jennifer re: preparation for 
deposition. 
Conference with client, appearance at deposition 
of Plaintiff and Client. 






















Preparation of objection to proposed discovery 
order 
Telephone conference with client, telephone 
conference with opposing counsel regarding 
client's mother deposition. 
Telephone conference with client. 















Preparation for meeting with deposition witnesses. 
Meeting with witnesses including travel 
Appearance at deposition of Naomi Griffith, Ken 
Christenson, Ron Christenson, Christenson & 
Griffith, Gary Griffith, including travel. 
Conference.with client and client's parents. 
In deposition, find references to FASIO and 


















Preparation of affidavit in opposition to contempt 
motion. 
Review and revise affidavit, preparation of 
memorandum in opposition to motion for 
contempt. 
Preparation of research memorandum to Jennifer 
regarding definition of "income" for alimony 
purposes. 




Summary and indexing of Plaintiffs deposition. 
Itemization of documents to be produced by 
Plaintiff and telephone conference with opposing 
attorney. 
Preparation of motion to compel production of 
documents and supporting memorandum. 
Telephone conference with opposing counsel 
demanding production of documents. 
Legal research. Is the limitationperfaming to 
child support income as regards to income from a 





















Correspondence to Ken Christenson outlining 
document inspection objectives. 
Preparation for hearing on contempt citation. 
Appearance at hearing on contempt motion, 
including travel. 
Summary and indexing of client's deposition. 
Summary' and indexing of client's'deposition. 
Telephone conference with opposing counsel, 
correspondence to opposing counsel, preparation 
"of affidavitr preparation "of Motion^ttf^compet; 
preparation of interrogatories and document 
requests, preparation of motion to shorten time to 
respond to interrogatories and documents 
requests, review of Plaintiffs deposition and 
summary, preparation of memorandum in support 
of motion to compel. 
Preparation of notice of deposition of Mountain 
.America Credit Union and University of Utah 
Employees Credit Union, preparation of 
Subpoena's Duces Tecum. 
Completion of indexing and summary of Client's 
deposition. 
Preparation of motion in limine and supporting 
memorandum to exclude evidence of "side jobs". 
Legal research, completion of memorandum in 
support of motion in limine, telephone conference 
with client, telephone conference with Ken 
Christenson, preparation of affidavit of client. 
Review of additional legal research by Jennifer 
Lee, revision of Memorandum in Support of 
Motion in limine. 

















 n _ . _ 
[TOTAL 
Research: Identify and locate a Utah case 
supporting the proposition that divorce is an 









Preparation of memorandum in opposition to 
second and third contempt motions, preparation 
of reply memorandum regarding client's motion to 
compel, preparation of affidavits for Defendant. 
Correspondence to opposing attorney regarding 
Christenson Deposition exhibits. 
Telephone conference with opposing attorney, 
preparation of motion to extend time to respond 
to motion to disqualify, preparation of affidavit. 
Review and analysis of Plaintiffs motion to 
disqualify-and-accompanying affidavits^ 
Conference with client, Gary Griffith, preparation 
of affidavits. 
Research memorandum to Jennifer Lee, 
conference with Jennifer Lee. 
Preparation of Memorandum and supporting 
affidavits. 
Preparation of affidavits for Gary and David 
Griffith 
Review of legal research by Jennifer Lee, revision 
of memorandum. 
Conference with clients to review and sign 
affidavits 
Preparation of Motion and memorandum for 
sanctions with respect to motion to disqualify 
Correspondence to opposing attorney regarding 
visitation. 
Review of research by Jennifer Lee, preparation 
of reply memorandum in support of motion in 
limine. 
Preparation for hearing on motion to compel and 





















Preparation for hearing on motion to disqualify. 
Appearance at hearing on motion to compel, 
motion for sanctions, motion to disqualify. 
Preparation of orders reflecting decision on 
motions to compel, motion for sanctions, motion 
to disqualify. 
Revision of Order. 
Legal research regarding Rules of Professional 















Response to Motion to Strike Reply 
Interoffice memorandum to Jennifer Lee 
Correspondence to Court, preparation of response 
to objection to order. 
Telephone conference with John-Allred 

















Preparation for trial 
Conference with client, appearance at document 
inspection with Ken Christenson, preparation for 
trial 
Preparation for trial 
Preparation for trial. 
Preparation for trial. 
Appearance at document inspection with Ken 
Christenson, preparation for trial. 
Conference with'cKent and witnesses, preparation 
for trial. 
Conference with Ken Christenson, revision of trial 
memorandum, preparation for trial. 
Conference with witnesses, preparation for trial. 
Appearance at trial including travel. 
Appearance at trial including travel. 
Preparation of motion and supporting 
memorandum and affidavit regarding attorney fees 
Research: Find case law supporting the 
proposition that, for purposes of property division 
in a divorce action, it doesn't matter whose name 
is on the title to real property. 
Organize file for trial. 
Intervivos gift from parents of one spouse during 
the marriage is the separate property of that 
spouse. 
Research: What case law or statute might 
encourage Judge Rokich to reconsider his decision 
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Reorganization of file and exhibits. 
Review and revision of client's witness outline for 












Telephone conference with court clerk, telephone 
conference with client. 
Organization of exhibits. 
Review of minute entry, preparation of revised 
order of recusal, preparation of findings, 
conclusions and judgment. 
Conference with Court. 
Preparation for trial. 
Review of Plaintiffs motion and memorandum to 
strike minute entry, legal research, preparation of 
memorandum in opposition to motion to strike 
minute entry. 
Preparation of memorandum in opposition to 
motion to reopen discovery. 
Review of legal research, preparation of 
memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs 
objections to findings, conclusions and judgments. 
Preparation of affidavits, preparation of affidavit 
of Robert M. McDonald, preparation of motion to 
bifurcate, preparation of memorandum in support 
of motion to bifurcate, revision of memorandum 
in support of objections to findings and 
conclusions. 
Preparation for hearing. 
Appearance at pre-trial hearing including travel. 
Review of minute entry, memorandum to file. 
Research: Find case support for the proposition 
that attorneys fees can be awarded for bad faith 






















Research: When is a discrepancy between a 
minute entry and the signed order not an error, 
prerogative of writing attorney to fill in details 
consistent with the judge's intent. 
Review documents, notice of appeal, etc; review of 
appellate rules 
Research: Issue of whether order for attorney's 
fees is a final judgment. 
















Review and analysis of Plaintiffs motion for relief 
from judgment, review of petitioner's motion for 
stay of enforcement of judgment, preparation of 
memorandum in opposition to motion for relief 
from judgment, preparation of memorandum in 
opposition to motion to stay enforcement of 
judgment. 
Preparation of motion to strike Plaintiffs notice to 
submit. 
Memorandum to Suzanne West regarding 
enforcement of judgment. 
Review and analysis of notice of appeal. 
Intra-office consultation with Frances Palacios. 
Review and analysis of legal research performed 
by Frances Palacios. 
Preparation of motion for summary disposition of 
appeal. 
Preparation of motion for costs and attorneys fees 
on appeal with supporting affidavit. 
Review and analysis of Petitioner's Interlocutory 
Appeal, preparation of Motion to dismiss petition 
for interlocutory appeal. 
Research: Time constraints for filing an 
interlocutory appeal under Rules 4 and 5 of the 





















Review of motion to strike client's motion for 
summary disposition and preparation of outline of 
response. 
Preparation of motion and memorandum to pay 
over cash bond. 
Telephone conference with Gary Griffith 
regarding subpoenas. 
Review of Plaintiffs motion to reopen discovery, 
legal research on grounds for quashing deposition 
subpoena, conference with Gary Griffith. 
Preparation of Notice of deposition of Paul 
Griffith, correspondence to opposing attorney. 
Preparation for appearance at status conference 
Appearance at status conference including travel 
Preparation for trial. 
Review of documents relating to side effects of 
Paul Griffith's medication, revision of Paul Griffith 
witness outline. 
Conference with client and Paul Griffith regarding 
deposition. 
Appearance at deposition of Paul Griffith 
Preparation of response to objection to deposition 
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I MONTH 
AUGUST 1-16, 1996 
TOTAL 
DESCRIPTION 
Telephone conference with Gary Griffith 
Preparation for trial. 
Conference with client. 
Revision of trial memorandum, preparation for 
trial. 
Preparation for trial 
Appearance at trial including travel 
Appearance at trial including travel 
Revision of exhibits and witness outlines with 
respect to updated information concerning 
property values and income, preparation for trial. 
Preparation of closing argument, telephone 
conferences with witnesses, preparation foi trial. 
Review of Exhibits, appearance at trial including 
travel, conferences with client. 














TOTAL TIME FOR ROBERT M. McDONALD 324.1 HOURS 
TOTAL TIME FOR JENNIFER LEE 15.50 HOURS 
TOTAL TIME FOR JOSEPH ORIFICI .25 HOURS 
TOTAL TIME FOR FRANCES PALACIOS 6.50 HOURS 
a \wpdocs\gntfith\costs2 mem 
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I MONTH 
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| MONTH 















Long distance telephone 
TOTAL i 
.14 I 
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1 MONTH 
OCT06ER, 1995 
1 DESCRIPTION j 
Postage 
Telephone 
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[MONTH 
1 JANUARY, 1996 
DESCRIPTION 
nothing charged 
TOTAL " l 
15 












Travel to Tooele 
Copies and research 
from University of 
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TOTAL COSTS $3,123.96 
a \wpdocs\gnffith\costs mem 
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SI FEB 10 £MH: 13 
FILED RY JLs 
Robert M. McDonald (2175) 
Attorney for Defendant 
3269 South Main, Ste. 270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 485-5500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




DAVID GARY GRIFFITH, 
Defendant. 






DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 944300281DA 
Judge Lee Dever 
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Lee A. Dever, District Judge, on 
August 7, 8 and 13, 1996. Present at said hearing were Plaintiff and her attorney, John 
Franklin Allred and Defendant and his attorney Robert M. McDonald. On August 9, 1996, 
Plaintiff made a Motion to Reopen her Case. A Notice to Submit on that issue was filed 
with the Court on September 3, 1996. On September 27, 1996, the Court denied Plaintiffs 
001747 
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Key Bank (secured by first mortgage on Marital Domicile); AT&T; First Card Visa; 
Citibank Visa; Key Preferred Line; Key Bank Visa; Key Credit Line. 
24.) Defendant shall pay and discharge the following indebtedness and indemnify Plaintiff, 
and save Plaintiff harmless with respect to the claims of the following creditors: 
Aline Griffith (Defendant's grandmother, secured by a second mortgage on the 
Marital Domicile) and Key Bank Silver Mastercard; and Dr. Olsen. 
25. Any debt or other obligation not described in the preceding paragraphs, incurred 
after September 14,1994, shall be paid and discharged by the party who incurred the 
debt and the party incurring the debt shall indemnify the other party, and save the 
other party harmless with respect to the claims of said creditors. 
26. Plaintiff and her attorney, John Franklin Allred, are hereby ordered to forthwith 
deliver to Christenson & Griffith the Houghlihan Report and any and all copies 
thereof. Plaintiff and her attorney, John Franklin Allred, are hereby enjoined from 
disclosing the contents of the Houghlihan Report to any other person or entity. 
27. Subject to the provisions of the following paragraphs, each party shall be solely 
responsible for the payment of their respective costs and attorneys fees incurred in 
the prosecution and/or defense of this action. 
28. Plaintiff and her attorney, John Franklin Allred, shall pay and discharge the costs and 
attorneys fees stated in the judgment heretofore entered by the Court on May 24, 
1996, in the principle sum of $4,542. The judgment entered by the Court on May 24, 
-9- 00173U 
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A That!s correct. 
2 I Q Mr. Allred, since the recess of the trial, have you 
3 had an experience with your daughter, Brianne? 
4 MR. ALLRED: Are you asking me that, Mr. McDonald? 
5 MR. MCDONALD: No, Ifm asking the witness. 
6 THE WITNESS: I have. 
7 MR. MCDONALD: Ifm sorry if I said Allred. 
8 Q BY MR. ALLRED: Mr. Griffith, did you have a 
9 conversation with your daughter Brianne concerning a • 
10 cheerleader outfit? 
11 A Yeah, my daughter's been gone for about three 
12 weeks. I had her return home and 
13 Q When did this conversation take place? 
14 A It took place yesterday. 
15 MR. ALLRED: I'll object. It's hearsay, Your 
16 Honor. 
17 THE COURT: It is hearsay, Mr. McDonald. 
18 MR. MCDONALD: Your Honor, I am offering it as a 
19 statement of the mental intent of the child. I don't I'm 
20 not offering it for the truth of the matters stated, but 
21 mainly stating her mental intent at the time of the incident. 
22 Therefore, it would follow as an exception to the hearsay 
23 rule. 
24 MR. ALLRED: Irrelevant, immaterial and hearsay, 
2 5 I Your Honor . Addendum p. 157. 0 0 " C 3 i 
1 THE COURT: What relevance does it have to 
2 anything? 
3 MR. MCDONALD: It goes to accounting for child 
4 support. 
5 MR. ALLRED: I think it would incompetent as well, 
6 Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Mr. McDonald, I don't see how it fits 
8 nor do I see how it's relevant. 
9 MR. MCDONALD: It shows the child support money is 
10 not going to the children. 
11 THE COURT: Well, that is to make the assumption 
12 that a cheerleading outfit is a necessary expense that the 
13 parent should have to provide for their child. 
14 Q BY MR. MCDONALD: Has Brianne been selected to be a 
15 cheerleader at her school? 
16 A She has. 
17 Q And are you aware that it's necessary she buy a 
18 cheerleader outfit? 
19 MR. ALLRED: I'll object. It calls for conclusions 
2 0 he may or may not know. 
21 THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. You can 
22 answer, Mr. Griffith. 
23 THE WITNESS: I do know that. 
24 Q BY MR. MCDONALD: During this incident did she ask 
25 you to purchase part of the cheerleading outfit? Q C C 8 j 0 
~~~~ Addendum p. 158. 
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1 MR. ALLRED: Objection. Hearsay, Your Honor. 
2 Irrelevant. 
3 THE COURT: He can answer whether or not he was 
4 asked to provide help in purchasing a cheerleader outfit. 
5 THE WITNESS: She returned home from Bear Lake two 
6 days ago 
7 THE COURT: Thatfs a yes or a no answer. Did she? 
8 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
9 Q BY MR. MCDONALD: Did you make a determination at 
10 that time as to what you would have to do in order to get her 
11 the cheerleader outfit? 
12 MR. ALLRED: Objection. Leading. Irrelevant. 
13 MR. MCDONALD: Foundation, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Let's let it in. 
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, I made the determination. She 
16 came to me, I asked her if she had asked her mother for the 
17 money. She said yes. 
18 MR. ALLRED: Objection. Hearsay. 
19 THE COURT: Sustained. 
2 0 Q BY MR. MCDONALD: Just listen to my question, Mr. 
21 Griffith, so that we don't get into a problem. On the basis 
22 of whatever she told you, did you contribute to the 
23 cheerleader outfit? 
24 A I did. 
25 Q Did your mother contribute to the cheerleader^ o Q " () 
Addendum p. i:>V. 
25 
1 outfit? 
2 MR. ALLRED: Objection. Hearsay. 
3 THE WITNESS: She did. 
4 THE COURT: He can testify whether or not his 
5 mother contributed. Thatfs not hearsay. 
6 MR. ALLRED: I'll object. There's no foundation. 
7 He's incompetent to testify. He's incompetent to testify to 
8 that fact as something the mother may have done, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Well, he can testify he did. If he was 
10 there when she did it, he can testify. 
11 THE WITNESS: I was there when she did it. I took 
12 her up to get the money from my mother. 
13 Q BY MR. MCDONALD: Then you supplemented it? 
14 A Then I supplemented it, yes. 
15 MR. MCDONALD: No further questions. 
16 THE COURT: Do you have anything on this, Mr. 
17 Allred? 
18 MR. ALLRED: Not specifically on this, Your Honor, 
19 but due to the lateness of the hour I did have some 
20 examination that I forewent because it was maybe 7:30 and I 
21 had just a few that would have been not to this question, but 
22 would have been the other cross. If the Court doesn't want 
2 3 me to do that I won't. 
24 THE COURT: What does it go to, Mr Allred? 
25 MR ALLRED- Well, Exhibit 167, I'd just like to 
1 r
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Q BY MR. MCDONALD: Is this the source of the 
2 I information concerning Janafs claimed living expenses that 
3 you considered? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Did you determine there were categories of expenses 
6 not supported by the documents you inspected? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q Would you identify the category of expenses which 
9 were not supported by the documents you examined? 
10 A Maintenance of home and yard. 
11 Q And what did you find with respect to that? 
12 A Fifty dollars in 1994 and $93 a month in !95. 
13 Q Okay. Were there other categories that in 
14 reviewing the check records you found there was no 
15 documentation for in living expenses? 
16 MR. ALLRED: I'll object. It's leading, Your 
17 Honor. 
18 THE COURT: I'll allow him to lead. 
19 MR. ALLRED: I'll also object it calls for a 
20 conclusion because how can he look at someone else's 
21 documents and conclude what they may or may not support? 
22 THE COURT: If he can testify as to whether there's 
23 any documents to support this that she's issued here. She 
24 can testify that they do and that's for the Court to 
25 determine. 0 0 2 7 J ( 
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Q BY MR. MCDONALD: What were the other areas where 
2 I you found no support for the claimed living expenses? 
3 A Food and housing. 
4 Q What was the total expenditures you found for food 
5 and you mean food and household supplies? 
6 A Yes, excuse me. 
7 Q What was the total expenditures you found for food 
8 and household supplies in 1994? 
9 MR. ALLRED: I'll object to that, Your Honor, 
10 unless he's got a summary of every document he looked at so 
11 that we can compare those with the 
12 THE COURT: You can ask him that on cross 
13 examination, Mr. Allred. 
14 Q BY MR. MCDONALD: What was the amount in 1994? 
15 A Two hundred and thirty three. 
16 Q What was the amount in 1995? 
17 A Four hundred and thirty seven. 
18 Q How about automobile fuel, oil, tires, licensing. 
19 Where she claimed one fifty, what did you find there? 
20 A In 1994, $17, and '95, $29. 
21 Q With respect to the category of automobile 
22 maintenance where she claims $70, what did you find with 
23 respect to actual expenditures in '94 and '95? 
24 A I found none. 
25 THE COURT: For what was that? Automobile ypA^rr^ C • " 
I Addendum p. 162, v ^ ~ » J ° 
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1 THE WITNESS: Automobile Expense Maintenance. 
2 Q BY MR. MCDONALD: There were no checks or credit 
3 card charges showing that; is that right? 
4 A Not that I found. 
5 Q On Automobile Depreciation, is that an actual cash 
6 outlay? 
7 A It's not. 
8 Q It's just a bookkeeping entry; is it not? 
9 A Right. 
10 Q On charitable contributions where she claimed $50 
11 in excessive tithing, what did you find with respect to that? 
12 A I didn't find anything that would justify the $50 a 
13 month in excess. 
14 Q Was that in both '94 and '95? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q In '95 did you not find $25 a month? 
17 A In '95 I found $25 a month, that's correct. 
18 Q I take the category "Children's School Lunch" where 
19 she claimed $146 a month, did you find what did you find 
20 with respect to that in 1994 and 1995? 
21 A In 1994 I found $29, in '95 I found none. 
22 Q None? 
2 3 A None. 
24 MR. ALLRED: I'm sorry, Your Honor. 
2 5 MR. MCDONALD: Children's School Lunch. OO^'I^Jj 
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1 THE WITNESS: Twenty nine dollars. 
2 Q BY MR. MCDONALD: With respect to the orthodontist 
3 where she claimed $50, what were the total expenditures in 
4 1994? 
5 A I found $30 in both years, 
6 Q Prescriptions, where she claimed between her and 
7 the children, $95 per month, what was the total expenditures 
8 for 1995? 
9 A 1995 I found $54. 
10 Q She has a category "Medical Insurance" and her 
11 paycheck stub shows $53 a month, did you observe that? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Does David have health insurance through C & G 
14 which covers the children? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q What is the cost to David for this insurance? 
17 A Nothing. 
18 Q To the extent of the portion of Jana's premium 
19 attributable to the children, is this duplicative coverage? 
20 A Yes. 
21 MR. ALLRED: No foundation. Motion to strike. 
22 You've got to compare the policies to see whether or not it 
23 is, Your Honor. This witness can't conclude that on the 
24 basis of anything he's seen. 
2 5 THE COURT: This is on medical or dental? ^
 n 0 .^  ^  / 
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MR. MCDONALD: This is on medical insurance for the 
children. 
3 THE COURT: I think he can testify as to what Mr. 
4 Griffith has and he can testify as to what he observed that 
5 she has deducted to. Whether or not it's appropriate it be 
6 there is a question for the Court to determine and for an 
7 expert in medical claims. 
8 Q BY MR. MCDONALD: Are you familiar with the general 
9 coverage under David's policy for the children? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Describe that coverage. 
12 A It's 80/20 plan where the defendant would pay - we 
13 pay everything after $100 and after the deductible's met and 
14 then he can get he'd have to get at least 20 percent 
15 Q What is the deductible? 
16 A One hundred dollars. 
17 Q So after one hundred dollars there's a co-pay of --
18 
19 A Twenty percent up to $3 00 maximum per child. 
20 Q And what is the co-payment after $300? 
21 A Nothing. 
22 Q Total coverage? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And that's currently in effect? 
2 5 | A I e S . r* s\ r\ I— *~i ' 




























With respect to laundry and dry cleaning where she 







In 1994 I found $5, in 1995 I found $13. 
With respect to car insurance where she claimed 
did you find? 
I found $45 per month both years. 
I ask you to examine 170, did she note in the 








In any event you confirmed the $4 5? 
Yes. 
Not any $90? 
Correct. 
MR. ALLRED: Which years were those? 
MR. MCDONALD: '94 and '95. 
BY MR. MCDONALD: On miscellaneous expense where 






At my request did you determine the total family 
expenditures for all categories of family expense in 1995? 
what cate 
MR. ALLRED: I'll object, Your Honor, it determines 
gories and family expenses there are. 
THE COURT: I think he can testify that he reviewed 


































BY MR. MCDONALD: You reviewed her documents to 
the total expenditures for family expenses in 1995? 
Yes. 
And what did you find was the total expenditure? 
$2,700 a month. 
As controller of C & G are you familiar with the 







employees and the amount thereof? f 
Yes. f 
What are the factors that are considered? J 
It depends on how well Christensen and Griffith 
year. 
Is there any guarantee that David Griffith or any 




MR. ALLRED: Object. Self serving, speculative. 
THE COURT: He can answer the question. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
BY MR. MCDONALD: If a bonus is declared is there 




At my request have you determined the amount of 
bonuses paid to David Griffith for the years 1990 through 
1996? Addendum p. 167. CO^'i L? JL 
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1 Q Now do you know the amount of the premium 
2 attributable to the children? 
3 A Do I know? 
4 Q Yes. 
5 A I've had $15 deductible and they're 
6 Q That isn't what I asked you. Listen. The premium 
7 for $58 per month, do you know much of that premium is 
8 attributable to the coverage for the four children as opposed 
9 to yourself? 
10 A I do not. 
11 Q You have dental insurance also on the paycheck, do 
12 you not? 
13 A I do. 
14 Q And that's $37 a month. 
15 A Right. 
16 Q Are you aware that dental is also covered on 
17 David's policy? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q I ask you to examine what has been marked as 
20 Exhibit 170, which was Exhibit K to your deposition, and ask 
21 you if that was your statement of living expenses as of the 
22 date of your deposition in August of 1995? 
23 A This is what we tried to go through and estimate 
24 from my checks. 
2 5 Q And you prepared that document, did you not? p p Q H ,; , , 
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1 A Right. 
2 Q So we can take the lunch money entry of $146 off 
3 your living expenses? 
4 A No, 'cause I still have to do that and that does 
5 not includes - I don't know if that includes the money I have 
6 to give to the girls. That was for the checks 
7 Q Well, that's another category of Children's 
8 Expenses. My question is your children 
9 MR. ALLRED: I object, Your Honor, and ask that he 
10 let the witness answer the question. 
11 THE WITNESS; I thought we were talking about lunch 
12 money. 
13 THE COURT: She's answered. She says she doesn't 
14 give them lunch money, she prepares lunches for them. 
15 THE WITNESS: I do and I do give them lunch money 
16 some of the time. 
17 Q BY MR. MCDONALD: But basically you provide lunch 
18 rather than give them lunch money. 
19 A Right. So then that would have to go in 
20 Q Just answer my question and we'll get through this 
21 quicker. 
22 A Only part of the time. 
23 Q Tithing and charitable contributions, do you see 
24 that entry there? 
25 A I do. 0 0 2 7 4 b 
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1 Q Is this an LDS tithing? 
2 A It is. 
3 Q Isn't it under your belief the reason you pay that 
4 is that it should be a financial sacrifice on your part? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Do you believe it's fair to assess David the amount 
7 of your tithing so that you can pay it? 
8 MR. ALLRED: I'll object to that, Your Honor. 
9 Those are her monthly living expenses. 
10 THE COURT: She can testify as to what she does 
11 with her money. That's what this list is, Mr. McDonald. 
12 Whether or not it should be included or not is what I decide. 
13 MR. MCDONALD: I think her view on it, Your Honor, 
14 is important in helping you decide. 
15 Q BY MR. MCDONALD: Doesn't obtaining tithe money 
16 from David for you to pay your tithing defeat the purpose of 
17 tithing? 
18 MR. ALLRED: I'll object, Your Honor. Totally 
19 irrelevant. 
2 0 THE COURT: It's argumentative. 
21 Q BY MR. MCDONALD: In any event, tithing is a 
22 voluntary payment on your part? 
23 A Right as David testified to. 
24 Q I want to talk to you a moment about automobile 
25 insurance. You note there $70 a month or $840 a year, is 
Addendum p. 170. Q0274 i 
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1 that right? 
2 THE COURT: Is this on a different**exhibit*thariTthe 
3 one I'm looking at, 170? 
4 MR. MCDONALD: This is on Exhibit 132, plaintiff's 
5 living expenses. This is Mr. Allred!s. 
6 Q BY MR. MCDONALD: You see automobile maintenance of 
7 $70 per month? 
8 I A So now we're going back up to automobile 
9 maintenance? Okay. 
10 Q See that there? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q And your car's a 1991 model car, is it not? 
13 A Right. 
14 Q Do you know of any reason why there were no 
15 expenditures in 1995 for automobile maintenance? 
16 A Some of them were on my credit card and some of 
17 them were cash. 
18 Q You paid cash for automobile maintenance? 
19 A I did. 
2 0 Q Will you find us the ones that are on your credit 
21 card for automobile maintenance? 
22 A I don't know that I have those. 
23 Q We have all your credit card statements here. 
24 Would you see if you can find anything for automobile expense 
25 or maintenance? 
I Addendum p. 171. Q Q 2 7 4 o 
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1 Automobile depreciation. Do you see that on your 
2 schedule? 
3 A I do, 
4 Q That's not money you pay out every month, is it? 
5 A No. 
6 Q And yard maintenance. Do you see that on your 
7 schedule? 
8 A I do. 
9 Q Isn't is a fact you have a 50 percent interest in a 
10 sit down lawnmower which is available at your brother-in-
11 law's house next door? 
12 A I haven't been able to use it, only my children 
13 have been able to use it. 
14 Q My question is do you have a 50 percent ownership 
15 interest in that lawnmower? 
16 A David and I do. 
17 Q Okay. 
18 A When it works. 
19 Q Then answer that yes or no. 
2 0 A Yes. No. 
21 Q That is available to you or at least to your 
22 children to do the lawn? 
23 A Not available to me. 
24 THE COURT: She's answered the question, Mr. 
25 McDonald. Please go on. 
Addendum p. 172.
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These were the pages from the answers to interrogatories that 
were admitted by the Court for 10 and we talked about 
stapling them. 
May the record show I gave Mr. McDonald four pages -
they're six, seven, twenty six and twenty seven. I111 give 
the clerk those four pages and ask that they be stapled. 
Would the Court like those as part of this exhibit, otherwise 
it wouldn't have a complete exhibit. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. MCDONALD: Your Honor, there was one item Ms. 
Griffith was going to look up and I'd like to call her to the 
stand on that one item, and also a little follow up on what 
the Court did on the Court's questions which I thought were 
good. I want to be sure we've got the right items. 
Would you take the stand please, Ms. Griffith? 
FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MCDONALD: 
Q Ms. Griffith, during the lunch hour were you able 
to obtain the documentation showing purchases of school 
clothes in September '95? 
A I (inaudible) and locked the doors. 
Q So you haven't got that? 
A Not yet. 
Q Now the Judge was asking you to describe the couch, 
loveseat and chair that you say is worth $200. That is the 
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1 I Q So he had quit sleeping outside wherever he was and 
2 left the premises then? 
3 A Right. 
4 Q Did he give you the $3,000 or $4,000 that he 
5 normally gives you to start the children for school? 
6 A He did not. 
7 Q He didn't do that before he left? 
8 A No. 
9 MR. ALLRED: No further questions. 
10 THE COURT: You may step down. 
11 Call your next witness please. 
12 MR. MCDONALD: Call Naomi Griffith. 
13 NAOMI GRIFFITH, 
14 having first been duly and legally sworn, was 
15 examined and testified on her oath as follows: 
16 THE CLERK: Please be seated. State and spell your 
17 name, please. 
18 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
19 BY MR. MCDONALD: 
2 0 Q State your name? 
21 A Naomi Griffith. 
22 Q Spell your name. 
23 A N-A-O-M-I G-R-I-F-F-I-T-H. 
24 Q Ms. Griffith, would you tell us your relationship 
25 I with the defendant in this action? 
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1 I support as opposed to the allergy medicines that you talked 
2 about, or the allergy physicians, what was one needing 
3 glasses? What else? Have they asked you for clothing? 
4 I A All the time. 
5 Q They ask your parents for clothing? 
6 A Yes. I think Jana testified to that earlier that 
7 the children did ask them for it before. 
8 Q Have you made any observations when you see them in 
9 the clothing that they're in with respect to how the money is 
10 being used that you're paying for child support? 
11 A Yes. We talked about that when they come over and 
12 they're just saying that they cannot get the clothing they 
13 need. 
14 Q Have you and your parents had to buy clothing? 
15 A Yes we have. 
16 Q Have you and your parents had to take them to 
17 allergy doctors? 
18 A I have taken them all both times, yes. 
19 Q Do these observations that you've described cause 
2 0 you concern? 
21 A Very much so. 
22 Q What is your concern? 
23 A I'm concerned that she is not doing the care that 
24 they need or deserve and trying to put me in the middle. 
25 Q Is it your request that the Court require plaintiff 
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to provide some sort of accounting for child support 
expenditures to assure that medical, clothing, and other 
items are taken care of. 
A I just want whatfs best for my children. Yes, I 
do. 
Q Mr. Griffith, what debts have been incurred at the 
time of the entry of the temporary order on September 27, 
1994? 
A To date or then? 
Q Then. There was the indebtedness to Key Bank on 
the first mortgage on the family home; wasn't there? 
A Yes, that is correct. 
Q There was indebtedness to your grandmother, Alene 
Griffith; wasn't there? 
A Yes. 
Q Those are two of them? 
A Yes. 
Q Do we have the pay off amounts? I want to ask you 
about that. Do you accept your former wife's representation 
as to the amount of indebtedness to your grandmother? 
A I do. She had the records and we stated earlier if 
that's what it is, I have no reason to doubt it. 
Q You anticipate the necessity of incurring further 
indebtedness in the immediate future? 
A Say that again. 
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